UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-2007

Inner experience during golf performance
Yani L Dickens
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Dickens, Yani L, "Inner experience during golf performance" (2007). UNLV Retrospective Theses &
Dissertations. 2760.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/a043-lepf

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that
is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to
obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons
license in the record and/or on the work itself.
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

INNER EXPERIENCE DURING GOLF PERFORMANCE

by

Yani L. Dickens
Bachelor o f Arts
University o f Nevada Reno
1999

Masters o f Arts
University o f Nevada Las Vegas
2004

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Department of Psychology
College of Liberal Arts

Graduate College
University of Nevada Las Vegas
December - 2007

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 3301768

Copyright 2008 by
Dickens, Yani L.

All rights reserved.

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
UMI Microform 3301768
Copyright 2008 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 E. Eisenhower Parkway
PC Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Dissertation Approval
The Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

November 8

The Dissertation prepared by
Yani L. D ic k e n s
Entitled

In n er E x p e r ie n c e D uring G o lf Perform ance

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
D o cto r o f P h ilo s o p h y i n P sy c h o lo g y

K\ I

/

E xam ination C om m ittee Chair

D ean o f the G raduate College

E xam ination C o m m ittee M em ber

E xam ination C o m m ittee M em ber

G raduate College F acu lty R epresentative

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20®^

ABSTRACT
Inner Experience During Golf Performance
by
Yani L. Dickens
Dr. Russell T. Hurlburt, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Psychology
University o f Nevada Las Vegas
Sport performance is widely believed to depend on internal processes that occur during
performance. Studies examining these processes have relied on retrospective self-reports
obtained long after performance, a method limited by athletes’ abilities to compete and
recall. Our study circumvented these problems by obtaining contemporaneous non
retrospective reports o f inner experience using Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES).
DES uses a device that emits a random beep via an earpiece. Participants record ongoing
inner experience immediately after the beep in a notebook. Within 24 hours participants
are interviewed about these momentary experiences. Five highly-skilled (handicaps of
between 2 and 7) and five moderately-skilled (handicaps between 13 and 26) golfers
competed in an experimental tournament. DES was used to examine inner experience
during golf. G olf inner experiences consisted o f golf-related content, mental preparation
strategies, perceptual awareness, and inner speech most prominently. Unsymbolized
thinking, sensory awareness, feeling, and speaking aloud were also present. Inner
experience during golf was also found to be individually different. Golf-related content
and mental preparation strategies may be positively related to performance.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Sport Psychology Literature Review
That golf is a mental game is widely recognized but only partially understood.
Conventional lore suggests that successful performance in sport is determined both by
physical and mental factors; in golf, success is thought to be determined even more by
mental processes than in other sports. As the prominent sport psychologist Bob Rotella
(1995) puts it, “at least half the battle occurs inside the golfer’s mind” (p. II).
Professional golfer Tom Kite speculates “the game is 80 percent or 90 percent mental”
(Rotella, 1995, p. 15). The fundamental assumption of what it takes to be successful in
golf is clear. As golfer Sam Snead puts it “G olf is a game played on a six inch course the space between your ears!” (Kirshenbaum, Owens, & O ’Connor, 1998, p. 271). Thus it
is commonly held in sport in general and golf in particular that successful performance
depends on mental processes.
The notion that successful performance depends on mental processes is pervasive
throughout the field of sport psychology with one notable addendum: Sport psychology
focuses on emotional (e.g. arousal and anxiety, stress and coping) as well as on mental
processes. The presence o f emotions in sport is exemplified by the cliché o f the athlete
who “chokes” under the pressure o f a competitive situation due to excessive arousal and
anxiety. Thus the regulation o f internal processes including emotions (Hanin, 2000;
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Hardy, 1996a; Lazarus, 2000; Meyers, Whelan, & Murphy, 1996) and cognitions (Hardy,
1996a; Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996; Meyers, Whelan, & Murphy, 1996; Williams &
Leffingwell, 2002) is a need recognized by researchers and laypeople alike.
Our understanding o f what it takes to be successful in athletic performance, and golf
for that matter, is far from thorough. One reason for this is the fact that studies examining
internal processes have strongly relied on methodologies with two main sources of
potential error: (1) they use retrospective self-report obtained after performance; and (2)
they rely on athletes’ abilities to compete and, simultaneously, to attend, process, encode,
store, and later retrieve inner experiential phenomena. Competing effectively and
simultaneously remembering aspects o f inner experience is a difficult combined task.
These potential sources o f error coupled with the demands required by retrospective selfreport about remote processes that occur in the midst o f complex task performance call
into question hundreds of sport psychology studies that suggest an understanding of
internal processes and threaten the effectiveness o f performance enhancement
interventions. As Meyers and colleagues (1996) cautioned, “the failure to engage in
assessment or the poor fit between assessment strategies and intervention raises serious
concerns about this applied work” (p. 157).
Equally troubling is the fact that many basic scientific questions about the
relationship between internal processes and sport performance remain unanswered
largely because they are seldom directly and explicitly examined. For instance, what
internal processes or inner experiences occur during golf? Are inner experiences during
golf emotional, cognitive, motivational, sensory, perceptual, directed toward behavior,
directed toward emotional regulation, directed toward others, directed toward self,
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simple, complex, organized, disorganized, present, or absent? How consistent are inner
experiences during golf? Do they vary within individuals? Do they vary across
individuals? Are they related to external experiences? Are they independent o f external
experiences? Are they related to the individual’s behavior? Are inner experiences related
to quality o f performance? In those rare instances where these questions have been
addressed, they have been examined deductively by quantitative approaches aimed at
assembling support for pre-existing theories by using narrow measures o f discrete
phenomena assumed to exist during performance. Inductive qualitative explorations that
suspend pre-existing theoretical assumptions have seldom been conducted on internal
processes in natural performance environments.
Methods are available that largely circumvent the inherent limitations o f retrospective
self-report. These methods may provide answers to basic scientific questions about the
relationship between internal processes and sport performance. One of these methods is
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES).
The current study seeks to provide preliminary answers to basic questions about inner
experience in sport and to provide directions for further study in sport performance by
circumventing many of the problems inherent within retrospective and theory-driven selfreports obtained well after performance. DES provides this by 1) obtaining
contemporaneous non-retrospective reports o f inner experience and 2) training
participants extensively to attend to, process, encode, store, and later retrieve and report
the phenomena o f their inner experience. The current study thus proposed a direct
approach to exploring internal processes during performance, consistent with the
recommendations of Burton and Naylor (1997), which will subsequently be discussed.
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The purpose o f this study is to understand these processes more completely and to begin
to address the aforementioned basic questions.
Prior to discussing the course of action used for this study, two topics will be
addressed. First, the empirical basis for the existing assumptions in the field o f sport
psychology, such as that o f the connection between particular internal processes and
optimal performance, will be summarized with an emphasis on work conducted in golf.
Next, we will summarize the rationale behind proposing a qualitative exploration o f
internal processes during sport performance using DES by describing methods that have
been widely used to sample inner experience. Once these topics have been examined, we
will describe the methods used in the current study to explore the internal processes that
occur during golf performance.
Internal Processes and Athletic Performance
Qualitative and, most frequently, quantitative methods have been used to investigate
the relationship between internal processes and athletic performance. Research has
sought to understand the relationship between sport performance and cognitive processes
such as self-talk, attentional focus, imagery, as well as self-confidence and self efficacy.
Research has also examined the relationship between sport performance and emotional
processes such as anxiety and arousal, stress and coping, anger and aggression, mood
states, and additional emotions. In both cases, hardly any research has explored internal
phenomena without relying on retrospective self-reports focusing entirely on expected
phenomena. This may shape our sense of which inner experiences occur in sport, how
frequently they occur, and how they influence performance. Thus existing research has
assessed phenomena in sport indirectly, retrospectively, casually, and deductively, so
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existing knowledge about these phenomena may be tenuous. To illustrate this, existing
research on cognitive and emotional processes in sport will be critically reviewed.
Research on emotion in sport will be reviewed first, followed by research on cognition in
sport, and finally recommendations for future research examining the internal processes
that occur during performance will be provided.
Emotion & Sport Performance
“Brad had begun to fear his driver.... In stressful situations, on narrow driving holes,
he tightened up and lost his rhythm. If he mishit a driver..., all the energy left his body”
(Rotella, 1995, pp. 133-134). As this depiction o f a struggling professional golfer
illustrates, emotional phenomena have been thought to have considerable influence on
sport performance. Considerable empirical attention has been devoted to the relationship
between anxiety and/or arousal and sport performance; stress and coping have also been
examined by sport psychology researchers, as have anger and aggression, mood states,
and several additional emotions. These domains o f emotional phenomena related to sport
performance will be reviewed with a general emphasis on major findings and specific
emphasis on findings in the sport o f golf. It will become evident from this review that
almost no studies have been conducted that directly assessed emotional phenomena,
despite the existence o f methods that can accomplish this. Instead, empirical
investigations o f emotion in sport have generally avoided the direct assessment o f
emotional phenomena in favor o f casual retrospective self-report measures.
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Anxiety & Arousal
Conventional wisdom and sport lore have posited two contradictory notions of
anxiety and arousal. Excessive anxiety is believed to cause athletes to “choke” under
pressure. The contrary is illustrated by the athlete or team whose overconfidence and
minimal arousal allows the underdog to pull off an upset. Thus conventional speculations
leave one with the notion that anxiety and arousal may be excessively low or high but
debilitating either way.
Within the field o f support psychology, empirical attempts have been made to
understand the anxiety and arousal-performance relationship and to manage anxiety and
arousal prior to and during performance. An optimal level of arousal is assumed to be one
of the fundamental preconditions to successful athletic performance. Nonetheless,
theoretical models o f arousal have not consistently attained empirical support.
Conceptual vagueness, complexity, and heterogeneity have plagued explanations o f
arousal. Although optimal levels o f arousal have been posited, research findings have
failed to support several explanations o f arousal consistently (Whelan, Epkins, & Meyers,
1990).
Research on the anxiety and arousal-performance relationship has used several
definitions for these constructs. Gould and Krane (1992) defined arousal as physiological
and psychological activation which exist on a continuum from deep sleep to extreme
excitement. The term anxiety was used to refer to the cognitive and emotional aspects of
arousal (Gould & Krane, 1992). Hanin (2000) specified several subtypes o f anxiety in
sport performance. Cognitive anxiety was used to refer to negative thoughts about
performance, whereas somatic anxiety included the bodily symptoms of autonomic
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reactivity associated with nervousness. Anxiety has also been viewed along a social
dimension. Vallerand and Blanchard (2000) suggested that emotions such as anxiety may
involve intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences. Interpersonal consequences
included emotional impact on thoughts (e.g., worry), motivations (e.g., approach or
avoidance), health (e.g., immune system seems to mediate the stress and illness
relationship), and sport performance (e.g., may depend on state anxiety level). Anxiety
was seen as interpersonal, when it influences the relationship between two specific group
members (e.g., an emotional display catches on). Thus in the context of a team, the
individual may experience interpersonal state anxiety. Finally, Spielberger’s state-trait
conceptualization (see Spielberger & Diaz-Guerrero, 1986) was extended to performance
anxiety to differentiate situational from characterological anxiety, respectively. Thus
competitive state anxiety was used to refer to the specific state o f anxiety in a given
competition (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996).
Zaichkowsky and Takenaka (1993) advocated the use of the term intensity as a
multidimensional construct for the physiological, cognitive, and behavioral processes that
perform an energizing function. Taylor and Wilson (2002) preferred the term intensity to
avoid the pathological connotations o f anxiety and the sexual connotations o f arousal.
There are two problems with this label. First, arousal and anxiety have been more
commonly used. Second, intensity may potentially be confused with severity.
The most recent definitional trends in arousal and anxiety research are; 1)
Researchers have more recently used arousal as a multidimensional construct that
includes both psychological and physiological components (Gould & Udry, 1994; Gould
& Krane, 1992) with either facilitative and debilitative connotations. 2) Intensity is a
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recently recommended term that is nonetheless seldom used among researchers. Taylor &
Wilson (2002) recommended that practitioners and researchers use the term intensity with
athletes and coaches to avoid misunderstanding. When used by researchers, intensity has
had connotations more similar to those of arousal than anxiety. 3) Anxiety related to
performance has been seen as a multidimensional construct with several subtypes (e.g.,
state-trait) and manifestations (e.g, cognitive, somatic, performance, interpersonal) with
debilitative connotations. Thus anxiety, arousal, and intensity have all been proposed as
multidimensional constructs related to the emotion and energy level in sport performance.
4) Researchers have advocated better distinction among these constructs but have failed
to provide consistent and mutually exclusive definitions. Hardy and colleagues (1996)
defined arousal as “cognitive and physiological activity which takes place in response to
some new input to the system” (p. 118). Anxiety was defined as “a meta-cognitive
emotion” (p. 119). For instance Hardy and colleagues believed that “doubts about one’s
ability to cope with a given stressor are likely to be reflected in feelings o f anxiety” (p.
141). More simply, arousal was seen as a mental and bodily process, whereas anxiety
was seen as a mental and emotional process. Both contain cognitive elements, but
arousal was seen as more physiological whereas anxiety was seen as more emotional.
Raglin & Hanin (2000) used a similar definitional strategy. Anxiety was used to refer to
an emotional reaction to stress, whereas arousal was used with more physiological
connotations.
Due to the conceptual similarity between arousal and intensity, only one term will be
used in the present study. Because arousal was more traditionally and frequently used
within the sport psychology literature, intensity will be abandoned in favor o f using
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arousal. Thus for the purposes o f the present study, anxiety’ and arousal will be used as
multidimensional constructs with physiological, cognitive, and emotional manifestations.
The only difference that will be evident is that arousal will have a slightly greater
physiological emphasis, whereas anxiety will have a slightly greater emotional emphasis,
consistent with the work o f others (Hardy et al., 1996; Raglin & Hanin, 2000).
Theories. Sport psychology has a rich theoretical tradition. In no area is this more
evident than with the continual development and refinement o f theories regarding the
anxiety and arousal-performance relationship. Several theories and conceptual models
have emerged to explain the relationship between arousal and athletic performance.
Descriptive models include drive theory, the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis, optimal zones of
functioning, multiple dimensional anxiety theory, reversal theory, and catastrophe theory.
Historically, the anxiety and arousal-performance relationship was evaluated by single
physiological or self-report measures. More recently however, the relationship has been
examined along multidimensional lines with multiple measures targeting state-trait
anxiety, cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and physiological arousal. Drive Theory, the
Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis, the State-Trait perspective. Optimal Zones o f Functioning
Theory, Multidimensional Anxiety Theory, Catastrophe Theory, and Reversal Theory
will be reviewed to discuss how arousal and anxiety have been studied in relation to sport
performance. From this review, it will become evident that studies that have examined
arousal and anxiety have relied on self-reported ratings o f arousal and anxiety rather than
samples o f immediate inner experience. Since no studies could be found that have
examined immediate inner experience during sport performance, little is known about the
actual experience o f anxiety and arousal during sport performance. Thus the existing
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knowledge about the relationship between anxiety/arousal and performance will be
reviewed.
Drive Theory. Drive theory (Hull, 1943; Spence & Spence, 1966) is one o f the earlier
and simplest approaches to the study o f the relationship between arousal and
performance. Drive theory hypothesized that the quality o f performance increases along
with increasing levels o f arousal. This simple positive linear relationship was later
contradicted by research findings. For instance, as arousal increases beyond a moderate
level, quality of performance decreases (Robazza, Bortoli & Nougier, 1998). Drive
theory has long since been rejected because o f a lack supporting evidence (Raglin &
Hanin, 2000) and its failure to account for the dynamics o f arousal related to the
performance o f complex motor tasks (Gould & Krane, 1992).
Yerkes -Dodson Hypothesis. The Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis, sometimes referred to as
the Yerkes-Dodson law, is the most widely recognized explanation o f the arousalperformance relationship (Taylor & Wilson, 2002; Weinberg, 1990). Yerkes and Dodson
hypothesized an inverted-U relationship between arousal and performance in 1908. At
low levels o f physiological arousal, performance typically suffers. As levels o f arousal
increase however, improved performance follows. This increase in the quality o f
performance begins to decline as arousal levels become exceedingly high. Oxedine
(1970) applied the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis to sport performance and suggested that
the level o f optimal arousal, although usually moderate, was different for different motor
tasks (e.g., fine or gross). In the 1970s this relationship was extensively studied with
initially supportive results. Several later failures to demonstrate its predictive validity
however relegated the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis to a well known historical artifact, and

10
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it is more typically used as a general descriptive model (Gould & Krane, 1992).
Exceptions to the model emerged as studies found that as arousal increases, performance
declines dramatically in an irreversible manner, where as the inverted-U hypothesis
suggests that simply decreasing arousal would improve performance. Further criticisms
o f the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis include the lack o f support for its premise (Fazey &
Hardy, 1988; Gould & Krane, 1992), lack o f support for Oxendine’s (1970) distinction
between different arousal levels for different tasks (Krane & Williams, 1994), and the
failure to take into account individual differences in coping with competitive stress
(Fazey & Hardy, 1988; Raglin & Hanin, 2000; Raglin & Turner, 1993; Taylor & Wilson,
2002). Thus, however logically appealing it may be, the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis has
failed to receive consistent empirical support for its application to athletic performance
(Gould & Krane, 1992; Taylor & Wilson, 2002).
State-Trait Perspective. Spielberger applied a state-trait theory to anxiety, which has
been extended to arousal (Spielberger & Diaz-Guerrero, 1986). State anxiety refers to
transitory levels o f arousal which vary across the contextual situations an individual
encounters. Trait anxiety is the predisposition for perceiving situations as threatening.
Thus anxiety can be described as both a mood-like state and a personality trait. Several
self-report anxiety inventories have been widely used in the study o f arousal, including
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), the Sport Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT),
which measures trait anxiety, and the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI),
which measures state anxiety (Gould & Krane, 1992).
Optimal Zones o f Functioning Theory. The Soviet sport psychologist Yuri Hanin
posited the optimal zones o f functioning theory in 1980. Based on Hanin’s observations

11
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that regardless o f sport, some athletes performed best at very low levels of anxiety and
others at very high levels (Taylor & Wilson, 2002), this theory suggests that no single
optimal level of state anxiety leads to optimal performance for all. Anxiety appeared to
be a more important factor on the individual level than the group level (Raglin & Hanin,
2000). Hanin’s method uses observations o f performance and assesses individual state
anxiety using instruments such as the STAI and the CSAI (see Pons, Balaguer, & GarciaMerita, 2001) to facilitate the identification o f an individual zone of optimal functioning
(IZOF).
According to Gould and Krane ( 1992), the high degree o f individual variability in
state anxiety scores commonly found in studies with different athletic subgroups makes it
unlikely that a simple (e.g., moderate) universal level of arousal exists. In addition to
differences among individuals within a sport for the same task, the level o f arousal
required for successful performance across tasks such as golf and football may be quite
different. For instance, Boutcher and Zinsser (1993) found that both elite and beginning
golfers exhibited significantly decelerated heart rate, a sign o f physiological relaxation
(Raglin & Hanin, 2000), during short and long putting performance, whereas elite golfers
showed significantly more deceleration than beginning golfers. By contrast, Secunda,
Blau, and McGuire (1986) found that aggressiveness in football, among other factors,
predicted ability, which seems consistent with higher physiological arousal. Indeed,
interventions aimed at elevating arousal have enhanced performance significantly more
on strength tasks (Tynes & McFatter, 1987), endurance, and sprinting compared to tasks
requiring more technical skill, timing, speed, and balance (Gould & Udry, 1994; Meyers
et al., 1996).

12
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In any event, IZOF theory suggests that individual differences should be taken into
account and assessed prior to interventions that manage arousal (Raglin & Turner, 1993).
The benefits o f this model are evident by the process o f establishing the IZOF using
multiple sources o f data from both recall and direct observational methods. Objective
(e.g., golf scores) and subjective (e.g., satisfaction with score) measures o f performance
can also be used. In addition, Hanin’s method is widely used and has recently being
improved. This approach was modified slightly by Pons and colleagues (2001) to
improve accounting for individual differences by using a graphical method o f
establishing IZOFs with highly skilled (handicap under 8) junior golfers. Although the
sample was small (N = 6), results indicated more golfers performed better using the
graphical method o f establishing IZOFs when compared to Hanin’s previous (direct and
recall) methods.
Several studies have supported the optimal zones o f functioning theory by showing
that athletes have performed more effectively within respective pre-established IZOFs
when compared with athletes whose arousal levels fall outside o f the IZOF (Gould &
Krane, 1992; Raglin & Turner, 1993). Nevertheless, the IZOF theory has been criticized
for failing to explain the etiology o f individually different levels of anxiety and arousal
(Gould & Tuffey, 1996; Jones, 1995), for its obsolete narrow and one dimensional view
o f anxiety and arousal (Jones, 1995; Taylor & Wilson, 2002), for reliance on
retrospective report (Taylor & Wilson, 2002), for significant results but small effect size
(Russell & Cox, 2000), and for over-reliance on the STAI, which is not sport specific
(Jones, 1995). Many o f these issues have been addressed by using revised and sport
specific anxiety measures (Jones, 1995) and by showing memory concerns related to

13
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retrospective report may be exaggerated (Taylor & Wilson, 2002). Recent studies appear
to reflect a broader view o f the IZOF as it has been extended to additional emotional
phenomena. Unfortunately, this extension has been extremely indirect. For instance, Ruiz
and Hanin (2004) examined the use o f symbolic metaphors used to prepare karate
athletes for competition, which were similar to additional emotional phenomena (e.g.,
happiness, pride, relief, anger, anxiety, fright, sadness, and shame). Metaphors that
reflected high readiness to perform were associated with best performance, whereas
metaphors reflecting low readiness to perform lead to worst performance. Thus, evidence
suggests that an individual optimal level o f arousal, as measured by anxiety
questionnaires, is plausibly related to optimal athletic performance, although these
phenomena have been measured quite indirectly. The current study attempted to measure
the actual inner experience o f processes such as these more directly by interrupting
participants during performance.
Multidimensional Anxiety Theory. Multidimensional anxiety theory emphasizes the
importance of the physical and mental elements of anxiety. Davidson and Schwartz
(1976) proposed two subcomponents o f anxiety - cognitive and somatic anxiety.
Cognitive anxiety is conceptualized as awareness o f unpleasant feeling whereas somatic
anxiety refers to physiological arousal. Somatic anxiety has been measured via
biofeedback (e.g., heart rate, galvanic skin response, cortisol) and even by self-report,
although the validity and reliability o f the latter has been criticized because responses
may be distorted by social desirability, demand characteristics, social and experimental
expectations, reactivity (Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1989; Hackfort &
Schwenkmezger, 1993; Raglin & Hanin, 2000). Cognitive anxiety is typically
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characterized by negative concerns, inability to concentrate, and disrupted attention,
whereas somatic anxiety includes directly assessed or perceived bodily symptoms of
anxiety or perceived autonomic arousal (Krane & Williams, 1992). Thus excessive
cognitive anxiety is thought to be distractive and therefore should interfere with
performance. Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith (1982, 1990) applied the
multidimensional theory to athletic performance by suggesting that cognitive and somatic
anxiety were related to athletic performance. The multidimensional theory suggested that
cognitive anxiety is negatively related to performance whereas somatic anxiety forms an
inverted-U relationship with performance (Jones, 1995). One o f outgrowth o f this theory
was the development o f the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2) and its
short form (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1998). The CSAI-2 measures cognitive anxiety,
perceived somatic anxiety, and state confidence with sport performance.
Research in the multidimensional tradition has supported several factors that may
influence the cognitive-somatic anxiety and performance relationship. Competitive
experience was associated with increased cognitive anxiety, and trait anxiety was
correlated with increased somatic anxiety for wrestlers (Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg,
1984). Examining these factors in golf, Krane and Williams (1986) found competitive
trait anxiety predicted both cognitive and somatic anxiety, whereas how well an athlete
performed in the past predicted somatic anxiety. Unfortunately, evidence o f moderating
variables has excessively relied on indirect measures, which extend even beyond
limitations o f self-report. For instance, cognitive and somatic anxiety was found to be
greater for individual than team figure skaters and lower for those later in birth order
(Martin & Hall, 1997). Birth order was taken as indirect evidence of differential parental
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expectations and socialization processes for first bom versus later bom children, which
might lead to differing anxiety levels. Results indicated that later bom athletes had less
cognitive and somatic anxiety in the team event relative to the individual event, but the
interpretation that this is due different contextual developmental factors (e.g., parental
expectations, socialization processes) seems to extend well beyond what was directly
measured (birth order).
Studies examining the relative influence o f cognitive and somatic anxiety on athletic
performance have yielded extremely mixed results. One the one hand, studies have
demonstrated that, compared to cognitive anxiety and confidence, somatic anxiety was a
better predictor o f athletic performance. For instance, Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, and
Vevera (1987) examined pistol-shooting performance and anxiety using the CSAI-2.
Cognitive anxiety was unrelated to performance, confidence was negatively related to
performance, and somatic anxiety was related to performance in a curvilinear (invertedU) fashion. By contrast, Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, and Plake (1986) found the opposite
with male college swimmers; that is, cognitive anxiety was a significant performance
predictor whereas somatic anxiety was not. Further mixed evidence was found as state
confidence was the strongest predictor o f female collegiate golf performance (Krane &
Williams, 1987). On the other hand, a meta-anlaysis of 29 studies using the CSAI-2 by
Craft, Magyar, and Becker, (2003) indicated weak support for the relationship among
performance and the CSAI-2 subcomponents cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and
confidence. In addition, several studies failed to find any relationship between the CSAI2 subcomponents and performance (Craft et al., 2003).
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Krane, Williams, and Feltz (1992) administered the CSAI-2 to 100 female college
golfers prior to first-round and prior to second-round competition at a golf tournament.
The purpose o f this study was to test a multidimensional theoretical model that suggested
that competitive trait anxiety and precompetitive cognitive anxiety significantly
influenced pre-first round state confidence. Results o f a path analysis indicated, not
surprisingly, that past performance was the best predictor o f actual performance.
However competitive trait anxiety and precompetitive cognitive anxiety influenced
baseline state confidence. First round cognitive anxiety predicted pre-first round state
confidence. In addition, first round state confidence predicted pre-second round cognitive
and somatic anxiety, both of which in turn predicted pre-second round state confidence.
Thus the authors suggested that reciprocal relationships were found between stateconfidence and cognitive and somatic anxiety; however none o f these processes
influenced first-round performance expectations whereas past average score did.
Performance expectations predicted cognitive anxiety, providing partial support for the
multidimensional model.
In summary, the dynamics o f anxiety and arousal during sport performance have been
examined by studies from the multidimensional theory perspective. Although consistent
empirical support for the multidimensional model has been lacking, a few studies have
provided supportive findings for this theory (Gould & Krane, 1992; Krane & Williams,
1992), two o f which used golfers (Krane & Williams, 1986; 1992). The continued used of
the CSAI-2 and efforts to improve it may strengthen this theoretical model. Furthermore
as Baron and Kenny (1986) noted, “most areas o f psychology... treat phenomena that
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have multiple causes” (p. 1176). As such, multidimensional models such as this one are
logically appealing, albeit in need o f much improvement.
Less optimistically speaking, multidimensional theory studies appear to be more
invested in testing theoretical models by asking for ratings of bodily and cognitive
anxiety before and after but never during performance. This is problematic for many
reasons that will later be discussed. But a major problem arises from asking participants
to report retrospectively about anxiety and arousal because this assumes that; 1)
participants had an inner experience related to anxiety and arousal; 2) they were aware o f
it; 3) they encoded in their memory; and 4) they later retrieved it without problem despite
the possibility that participating in sport performance and simultaneously remembering
inner experience for future self-report is a difficult combined task. Rather than focusing
on the actual experience of arousal and anxiety related to sport performance, these studies
are subject to the limitations of retrospective self-report. To overcome these problems,
the current study attempted to measure the actual inner experience o f processes such as
these by interrupting participants during performance.
Catastrophe Theory. Catastrophe theory is a multidimensional nonlinear approaeh to
conceptualizing sport performance with roots in systems theory. This theory was applied
to sport performance to account for apparently contradictory findings. For instance, one
study found that performance improved in cognitively anxious individuals before
competition when both somatic anxiety (e.g., reported) and physiological anxiety (e.g.,
directly measured) were low (Parfitt & Hardy, 1994). Several studies have shown mixed
positive and negative effects with somewhat higher somatic and physiological arousal
when cognitive anxiety was high (see Parfitt, Jones, & Hardy, 1990). Catastrophe theory
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accounts for these findings by applying a nonlinear model that explains the dynamics of
three factors: 1) physiological arousal, which can be measured directly instead o f via selfreport; 2) cognitive anxiety, which is measured via self-report; 3) and performance,
which can be measured by objective observation (Hardy, 1996a; Hardy et al., 1996).
Cognitive anxiety is thought to mediate the relationship between physiological arousal
and performance: 1) The Yerkes-Dodson relationship between physiological arousal and
performance is thought to exist when cognitive anxiety is low. Thus a moderate level of
arousal facilitates performance; 2) When cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal both
reach a moderate point called the critical threshold, bifurcation point, or cusp, two
opposite levels o f performance are possible - optimally high or drastically low. At the
bifurcation point, the path that performance takes is analogous to the pitchfork, which is
determined by the exact level o f physiological arousal (Hardy et al., 1996). As cognitive
anxiety (or physiological arousal) surpasses this critical point, performance descends
catastrophically. Once this point has been reached, “it can only be reversed by a
considerable reduction in physiological arousal beyond the point where the original
decrement in performance occurred” (Hardy et al., 1996, p. 152). This is not predicted by
continuous theories, which suggest the immediate reversal o f performance from positive
to negative would occur with decreased cognitive anxiety and/or physiological arousal; 3)
When physiological arousal is already high, a simple negative correlation between
cognitive anxiety and performance is predicted to exist, indicating that cognitive anxiety
interferes with performance; 4) Finally, when physiological arousal is low, a positive
correlation is expected to occur between cognitive anxiety and performance (see Biddle,
1995; Hardy, et al., 1996).
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Hardy ( 1996a) compared two slightly different multidimensional models, one without
and one with self-confidence, to three similar versions o f catastrophe theory in eight
experienced golfers. Cognitive and somatic anxiety were measured using the CSAI-2,
and physiological arousal was measured using heart rate during golf putting performance
in a tournament. Using multiple regression, the proportion of variance in putting
performance accounted for by the first respective multidimensional anxiety theory model
was 5%, which was not statistically significant. When self-confidence was added to the
second multidimensional model, 7% o f the variance in performance was accounted for,
which was significant. The three catastrophe models accounted for 57%, 57%, and 58%
of the variance in performance, and self-confidence did not add to the proportion of
variance accounted for. Confidence was found to be at least partially independent o f
cognitive anxiety. In any event, support was found for both models, and results strongly
favored catastrophe models. In 2004, Hardy, Woodman, and Carrington found evidence
supporting a moderating role for self-confidence in a catastrophe model o f anxiety using
male golfers. In a low self-confidence condition when somatic anxiety was low (i.e., “my
body is relaxed), cognitive anxiety (i.e., “worry”) was negatively related to performance
as predicted. In a high self-confidence condition, an interaction resulted between
cognitive and somatic anxiety - cognitive anxiety (i.e., “worry”) was more positively
associated with performance when somatic anxiety was high than when low. The worst
performance, however, resulted from the high self-confidence, high cognitive, and low
somatic anxiety condition (i.e., “confident and worried” but “body is relaxed”), an
unpredicted finding logically difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, emerging evidence
suggests self-confidence may moderate the anxiety and performance relationship.
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A critical response to Hardy’s anxiety theory and the use o f the CSAI-2 in general
was presented by Burton and Naylor (1997), who suggested that current theories and
related measures confound anxiety with “positive affective states, such as challenge,
excitement, or self-confidence” and may have mislabeled these phenomena as facilitative
anxiety. In fact. Hale and Whitehouse (1998) attempted to induce either “challenge” (i.e.,
positive appraisal) or “pressure” (i.e., negative appraisal) reactions in soccer players via a
combined relaxation video and imagery audiotape intervention. The challenge condition
produced significantly more self-confidence and significantly less somatic anxiety. In
addition. Burton and Naylor (1997) stated that competitive anxiety theory overlooks the
temporal patterns of anxiety, particularly the notion that anxiety prior to performance
may be necessary for preparation, whereas anxiety during performance may not be
facilitative. Furthermore, current anxiety theories may overlook athletes’ interpretation of
anxiety symptoms, which “is more predictive o f performance than the intensity of the
symptoms experienced” (Burton & Naylor, 1997, p. 299). The authors’ final
recommendations included “measuring anxiety during breaks in competition with field
measures o f state anxiety” (p. 301).
In summary, the catastrophe model accounts for different relationships found between
arousal and performance. According to Hardy (1996a) and Hardy and colleagues (2004),
the anxiety and performance relationship may be moderated by self-confidence; the
arousal and performance relationship may be mediated by cognitive anxiety according to
Biddle (1995). These relationships are best represented graphically in three dimensions as
demonstrated by Biddle (1995) and Gould and Krane (1992). The drawbacks to
catastrophe theory may be its inherent complexity and relative difficulty testing its
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predictions. Although the model has been supported via modeling (e.g., Hardy, 1996a;
Hardy et al., 2004), catastrophe theory constructs and processes have been criticized for
being excessively difficulty to measure (Hardy, 1996b) and can be tailored to meet the
theoretical or empirical needs o f models (Hardy et al., 2004). Furthermore, dynamic
systems are thought to exhibit sensitive dependence on initial conditions and are thought
to be quite unstable (Gleick, 1987; Masterpasqua, 2004). Thus, measuring dynamic
processes may alter the processes themselves (e.g., reactivity). Evidence for nonlinear,
ehaotic, dynamic processes exhibiting sensitive dependence on initial conditions has been
found by Kelly, Heath, and Longstaff (2001) and Prorokovic and Gregov (2004) in
psychomotor processes (reaction time). Thus catastrophe theory has increasing empirical
support (Biddle, 1995; Prorokovic & Gregov, 2004; Kelly, Heath, & Longstaff, 2001) in
golf performance (Hardy, 1996a; Hardy et al., 2004), and scientific examination of
complexity in the anxiety and arousal-performance relationship appear inevitable.
The dynamics o f anxiety and arousal during sport performance has been examined by
studies from the catastrophe theory perspective. Rather than focusing on the actual
experience of arousal and anxiety related to sport performance, these studies appear to be
more invested in testing theoretical models by asking for ratings o f bodily and cognitive
anxiety before and after but never during performance. This is problematic for many
reasons that will later be discussed, but the current study attempted to measure the actual
inner experience o f processes such as these by interrupting participants during
performance.
Reversal Theory. According to reversal theory (RT) (Apter, 1992), polar opposite
“metamotivational” states exist in four pairs: 1) a telic (characterized by low arousal.
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planning, and goal directed behavior) and paratelic (e.g., high arousal, lack o f planning,
and nongoal directed behavior) pair, 2) a negativist (e.g., autonomous and rebelling
against norms) and conformist (to norms) pair, 3) an autic (e.g., focus on self) and alloic
(e.g. focus others) pair, and finally 4) a mastery (e.g., desire to dominate over competition
and compete with others) and sympathy (e.g., desire to be nurtured by and cooperate with
others) pair. The relationship between anxiety/arousal and affect is thought to depend on
cognitive appraisals o f the individual’s level o f anxiety/arousal, which is typically
indirectly measured. This model predicts that if anxiety/arousal and stress are high, the
individual is over-stimulated. If anxiety/arousal and stress are low, the individual is closer
to a state o f sleep. If the level o f anxiety/arousal is high and stress is low, the individual is
excited or “psyched-up,” a state predicted to yield optimal performance. Finally, under
conditions o f low anxiety/arousal and low stress, boredom is experienced. Until recently,
little empirical evidence supported this theory (Gould & Krane, 1992; Biddle, 1995).
In 2002, Hudson and Walker conducted one o f the few qualitative investigations of
internal processes in golf. Because this study attempted to examine inner experience
related to sport performance in golf, which the current study was designed to examine,
and because it did so qualitatively, this study will be extensively reviewed. The strengths
and weaknesses o f the study will be discussed, and it will become apparent that
improvements to studies such as this are warranted. Methods to improve the study of
inner experience in sport performance will be discussed in the next chapter.
Hudson and Walker (2002) sought to examine RT in golf. Their interpretation o f RT
related to sport performance suggested that individuals can experience reversals between
opposite states within a given pair due to: 1) frustration that the needs o f current state
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aren’t being met, 2) satiation (e.g., where time dictates reversal), or 3) a contingent event
or environmental stimulus (e.g. cue) demanding a switch between metamotivational
states. Metamotivational states and reversals were examined among five competitive
golfers who participated in a round robin tournament for the study. The authors used a
modified version o f the Metamotivational State Coding Schedule (MSGS) structured
interview (Potocky, Cook, & O ’Connell, 1993) with participants within 24 hours, a
measure aimed at reducing memory problems associated with retrospective self-report.
Reversals in state occurred when participants reported a change from one state to another.
A total o f 17 reversals in states were reported, with a range o f one to five reversals, and
65% were attributed to contingent events, 29% to frustration, and 6% to satiation.
Reversals were not associated with winning (53%) or losing (47%), and all but one
reversal occurred between the 5'*' and 16*’’ holes. The most frequent states reported were
paratelic conformity (29%), telic conformity (27%), and autic state (27%).
The authors indicated more similarities than differences in metamotivational state
profiles. The major similarity was in the frequently-experienced paratelic conformity
combination, followed closely by telic conformity and the autic state. Qualitative
descriptions o f participants’ metamotivational states during performance were also
provided by the authors. For instance, the winner o f the tournament displayed a
consistent pattern o f telic conformity (e.g., low arousal, planning, goal directed behavior),
and autic states. According to the authors, this player experienced a reversal from the
paratelic to the telic state that was attributed to a contingent event, saying “on the last
hole I tried to veer it round the com er.. .tried something different.... I think if it was
closer I wouldn’t have tried it, I would have hit it straight” (p. 208). In contrast, the last

24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

place player had a higher incidence o f the paratelic state. One of the strengths o f this
study was the collection of data from a naturalistic sport context, which may enhance
ecological validity. Although this study collected data within 24 o f competition, which
may have somewhat reduced o f memory problems, it is likely that forgetting and
reconstruction would have occurred at a higher rate that if participants were interrupted
during performance and asked to briefly report about inner experience for later
interviews. Studies such as Hudson and W alker’s (2002) contained several weaknesses
that should be considered for the development o f improved qualitative research; 1)
Although authors speculated that telic conformity “is likely to facilitate attentional focus
on factors associated with performance success” and may “attenuate” the “focus on
factors that may be detrimental to performance,” this interpretation is based on an
extremely small homogeneous sample with regard to skill (handicap 1.5 to 6). This
interpretation may have been better tested by including a comparison group of novice
golfers. 2) Although authors present an appealing and sensible theory, the use o f a
deductive approach with a priori predictions may have led to experimenter expectancies,
influencing results in unanticipated ways. 3) The authors described the MSCS as a
“powerful, reliable tool for assessing metamotivational states,” but they failed to provide
evidence o f this from past studies o f their interview process or from measurements
obtained from their study. 4) The interview schedule was provided in their publication,
and many o f the items were open-ended questions. Unfortunately, questions like “did this
make you feel uncomfortable or was the feeling unpleasant?” are leading. This question
reveals the researchers’ assumptions that a) participants were aware of some type o f inner
experience, b) this phenomenon caused them to experience an emotion that can
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accurately be labeled either as discomfort or unpleasantness and not c) some other
emotion, thought, behavior, or nothing at all. Furthermore, an affirmative answer to the
question above leads to a misunderstanding about experience even if all o f the
assumptions above are valid because answering “yes” could actually suggest the presence
of either discomfort or unpleasantness or both. Without adequate follow-up questions,
there is no way o f determining the actual nature o f inner experience. Several additional
questions may have been nearly as leading. For example, “would you say you were
feeling generally serious or light hearted” a) assumes and emotion occurred, b) suggests
only two possible expressions o f the emotion, c) assumes participants were aware o f the
emotion or should have been, and d) fails to allow or at least limits the expression of
other possible phenomena. Dichotomous questions such as this (e.g., “did it feel like the
match was a job you had to do or were you simply going to enjoy it because it was fun”
italics added) were delivered a minimum o f four times and in many cases repeated
throughout the interview. The leading nature o f many o f these items and the exclusion of
alternative experiential phenomena constitute a significant threat to the construct validity
o f this study. 5) Interview responses were coded by the two sport psychologists, and “in
the majority o f cases, the two analysts agreed on the metamotivational states, timing and
nature o f reversals reported, and the factors affecting these reversals.” According to the
authors, the majority o f cases reflected agreement, “however, some discrepancies were
apparent in the independent analyses o f these d ata.... [and] no pattern could be discerned
in the observed discrepancies.” Unfortunately, the authors failed to report how frequently
disagreements occurred, calling into question the reliability o f results and subsequent
interpretations. 6) Finally, three o f the 17 interviews were not completed, and authors
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failed to explain why. Although the authors minimized this 15% loss o f data, they did not
address the possibility of a systematic cause for mortality, a significant threat to the
internal validity o f the study.
In conclusion, although Hudson and W alker’s (2002) study may have partially
reduced problems associated with retrospective report, but further measures could easily
be taken to further reduce memory problems. Although this study produced more
descriptive data about inner experience during golf performance, this study contained
many limitations such as the use o f leading questions. Fortunately, many o f these
limitations can be easily corrected. The current idiographic investigation provided
measures to addresses each o f the limitations o f Hudson and W alker’s (2002) study.
Specific methods to improve the study o f inner experience in golf performance will be
discussed in the next chapter, but first we will summarize this section on anxiety and
arousal theories, then we will briefly discuss anxiety and arousal interventions, and then
we will continue the review o f emotions in sport.
Anxiety & Arousal Theories: Summary. Conceptualizations o f the arousalperformance relationship have generally improved in terms o f descriptive, explanatory,
and predictive ability. However as empirical inconsistencies have emerged, the general
trend has been toward increasing consideration o f multidimensional and complex
relationships between proliferating numbers o f factors. The relationships among these
factors on performance have only begun to be studied. Additional factors that may
mediate the dynamics o f the arousal-performance relationship include self-confidence
(Hardy, 1996a; Hardy et al., 2004), attentional focus (Backman & Molander, 1986), task
type (Gould & Udry, 1994; Meyers et al., 1996; Tynes & McFatter, 1987), task

27

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

complexity, task familiarity, skill level, perceptions o f the anxiety-arousal context,
previous experience with arousal changes, perceived ability to mange or control arousal,
experience with the task, presence of observers or competitors, importance o f
performance in the context, and coping skills (Meyers et al., 1996). Anxiety and arousal
studies typically focused on anxiety, arousal, and self-confidence perhaps because the
CSAI-2 is one of the most popular self-report measures. These studies have failed to
examine the possible presence o f other possible inner experiential phenomena, only a few
o f which have been mentioned as potential mediators o f the anxiety/arousal and sport
performance relationship. As we shall see, the current study openly examined whatever
inner experience occurred during performance in golf. As such, the presence or absence
o f anxiety/arousal experiences and other potential mediators were equally explored.
Arousal and anxiety researeh in sport psychology has been limited by the
overwhelming reliance on retrospective self-report and indirect measurement of these
phenomena. Definitional problems may weaken the support for anxiety and arousal
theories and weaken our understanding o f these phenomena. Future research could more
aceurately and consistently examine emotional phenomena by using direct and immediate
methods o f measurement. Despite the existence o f methods that interrupt participants in
the midst of an activity to more directly and immediately assess inner experience, as we
will continue to see, very few studies have used them.
Anxiety & Arousal Management Interventions. Despite theoretical and
methodological problems of anxiety and arousal research, anxiety and arousal
management interventions have proliferated. These strategies can been divided between
interventions that attempt to reduce anxiety and arousal, relaxation techniques, and those
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that attempt to intensify arousal, “psyching-up” approaches. Although conceptual models
may not receive empirical support, both “psyching-up” interventions (Whelan et al.,
1990) and relaxation interventions (Kendall, Hrycaiko, & Martin, 1990) have been
effective for particular athletes on specific tasks. “Psyching-up” and relaxation
interventions will be briefly described, example studies will be provided, and the
effectiveness o f these interventions will be discussed.
Psyching-up: Increasing Anxiety/Arousal. “Psyching-up” interventions attempt to
increase arousal prior to performance. Without formal sport psychology interventions,
athletes may use their own strategies to increase arousal prior to performance. Gould and
colleagues (1980) examined the particular strategies used during non-standardized
“psych-up” interventions. Strategies that were reported as most frequently-used were
attentional focus (s e lf administered instructions to narrow attention to task relevant
movements and skills), imagery (visualizing optimal task performance), and preparatory
arousal (“emotionally charging-up”) during the “psyching-up” period.
Gould and colleagues (1980) subsequently examined the relative effectiveness of
these strategies in 15 male and 15 female undergraduate students. A Latin square design
was used to examine the effects o f five different mental preparatory conditions (i.e.,
attentional focus, preparatory arousal, imagery, counting backwards control, rest) on a
leg-strength task. O f the mental preparatory conditions, preparatory arousal and imagery
techniques led to significantly greater output than the other conditions. Performance in
the arousal and imagery groups were not significantly different with regard to legstrength.

29

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Meta-analysis by Meyers and colleagues (1996) reported a large effect size {d = 1.23,
SD = .73) for arousal elevation interventions, but this was based on only 5 studies.
Although it is far too early to conclude that strategies for increasing arousal are effective,
and the generalizability o f these results across different performance tasks and contexts
remains tentative (Meyers et al., 1996) several patterns have emerged.
One key research finding has been that mental preparation involving arousal elevation
techniques are more effective on motor tasks requiring strength (Tynes & McFatter,
1987), endurance, and sprinting than on tasks requiring more technical skill, timing,
speed, and balance when compared to attentional focus, imagery, distraction tasks, and
controls (Gould & Udry, 1994; Meyers et al., 1996). Nevertheless, it is not apparent
whether arousal elevation techniques typically increase states o f arousal or athletes’
perceptions of arousal (Meyers et al., 1996; Whelan et al., 1990). Several factors that may
mediate the arousal-performance relationship have been cited, including the nature o f the
task, individual experience or task familiarity, and cognitive aspects o f the task including
attentional focus (Whelan et al., 1990). In summary, with the possible exceptions o f tasks
requiring strength, endurance, and sprinting, interventions seeking to increase levels o f
arousal alone have been insufficient for enhancing performance.
Relaxation: Decreasing Anxiety/Arousal. Several techniques have been implemented
to moderate the debilitating effects o f excessive anxiety and arousal on performance.
These strategies parallel developments in cognitive-behavioral approaches to reduce
anxiety. Relaxation is associated with parasympathetic dimensions of physiological
arousal such as decreased heart rate, breathing, muscle activity, and brain activity.
Through cognitive behavioral relaxation strategies, physiological arousal may be
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attenuated. Relaxation strategies have been more rigorously evaluated empirically and
more widely used in performance enhancement than psyching-up approaches, although
both have actually been used in combination.
Progressive muscle relaxation interventions have been used to decrease anxiety and
arousal. Progressive muscle relaxation employs several exercises involving brief
instrueted muscular tension followed by relaxation o f systematically targeted muscle
groups. Because relaxation is incompatible with tension, retraining the muscles to relax is
thought to reduce involuntary and inefficient muscular activation associated with
excessive arousal or anxiety. Similar to several performance enhancement approaehes,
self-regulation and external instructions may be provided. It is typical for relaxation
techniques to move from initial instruction by a coach or sport psychologist to self
regulation that encourage athlete self-efficacy (Singer, Murphey, & Tennant 1993).
Patrick and Hrycaiko (1998) demonstrated the effectiveness o f a mental training
package including progressive relaxation on endurance performance (1600-m) for four
runners using a multiple baseline design across individuals. Social validation results
indicated positive reactions from athletes and coaches concerning the enjoyment and
significance o f the results, respectively. A review by Greenspan and Feltz (1989) reported
positive effects o f relaxation training on performance in two o f nine interventions,
whereas under less stringent criteria (e.g., when causality was disputable), all the
interventions demonstrated positive effects on performance, suggesting that relaxation
strategies are generally effective in enhancing performance. Meta-analysis by Meyers and
colleagues (1996) reported a moderate effect size (d = .73, SD = 1.64) for relaxation
interventions based on 25 studies.

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Anxiety & Arousal Management Interventions: Summary
Both psyching-up (Gould & Udry, 1994, Meyers et al., 1996; Tynes & McFatter,
1987) and relaxation strategies (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989, Patrick & Hrycaiko, 1998)
have tentatively demonstrated effectiveness, although the effectiveness o f the former
seems confined to a narrower set of performance tasks than the latter (Gould & Udry,
1994; Meyers et al., 1996; Tynes & McFatter, 1987). Research on psyching-up
interventions, however, demonstrated a large effect size, whereas a moderate effect size
was found for relaxation strategies (Meyers et al., 1996). Several suggestions for future
research expressed throughout the literature on the arousal-performance relationship call
for increased methodological thoroughness, examination of the processes through which
interventions operate, the extension o f outcome studies to the field, the need to consider
multidimensional mediating individual factors (Hardy et al., 2004), and the effective
mechanisms o f instructing athlete populations in arousal management (Gould & Udry,
1994). Clearly further evaluation o f the conditions under which specific interventions
may be indicated is echoed throughout the literature, and studies in performance profiling
and treatment matching have emerged in response (Jones, 1993; Doyle & Gaynor, 1997).
Anxiety & Arousal Summary
Anxiety and arousal are widely thought to be related to performance. These
phenomena are likely to be related to other psychological phenomena as well. Anxiety
and arousal management interventions may interact with increases in task mastery, selfefficacy, and other cognitive and affective variables (Gould & Udry, 1994). Several
studies have shown relationships between anxiety, arousal, and self confidence (Hardy,
1996a; Hardy et al., 2004). While optimal arousal and even anxiety at times appear to be
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necessary conditions for performance, an athletes’ perceptions o f anxiety and his or her
ability to mange it may be more significantly related to performance according to Meyers
et al. (1996). This notion invokes the distinction between the measurement o f arousal and
anxiety as phenomena and athletes’ understanding o f arousal and anxiety. The
concordance between retrospective self-reports of arousal and anxiety and the actual
phenomena in performance has been largely unexamined. As we shall see however, a
lack o f concordance has been found between retrospective self-reports and daily reports
o f coping (Ptacek, Smith, Espe, & Rafferty, 1994). Furthermore, Raglin and Hanin
(2000) stated that self-report measures are limited because their validity and reliability
may be influeneed by participants’ verbal ability and self-awareness (Hackfort &
Schwenkmezger, 1989), social desirability, demand characteristics, social and
experimental expectations, and reactivity due to repeated assessments. Although optimal
levels o f anxiety and arousal have been suggested, research findings have failed to
support several explanations o f these processes consistently (Whelan, Epkins, & Meyers,
1990). It seems plausible that the limitations o f retrospective self-report measures may
explain the prevalence o f inconsistent findings in sport psychology research. Despite
these criticisms, “most researchers agree that appropriately used, validated self-report
measures provide accurate assessments o f anxiety” (Raglin and Hanin, 2000, p. 94). It
seems clear that the limitations o f retrospective self-report have been conveniently
dismissed with little consideration o f alternative methods. Alternative methods o f
examining internal processes such as directly investigating emotional experience during
sport performance may illuminate athletes’ experiences o f arousal and anxiety processes
and overcome the inherent limitations associated with retrospective self-report.
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Stress & Coping
The majority of research examining emotional processes has been directed at the
relationship among anxiety, arousal, and performance. Relatively less attention has been
devoted to other emotions and processes such as stress and coping, which is problematic
(Anshel & Anderson, 2002) because the capacity to respond effectively with stress
associated with athletic performance is thought to be essential to performance success
(Hardy et al., 1996). Conversely, ineffective coping strategies can be deleterious in terms
o f performance outcome (Anshel, Brown, & Brown, 1993). According to Hardy and
colleagues ( 1996), the progress o f stress and coping research has been hindered “by the
failure o f researchers to make a clear distinction between the basic constructs of stress,
anxiety, [and] arousal...” (p. 141).
Jones (1990) and Hardy and colleagues (1996) operationalized stress as a state
involving the introduction of a demand placed on the individual who must cope with the
situation. For the purposes o f this review, stress will be viewed as relatively orthogonal
from arousal and anxiety with the recognition that the distinction among these constructs
is not completely established and understood. Nonetheless, stress will be seen as an initial
general reaction to a stimulus. Coping has been viewed as a general strategy to respond to
stress. Together, stress and coping are considered bidirectional processes in which coping
mediates emotional states depending on the individual’s appraisal of the stressor
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1988).
Lazarus (2000) provided theoretical recommendations for research in sport
performance that emphasized stress and emotion as well as appraisal, coping, and
relational meaning. In addition, Lazarus (2000) suggested that, although process and
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structure are necessary in research, process should be considered more essential in stress
and emotion research. Thus, stress as well as other emotional phenomena should be
considered. Lazarus (2000) suggested that discrete emotional categories should be used,
and appraisal, coping, and relational meaning are essential theoretical constructs for
stress and emotion.
Anshel and colleagues (1993) found that an acute stressor (i.e., negative verbal
feedback) impeded performance in dart-throwing, increased muscle tension, and
increased negative affect, whereas an effective coping skills intervention enhanced
performance and increased positive affeet compared to controls. Anshel and Anderson
(2002) found significant correlations between coping styles, a trait-like conception o f
coping tendency, and state-like coping strategies used during table tennis performance.
Coping style was dichotomized as approach (e.g., positive preparation, engagement,
vigilance, attention) or avoidance (e.g., negative avoidance, distraction, ignoring,
disengagement). Stress was induced by standardized negative feedback delivered to all
players and pressure from coaches. Anshel and Anderson (2002) found that negative
affect increased significantly after stress inducements. Individual coping style, measured
initially, predicted self-reported coping strategy after stress inducements and
performance, suggesting that players used strategies selectively as a function o f coping
style and situational factors. In addition, approach coping styles predieted performance in
preliminary task tasks, whereas a combination o f positive affect, avoidance coping, and
negative affect best predicted performance in later task trials. The latter finding was
particularly unexpected and difficult for the authors to interpret. The authors speculated
that since better performance resulted from a change from initial approach to later
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avoidance strategies, this suggested that athletes may have changed strategies “rapidly
following an unpleasant experience” (p. 206). This suggests that coping styles may have
some influence on performance outcome, although it is not apparent exactly how coping
is related to performance.
Anshel and Wells (2000) examined coping strategies in 147 basketball players asked
to reconstruct their experiences of coping immediately after a basketball game. All
players experienced at least one occurrence o f four events predicted to invoke coping
strategies — missing an easy basket, receiving physical abuse from an opponent, losing
the ball to an opponent, and receiving a perceived bad call from the referee. Approach
strategies were reported at a higher more rate than avoidance strategies in situations
where rough physical play occurred, an easy basket was missed, and the player lost the
ball. Participants did however report using avoidance in coping with a bad call from the
referee. Results indicated that personal and situational variables predicted coping with
acute stress in basketball. Cognitive appraisals and perceived stress intensity also strongly
influenced the participants' reported use o f coping strategies, both o f which accounted for
34% of the variance. Finally, competitive basketball players’ coping strategies were
consistent with cognitive appraisals in response to stressful situations.
Studies have been recently conducted on stress and coping in golf. A qualitative,
descriptive study was performed using semi-structured interviews with 11 golfers by
Giacobbi, Foore, and Weinberg (2004) to examine sources o f stress as well as coping
responses. Skilled and moderately skilled golfers reported using coping strategies and
emotional management techniques related to stress including cognitive strategies,
relaxation attempts, efforts on the golf course and off the course, avoidance coping, and
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emotion-focused coping strategies. Nicholls, Holt, and Polman (2005) conducted semi
structured interviews with 18 male Irish golfers and phenomenological analysis o f coping
effectiveness during golf competition. Data were analyzed using the Interpretive
Phenomenological Analysis (Smith & Osborn, 2003). Golfers reported that competition
involved stressors “relating to outcome, mistakes, score, evaluation and opponents” (p.
121). Coping strategies perceived and self-reported by athletes to be effective included
“rationalizing, reappraising, blocking, positive self-talk, following a routine, breathing
exercises, physical relaxation, and seeking on-course social support” (p. 111). Ineffective
self-reported strategies included “trying too hard, speeding up, routine changes, negative
thoughts, [and] lack o f coping” (p. 111).
One o f the greatest limitations o f the majority o f sport psychology studies described
here is their reliance on retrospective self-report. Ptacek and colleagues (1994) examined
the accuracy o f self reports about coping compared with more immediate daily eoping
reports. The correspondence between daily coping reports and retrospective report of
coping as the was moderate at best, as “daily reports obtained during the stressful event
revealed only a moderate degree o f correspondence, sharing at best only 34% common
variance in correlational analyses” (p. 46). Thus Ptacek et al. (1994) criticized the
accuracy o f self-reports o f subjective experiences related to actual coping strategies
because o f “potential contaminating influences of defensive processes and response
biases such as social desirability, acquiescence, and extreme responding” (p. 42).
Furthermore, they argued that ability to accurately recall coping efforts is reduced over
time, and long retrospective self-reports should be avoided.
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Another limitation o f self-report methods in examining internal phenomena includes
the possibility social desirable responding. Krane and Williams (1992) conducted a study
with 112 competitive female golfers study to determine the influence o f social desirable
responding on anxiety, stress, and coping. The authors measured anxiety (Sport
Competition Anxiety Test) and socially desirable responding (Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability Scale), which led to four categories o f responding styles: true anxious
consisted o f low-anxious (LA)/low-social-desirability (LSD) reports, defensive reports
were high-anxious (HA)/high-social-desirability (HSD), HA/LSD reports were
considered truly high-anxious, and LA/HSD reports were labeled the repressor style o f
responding. Results indicated that biased responding on the CSAl-2 occurred only for
those with the repressor style. Confidence was higher among golfers with the repressor
style compared to the low-anxious style, whereas high-anxious and defensive highanxious golfers reported the lowest levels o f self-confidence and highest cognitive
anxiety. The authors suggested that “future researchers examine whether or not athletes
classified as repressors present themselves favorably when responding to anxiety and
confidence questions” (p. 134). Thus researchers have acknowledged some o f the
inherent limitations of self-report methods in sport psychology but have generally
proceeded to conduct studies without addressing these problems to any extensive degree.
Much like studies that have been conducted on anxiety and arousal, few stress and
coping studies have been conducted on performance in golf. In addition, most studies
have strongly relied on methods using retrospective self-report, despite limitations that
have even occasionally been acknowledged. No studies could be found that directly
assessed stress and coping phenomena by training participants in observing and reporting
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inner experience, interrupting performance, and examining whether these processes occur
by directly questioning about internal phenomena.
Additional Emotions in Sport Performance
The majority o f sport psychology research on emotion has been directed at the
relationship among anxiety, arousal and performance, although stress and coping research
has grown considerably in the last decade (Giacobbi et al., 2004). Compared to the
extensive research on anxiety, arousal, stress related to sport performance, considerably
less attention has been devoted to a wider array of emotions. Beyond anxiety, arousal,
and stress, there are other emotions that have been studied with respect to sport
performance. The research that has been conducted on additional emotions related to
sport performance has focused on mostly on anger, hostility, and aggression; however, a
few studies have examined mood states and additional positive emotions independent
from anxiety, arousal, and stress. Research examining these additional emotions will be
briefly reviewed, with an emphasis on studies examining emotion in golf performance.
Anger, Hostility, & Aggression. Examples o f behavior typically associated with
anger, hostility, and aggression occur with some degree o f frequency in sport, although
the most dramatic displays take the form o f aggressive behaviors as evidenced by the
recent Detroit Pistons vs. Indian Pacers professional basketball brawl between players o f
both teams and even fans (Associated Press, 2005a).
Isberg (2000) provided a multidimensional definition of anger as a psychobiosocial
state including cognitive and motivational, affective, bodily-somatic (i.e., increases in
heart rate and blood pressure), and behavioral components (e.g., aggressive behavior).
Isberg (2000) proposed that stress, arousal, context, and personality factors may lead to
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anger, hostility, and aggression in sport, which he conceptualizes and overlapping
phenomena that may be facilitative or debilitative with respect to performance.
According to Isberg (2000), it is not apparent how components o f anger, hostility, and
aggression interrelate with behavioral components of these phenomena, and whether an
optimal level o f anger intensity exists is undetermined. Future research including the
current study may illustrate how frequently emotional, cognitive, and behavioral
components occur and to what extent they may co-occur.
Several non-sport specific assessment measures o f anger, hostility, and aggressive
behavior have been available for decades, and sport-specific measures have emerged
more reeently. O f the seven sport-specific instruments described by Isberg (2000), only
five reported reliability, four o f these focused on adult populations, and three examined
anger, hostility, and aggression in athletes as opposed to spectators - the Bredemeier
Athletic Aggression Inventory (Bredemeier, 1975), the Rice Reactive Aggression
Measure for Baseball (RRAMB) (Rice, Ostrow, Ramsburg, & Brooks, 1989), and the
Sport Aggression Questionnaire (SAQ) (Thompson, 1989). Two o f these three were
general sport measures, the RAAGI and the SAQ, and one was intended for use in
specific sports, the RRAMB for baseball. O f the remaining three emotional measures,
none were published in peer-reviewed journals, and no empirical studies examining these
measures could be found in published peer-reviewed journals. Thus it appears that little
attention has been given to the assessment o f anger, hostility, and aggression in sport.
In 1978, McCarthy and Kelly found that ice hockey players who self-reported higher
levels o f aggression scored significantly more goals and shots on goal than did those with
lower levels. No significant differences were found for assists. McCarthy and Kelly
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(1978) suggested that anger may be associated with higher energy output and efficiency,
leading to enhanced performance in ice hockey. Consistent with this, McGowan and
Miller (1989) found that successful karate athletes had significantly higher anger than did
less successful athletes. In addition, aggressiveness predicted o f football ability (Secunda
et al., 1986).
O f the studies that have been conducted regarding anger, hostility, and aggression,
many have been examined these phenomena in youth sport. Stephens and BredemeierLight (1996) found that female soccer players' aggressive behaviors were related the
teams’ moral context (i.e., aggressive norms, perceptions of team norms, coaches’
characteristics, and players' moral motives for behavior), consistent with Isberg’s (2000)
conceptualization o f contextual influences. A replication o f this study with male and
female youth soccer players found players' perceptions o f pro-aggressive team norms was
the primary predictor o f likelihood to aggress for both genders, and moral motivation and
perceived ability also contributed to the prediction equation for the boys whereas
perception o f coach's ego orientation predict girls aggression (Stephens, 2000).
Guivemau and Duda (2002) examined the relationship between the sport context and
athletes' self-reported tendencies toward aggression in adolescent soccer players.
Athletes' perceptions o f pro-aggressive team norms were predictive of self-reported
tendencies toward aggression. Both genders reported higher likelihood to aggression
when behavior was perceived to be supported by coaches.
Maxwell (2004) applied the concept o f anger rumination defined as “the propensity to
think almost obsessively over past experiences that have provoked negative affect in the
form o f anger” (p. 279) to sport behavior. High levels of anger rumination are thought to

41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

be associated with an increased propensity toward aggressive behavior. Although no
differenees were found between males and females or between competitive levels on
anger rumination, aggressive behavior was higher in males compared to females, and
anger rumination was significantly correlated with athletes' reported aggressive behavior.
In addition, athletes who participated in individual sports reported lower levels o f
aggression than did those participating in team sports. Although this study relied on
retrospective self-report, this study appears consistent with the multidimensional
conceptualization o f anger because relationships were found among context (i.e., type of
sport), affect, and self-reported behavior.
Although examples of anger, hostility, and aggression seem evident and accessible,
these phenomena have not been examined extensively in athletes. Research that has been
conducted reveals tentative relationships between anger and aggression and performance
suggest for ice hockey and karate (McCarthy & Kelly, 1978; McGowan & Miller, 1989).
Much like the research on anxiety, arousal, and stress, few studies have explored these
phenomena without relying on retrospective self-report questionnaires focusing entirely
on specific phenomena. Thus equal weight is typically not given to the possible presence
o f other similar phenomena. Unfortunately this leaves much o f the research open to
internal validity threats including experimenter expectancies, demand characteristics, and
construct validity problems. Thus it is difficult to accurately infer the presence,
frequency, and individual experience o f these phenomena based on existing research.
Mood & Sport Performance. Research examining mood related to sport performance
has focused on positive as well as negative states. Mood states have been investigated
mainly by methods incorporating retrospective self-report and correlational designs.
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although some patterns may have emerged. Stevens and Lane (2001) examined strategies
athletes used to self-regulate mood dimensions assessed by the Profile o f Mood States
(POMS), which evaluates anger, confusion, depression, fatigue, tension, and vigor. The
most common general emotional regulation strategies were changing location, exercising,
and listening to music, whereas unique strategies included trying to be alone for anger,
analyzing the situation for confusion, engaging in pleasant activities for depression, and
relaxation for tension. Thus athletes appear to use general and emotion-specific
regulation strategies to regulate mood.
Terry, Carron, and Pink (2000) examined group cohesion among netball, rowing, and
rugby teams after administration o f the Group Environment Questionnaire and the
POMS. Results indicated that participants’ high level attraction to the group predicted
low tension and anger. High group integration predicted low depression. High attraction
to the group predicted low tension, low depression, and high vigor. Thus it is plausible
that group affiliation and cohesion attenuate negative emotions such as tension, anger,
and depression, and vigor may be enhanced as well, although more research is needed to
demonstrate the connection among the reduction o f negative emotions and the increase of
positive emotions in groups.
Alcohol use may have a negative influence on emotion with athletes (Green, Burke,
& Nix, 1995), although the direction o f this relationship is tenuous. Athletes who used
alcohol scored significantly higher on the anger subscale of the POMS than the alcohol
nonusers. Alcohol nonusers also scored significantly higher on state anxiety about
receiving a scholarship to college than did alcohol users. In addition, males felt more
pressure to win than did females. The POMS did not predict successful performance.
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McGowan and Shultz (1989) examined differences in preseason measures o f affect
with college football players. Vigor scores on the POMS were significantly higher for
defensive than offensive players, and linemen scores were higher than others’ as well.
Authors suggested that participants appeared to use anger as a pre-event motivating
strategy for simple tasks.
In 1985, Miller and Miller developed an anxiety and emotional state instrument. The
Scale of Eight Emotions was validated with 27 female high school gymnasts before and
minutes after performance. Significant correlations resulted between the overall 8
emotion predictors (enjoyment, fear, depression, anxiety, surprise, anger, shame/guilt,
and attentiveness/interest) and motor performance (0.72). State anxiety was negatively
correlated with performance (-0.58).
Performance outcome appears to have a considerable effect on athlete moods. Using
the Profile of Mood States (POMS), Hassmén and Blomstrand (1995) assessed female
soccer players’ mood immediately and two hours after the games. Results indicated
playing soccer, “especially if the game ended in a tie or a loss, had a massive influence
on the mood states o f the team” (p. 297). Participants reported significantly less tension,
depression, anger, and confusion after wins than losses or ties.
Rowley, Landers, and Kyllo (1995) performed a meta-analysis of 33 studies utilizing
the POMS to determine the extent to which mood profiles discriminate between
successful and unsuccessful athletes. This study sought to test the iceberg profile, which
states that athletes exhibiting low tension, confusion, anger, and fatigue along with high
vigor and non-depressed mood are more likely to succeed (a profile graphically similar to
an iceberg when plotted on the POMS profile sheet). Overall effect size was very low
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(0.15), albeit significant, but the variance accounted for was less than 1%, once again
questioning the predictive utility o f the POMS as well as the iceberg profile. Nonetheless,
results seem to reflect the general trend that successful athletes had slightly more positive
moods than do less successful athletes, although “claiming that successful athletes tend to
be mentally healthy is not a provocative concept,” and “psychopathology and success at
nearly anything should be inversely correlated” (Rowley et al., 1995, p. 186).
Beedie, Terry, and Lane (2000) conducted two meta-analyses o f POMS research
studies to examine relationships between mood and athletic achievement (N =13) and
between mood and performance outcome (N = 16). Low effect sizes resulted for level of
achievement, consistent with Rowley et al. (1995). Larger effects were found for the
performance outcome meta-analysis. “Effects were moderate for vigor, confusion, and
depression, small for anger and tension, and very small for fatigue” (p. 49) and effects
were larger in short duration and open skills sports (Beedie et al., 2000).
Research on the mood in sport performance has yielded promising findings, but
methodological limitations have been pervasive. Mood states have been frequently
investigated by methods incorporating retrospective self-report and correlational designs,
although many studies have collected self reports relatively soon after performance.
Studies incorporating retrospective self-report risk reduced internal validity due to
problems o f recall, especially after significant time delays. Evidence o f memory
problems emerged from a zone o f optimal functioning inspired study by Russell and Cox
(2000), who compared actual and recalled optimal positive and negative affect using the
Positive and Negative Affect scales. Significant differences in initially-reported and laterrecalled positive affect were found in basketball, although no significant differences were
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detected in actual and recalled negative affect for football and basketball. Despite this
potential limitation, several studies have found that mood predicts successful
performance (Beedie et al., 2000), although the practical utility o f this effect has been
questioned as studies have failed to consistently discriminate between successful and
unsuccessful athletes based on mood (Rowley et al., 1995). Mood does seem to be
effected considerably by performance outcome or degree of performance success
however (Hassmén & Blomstrand, 1995). Considering both o f these findings, it seems
plausible that performance outcome may have a stronger influence on mood than the
latter has on the former, as performance appears to be relatively less influenced by mood
states, with the exception o f anxiety and arousal, which have been shown more
consistently to influence performance depending on the type o f task. Future
investigations into emotional phenomena may begin to illustrate more precisely how
emotions are related to performance.
Similar to other research examining emotions in sport, mood research has strongly
relied on retrospective self-report questionnaires that fail to give equal weight to the
existence o f other emotional phenomena. Retrospective self-report measures have been
frequently used even in light o f observed memory distortions (Russell & Cox, 2000), and
very few studies have focused on direct measures o f internal phenomena that reduce
these potential problems.
Evidence o f Other Emotions in Sport. Ruiz and Hanin (2004) offered evidence, albeit
quite indirect, that other emotions may be present during sport performance. Sixteen
high-level Spanish karate athletes generated “extensive functionally meaningful
metaphors” and interpretative descriptors o f feeling states prior to, during, and after
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performance. Interpretative emotional descriptors were idiosyncratic and contextspecific. These descriptors were considered similar enough to reflect eight basic emotions
including happiness, pride, relief, anger, anxiety, fright, sadness, and shame. Palmer
(1993) explored floor hockey players’ emotional states, and found evidence o f aggression
as well as humor. Criticism has been directed at the field of sport psychology for
excessive focus on pathological processes over positive experiences such as joy and fun
(Jackson, 2000) and the potential confounding o f positive affective states (e.g.,
excitement, challenge) with negative states such as anxiety (Burton & Naylor, 1997).
Indeed, initial, recreational, competitive, and even perhaps professional participation in
sport would be difficult to explain without the possibility that participants’ experience
positive emotions at some point in the process, possibly even during participation. If the
principles of positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Seligman, Steen,
& Park, 2005) influence the direction o f empirical investigations, it seems likely that
future research may examine positive internal experiences more extensively.
Emotions: Summary’
A significant degree o f attention has been directed at anxiety, arousal, and stress in
sport performance compared to other emotions. This focus would be justified if: 1) these
emotions were examined more directly and carefully with much less reliance on
retrospective self-report based on the deduction from theory that these emotions must be
present; 2) these emotions were found to occur consistently during performance using
improved methods o f research; and 3) a known level o f these emotions was consistently
found to facilitate successful performance. These criteria have not nearly been satisfied.
The dominant focus on anxiety, arousal, and stress has occurred at the possible expense
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o f an understanding o f others. The breadth o f human emotional experience during sport
performance is probably much less restricted than what is reflected by the dominant focus
o f sport psychology research. Additional emotional experiences o f positive (e.g.,
happiness, pride, relief, challenge, excitement), negative (e.g., anger, hostility,
aggression, sadness, shame), and perhaps even benign dimensions may be prevalent, but
the wider array o f possible emotional phenomena has rarely been carefully examined in
sport contexts with athletes. No studies could be found that directly and immediately
examined emotional phenomena while giving equal attention to the possible presence of
any and all emotional experiences. Hardly any research has explored emotional
phenomena without relying on retrospective self-reports focusing entirely on expected
phenomena. This may shape our sense o f which emotions occur in sport, how frequently
they occur, how they influence performance, and o f course how interventions should be
designed to respond to emotional phenomena. Qualitative investigations into emotional
phenomena may begin to illustrate more precisely how emotions are related to
performance by providing the degree o f resolution and richness o f detail required to
understand phenomena.
Cognition & Sport Performance
According to sport psychologist Bob Rotella (1995), “when great players are playing
well, trust becomes a habit. The golfer executes” the “shots without being aware” of
“trusting” the “swing. [They] simply [pick] out a target, envision the kind o f shot..., and
hit it.... [They] trust... [the] body will produce the swing needed for the shot [they]
envision...” (p. 44).
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As this profile of the ideal mental processes needed for successful golf illustrates,
cognitive phenomena are thought to have considerable influence on sport performance.
The most widely recognized sport-related cognitive phenomena include self-talk,
attentional focus, imagery, as well as self-confidence and self efficacy. Considerable
empirical attention has been devoted to these processes by sport psychology research.
These cognitive domains will be reviewed with a general emphasis on major findings and
specific emphasis on findings in the sport o f golf and similar performance tasks. Much
like the existing research examining emotional phenomena in sport performance, it will
become evident from this review that almost no studies have been conducted that directly
assessed cognitive phenomena. Empirical investigations have generally avoided the direct
and immediate assessment o f cognitive phenomena in sport in favor o f casual and
indirect retrospective report measures.
Self-Talk, Self-Instruction, & Self-Monitoring
A common element connecting many cognitive-behavior interventions in
performance enhancement is self-talk. Although self-talk is one o f the most frequentlyused strategies reported by coaches across several sports (Gould, Hodge, Peterson, &
Giannini, 1989; Weinberg & Jackson, 1990), the construct has been inconsistently
defined. Hardy and colleagues (1996) called for better specification o f “precisely what
constitutes self-talk” (p. 37) because “past researchers have been too ‘loose’ in their
operationalization o f self-talk” (p. 37-38). According to Williams and Leffingwell
(2002), “broadly defined, self-talk occurs whenever an individual thinks, whether that
individual is making statements internally or externally” (p. 81; see also Williams &
Leffingwell, 1996). This is evidently a belief shared by Bunker and Williams (1980), who
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stated “anytime you think about something, you are in a sense talking to yourself’ (p.
236; see also Bunker, Williams, & Zinsser, 1993). It seems evident that the pervasiveness
o f self-talk has been overstated, reflecting “the widely held prejudice that all thinking is
in words” (Hurlburt, 1997, p. 947). Thus researchers have defined self-talk both broadly
and narrowly, but definitely not carefully. In fact, self-talk has been used to describe
statements said aloud (Van Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, & Petipas, 1994), internally
(Williams et al., 1993), and even statements delivered by others such as coaches that
athletes may somehow process internally (Gould, et al., 1989; Weinberg & Jackson,
1990).
In practice, researchers examining the effectiveness o f self-talk interventions have
typically requested that participants speak out loud so manipulation checks can be
performed (Theodorakis, Chroni, Laparidis, Bebetsos & Douma, 2001; Van Raalte,
Brewer & Lewis, 1995), although the degree o f similarity between external and internal
self-talk is not apparent. Thus self-talk or self-instruction will be defined as statements
directed inward in which the individual interprets thoughts and feelings and responds
with instructions and reinforcement (Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1993; Hardy et al.,
2001 ).

Self-talk investigations have sought to test the assumption that positive self-talk
improves performance, whereas negative self-talk impedes performance. Van Raalte and
colleagues (1994), found that junior tennis players who reported using negative self-talk
were more likely to lose matches. During matches, nearly 90% players reported using
negative self-talk at least 13 times. In addition, participants who reported believing in the
utility o f self-talk won more points than others. Using a between subjects design. Van
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Raalte and colleagues (1995) found the performance o f dart throwers’ was significantly
better in a positive self-talk versus a negative self-talk condition. Van Raalte, Cornelius,
Hatten, and Brewer (2000) examined the antecedents and consequences of observable
positive and negative self-talk via the Self-Talk and Gestures Rating Scale (STAGRS) to
adult competitive tennis players. The STAGRS is a behavioral measure completed by
trained observers. Results indicated that match circumstances predicted negative self-talk
for all players, whereas positive and instructional self-talk was predicted only by these
circumstances for some players. Highlen and Bennett (1983) surveyed the use o f self-talk
in elite divers and wrestlers and found that self-reported self-talk discriminated closedskilled divers more than open-skilled wrestlers. Open-skill tasks involve reaction to
teammates or competitors in a dynamic competitive context, whereas closed-skill tasks
involve reaction to constant competitive context (Highlen & Bennett, 1983; Meyers et al.,
1996). Results suggested that self-talk distinguished qualifiers from non-qualifiers in
closed-skill diving better than in open-skill wrestling. Successful divers reported using
more self-talk during training and competition and more self-instructions in competition.
However, non-qualifiers used more positive self-talk by praising themselves during
competition, in opposition to self-talk assumptions. Self-talk did not distinguish
qualifying wrestlers from non-qualifiers. Finally, Rotella, Gansneder, Ojala, and Billing
(1980) found that positive and negative self-talk actually had no effect on performance.
Thus the notion that positive self-talk improves performance, whereas negative self-talk
impedes performance, has been empirical supported, although inconsistent results have
been found.

51

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

W egner’s (1989) ironic processes theory o f mental control suggests that mental
control interacts with thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. Janelle (1999) applied this
theory to sport performance. Under conditions o f high cognitive load, which are thought
to be common in sport performance, self-regulation effectiveness is thought to be
reduced. Janelle (1999) stated that breakdowns in mental control may explain paradoxical
effects observed in sport performance. When mental control resources are compromised,
attempts to suppress negative thoughts may increase the occurrence o f these thoughts and
interfere with performance. Janelle speculates that ironic processes may include motor
control problems stemming from negative self-talk, problems controlling attentional
focus, mood states, negative expectations, negative images, arousal management
problems, and confidence loss. Thus ironic processes theory is use to account for
paradoxical findings that occur when, for instance golfers think “whatever you do, don’t
hit the ball in the water” and proceed to execute the action in opposition to this thought.
Hall, Hardy, and Gammage, (1999) suggest that other theories can equally or better
explain some o f the losses o f mental control (e.g., loss o f self-confidence, development of
negative images) experienced by athletes; and it is not apparent how researchers and
practitioners may benefit from using the theory o f ironic processes compared to these
other theories. Based on Van Raalte et al. (1994), Hall and colleagues (1999) speculated
that “negative thought processes are mostly verbal” (p. 223), especially when compared
to negative imagery, and that ironic processes occur verbally more fi'equently than
nonverbally. They suggest that this is because attentional resources may be allocated
differently in these two systems, which may be why elite athletes use more imagery to
avoid negative thoughts.
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Self-talk interventions typically involve efforts to identify, evaluate, and modify self
talk prior to and during performance. These interventions are grounded in the premise
that positive self-talk results in affective improvements such as reduced anxiety,
increased effort, and higher self-confidence (Finn, 1985; Weinberg, 1988) with
behavioral change (e.g., performance enhancement) as the end goal. Positive preparatory
self-statements are thought to improve physiological preparation (Rushall, 1982; 1984).
Self-talk may be used for basic instructional assistance (Chorkawy, 1982; Zinnser,
Bunker, & Williams, 1998). Several studies suggest that self-talk increases motivation,
facilitates encouragement, and benefits performance (Desiderate & Miller, 1979;
Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1979; Weinberg, Jackson, & Smith, 1984). Thought content prior
to performance may be directed toward positive mood words and task-relevant content as
well (Anderson, 1997).
Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, and Kazakas (2000) evaluated the potential
performance effects o f motivational and instructional self-talk using an innovative
design. Motivational and instructional conditions were separately compared to a control
across four different performance tasks. This was carried out by conducting a series o f
four treatment outcome studies, each with a different sample. Significantly better
performance was predicted for the instructional intervention (i.e., “I see the net, 1 see the
target,” “1 move fast and strong”) in tasks involving greater technique skill, timing, and
precision (i.e., soccer accuracy test, badminton service test). The motivational
intervention (instructions to say “1 can” immediately prior to the task) was predicted to
lead to statistically significant improvements in strength and endurance tasks (e.g., knee
extension test). In the first study, 72 male high school soccer players were matched for
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accuracy in an empirically validated soccer passing test and subsequently assigned to the
motivational condition, instructional condition, or a control condition in which they heard
no self-talk instructions. After the matching trial, participants performed the soccer test a
total o f four more times. Consistent with predictions, instructional condition participants
performed significantly more accurate passes than control and motivational participants.
Forty-eight university students volunteered for the second study, which used a similar
experimental design for performance on a badminton serve test. Consistent with the first
study, instructional participants performed significantly better than participants in the
other control and motivational conditions. Using a similar design, the third study
examined the performance o f 54 high school students on three minutes o f sit-ups. No
significant performance differences emerged; however motivational condition
participants performed more sit-ups during the last trial than participants in the other
conditions. The fourth and final study examined strength and endurance with 63
university students on a test measuring leg extension performance. After being matched
for performance, participants were assigned to one o f the three experimental conditions.
Results o f this study indicated that the motivational and instructional participants
performed significantly better in the leg extension test than those in the control condition.
In summary, these four studies suggested that instructional interventions are indicated for
tasks requiring fine motor movements and precision, whereas, for strength and endurance
performance, instructional and motivational tasks are equally effective. Far from being an
entirely novel notion, this conclusion is consistent with several studies that have
demonstrated the effectiveness o f instructional strategies for complicated technical tasks.
Rushall and Shewchuk (1989), for example, reported performance improvements for
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swimmers following self-talk focused on task-relevant content, positive mood words, and
other positive thinking strategies.
Even simple cues such as “step, swing” in tennis appear to stimulate cognitive
associations that encourage the acquisition o f appropriate task execution (Bunker,
Williams, & Zinsser, 1993; Zinnser et al., 1998). Self-talk that is rehearsed prior to
performance can improve speed and volume o f work output for athletic tasks during
practices, leading to improved skill execution in competition (Rushall, Hall, Roux,
Sasseville, & Rushall, 1988). Despite the empirical support for these strategies, the
methods o f implementation (i.e., instructions from others, self-instructions) have varied
across studies, and optimal methods have not been determined.
Hardy and Jones (1994) called for the development of techniques for gathering and
evaluating self-statements because, despite the apparently important role o f self-talk in
sports performance, they believed that the amount of research in this area was
disappointing. Expressed throughout the performance enhancement literature is a call for
increased methodological thoroughness, examination o f the processes through which
interventions operate, extension o f research to the field, the need to consider
multidimensional mediating individual factors, and the identification o f effective
mechanisms o f instructing athlete populations in use o f interventions (Gould & Udry,
1994; Hardy & Jones, 1994; Meyers et al., 1996). Frequently suggested throughout the
literature is further evaluation o f the conditions under which specific interventions may
be indicated. Studies in performance profiling and treatment matching appear promising
(Jones, 1993; Doyle & Gaynor, 1997).
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Research that has examined self-talk, self-instruction, and self-monitoring has relied
rather strongly on retrospective self-report and indirect measures o f these processes. The
narrow focus on these processes at the expense o f understanding cognitive processes is
evident in the blatant prejudice that all thinking is in words. Thus research appears to
have been conducted deductively, driven by the theoretical assumption that self-talk, instruction, and -monitoring must exist in cognition and may therefore be associated with
sport performance. The present study incorporates methods to capture internal processes
such as self-talk and a wider array of other internal phenomena that occur during sport
performance using inductive exploration rather than a confirmatory deductive procedure.
Attention
Attentional focus strategies posit the existence o f difference types o f attention related
to performance. For instance, Nideffer (1986) proposed two dimensions o f attention:
width and direction. These dimensions theoretically allow four patterns o f attention broad-external, broad internal, narrow-external, and narrow-internal. Depending on the
nature of the performance task, an athlete is thought to shift between different these types
o f focus. Different sports are thought to require different types o f focus. Attentional focus
strategies may be directed at enhancing performance directly through concentration on
sensory or motor processes (Mallet & Hanrahan, 1997). These strategies may also be
directed at influencing other internal processes thought to be associated with successful
performance such as managing arousal levels, increasing or decreasing them depending
on the task demands, in order to facilitate concentration (Nideffer, 1986).
Several investigations have demonstrated attentional differences between athletes of
different skill levels. In an early study of attentional styles, Kirshenbaum and Bale (1980)

56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

found better golfers reported high sensitivity to external distractions, struggled more with
overly narrow attentional focus, and experienced specific worry more than did less
skilled golfers. Highlen and Bennett (1983) found that reported concentration
distinguished qualifiers from nonqualifiers in wrestling and diving, with qualifiers
reporting greater ability to concentrate.
Other attention studies have examined associative and dissociative strategies,
especially in endurance tasks (e.g., long-distance running, aerobic exercise, rowing).
Associative strategies involve directing attention toward performance, whereas
dissociative strategies involve directing attention away from performance. One major
finding indicates that experienced athletes tend to report utilizing associative strategies
(Tammen, 1996), whereas inexperienced athletes tend to report incorporating dissociative
strategies (Brewer, Van Raalte, & Linder, 1996; Connolly & Janelle, 2003; Morgan &
Pollock, 1977; Ungerleider, Golding & Porter, 1989), but this finding may be restricted to
endurance tasks.
Attention research has also has examined the effects of attentional strategies on task
performance. Using a within-subjects design, Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes
(2002) had participants engage in a putting task under two attentional conditions: skillfocused and dual task. In the skill-focused condition, participants were instructed to
attend specifically to their golf-putting swing (e.g., monitor the swing, follow through,
and say “stop” out loud). In the dual-task condition, participants putted while listening to
randomly occuring target and distractor tones. Upon hearing the target tones, they were
instructed to say “tone” out loud. The single focus condition, which instructed a step-bystep attentional focus process, led to increased performance on tasks for which athletes

57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

had lower relative skill. Conversely, the same step-by-step attentional focus strategy was
debilitative when used by athletes for whom tasks were well learned whereas a divided
attention distraction task appeared to facilitate performance. These results were
demonstrated for both golfers and soccer players. Skilled soccer players dribbling with
their dominant (right) foot performed best under a distraction (dual-task) condition. In the
skill-focused (e.g., step-by-step) condition, skilled soccer players dribbled more
accurately with their non-dominant (left) foot than the dual-task condition. Both
dominant and non-dominant novice dribbling performance was optimal under the skillfocused condition. A similar pattern o f results was found for skilled golfers. Putting
accuracy was highest for skilled golfers under the dual-task condition. The authors
concluded that “whereas novices and the less-proficient performances o f experts benefit
from online attentional monitoring o f step-by-step performance, high-level skill
execution is harmed” (Beilock et al., 2002, p. 6). However, this finding was not replicated
for higher skilled putters as accuracy did not significantly differ on single versus dual
task condition in a different study (Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002). The authors o f
both studies stated the evidence did support the notion that well-learned skills are more
automated and requires less attentional resources.
More recently, Poolton, Maxwell, Masters, and Raab (2006) found that attentional
focus has an effect on learning to putt. Groups learned to putt under different conditions
either 1) being instructed to focus on the movement o f the putter (external focus) or 2) on
their hands (internal focus). The external group’s performance remained robust, whereas
the internal group’s performance dropped significantly.
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The efficacy o f attentional focus interventions has been mixed. Developing focus
plans based on managing arousal via attentional focus has been shown to be effective for
100 meter sprinting performance (Mallet & Hanrahan, 1997) with elite sprinters using a
multiple baseline design. Meta-analysis by Meyers and colleagues (1996) reported a large
effect size {d = 1.21) for attentional focus interventions; however, standard deviations
were so large {SD =1.61) that the effect size was nonsignificant.
Research on attention in sport performance has often used retrospective and indirect
measures o f this cognitive phenomenon rather that dealing with attention more directly
and immediately. The experiments by Beilock and colleagues (2002) and Poolton, and
collegeaus (2006) are exceptions to this due to the lack o f reliance on self-report. Even
so, the observation o f different performance for more and less experienced athletes under
different experimentally manipulated conditions was not replicated and still deals will
attention quite indirectly. Thus research on attention in sport performance could also be
improved with more direct and immediate methods.
Imagery ■
Imagery is one o f the most studied internal processes in sport psychology and the
most frequently used mental rehearsal strategy (Meyers et al., 1996). Imagery has been
described as internal visual experience in the absence o f visual stimuli. In the context o f
athletic performance, imagery has been defined as broadly as using all o f the human
senses to re-create or create an experience in the mind (Vealey & Greenleaf, 2001) and as
narrowly as “symbolic sensory experiences that may occur in any sensory mode” (Hardy
et al., 1996, p. 28).
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Several theories have been posited to explain why imagery might facilitate
performance (e.g., psychoneuromuscular, symbolic learning, bioinformational,
attentional-arousal), but most suggest that imagery interacts with other mental (e.g.,
attention, arousal, learning) and physical (e.g., muscles memory) processes (Vealy &
Greenleaf, 2001). Paivio (1985) offered a parsimonious conceptualization, suggesting
that the function o f imagery in sport performance is cognitive and motivational.
According to Paivio, specific or general performance goals may be accomplished using
cognitive or motivational imagery. Hall, Buckolz, and Fishbume (1992) also considered
imagery to have “both a motivational and a cognitive role in mediating behavior” (p. 19).
Imagery use by athletes has been reported to be as high as 99% (Orlick & Partington,
1988), but imagery ability has been shown to be individually different (Hall & Martin,
1997; Overby, 1990). Olympic athletes reported that attentional focus and imagery were
the most important mental skills at the Olympics (Orlick & Partington, 1988).
Imagery use has been linked to performance success. Highlen and Bennett (1983)
found self-reported use of imagery distinguished qualifiers from nonqualifiers in
wrestling and diving. Crews and Boutcher (1986) found that successful LPGA golfers
used significantly longer full swing and preshot routines compared to lower-ranked
players, a result that led Crews and Boutcher to speculate that successful LPGA golfers
might have more developed visualization and imagery strategies. McCaffery and Orlick
( 1989) interviewed golf professional instructors and top touring professional players and
asked them what factors the believed were related to excellence. Commonly reported
factors included commitment, goal setting, practice and tournament planning, tournament
focus control, distraction control, tournament evaluation, mental preparation, and
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imagery training. Somewhat more direct investigations o f the relationship between
imagery and performance followed, but no study has directly investigated imagery use in
golf during performance.
The potency o f imagery for motor performance was demonstrated for tasks requiring
the acquisition of new skills. Rawlings, Rawlings, Chen and Yilk (1972) examined motor
performance acquisition on a rotary pursuit tracking task with three practice conditions
(mental, physical, no practice control). After 10 days o f practice with 24 females, the
physical practice and mental rehearsal groups were superior to the no-practice control
condition, and between group comparisons indicated both physical practice and mental
rehearsal groups were equally proficient. For 20 males, a combined mental and physical
practice group learned faster than the physical-practice-only group. Although physical
practice is typically more facilitative o f performance, mental rehearsal, including
techniques such as imagery, is typically more effective at enhancing performance than
controls (Feltz & Landers, 1983; Hall et al., 1992; Meyers et al., 1996). According to
Hall and Bemoties (1995) and Hall and colleagues (1992), imaginai practice may be
more effective on certain occasions due to the nature o f the motor task, the imagery
abilities o f the individual, and the type o f imagery used.
The relationship between imagery and performance has been studied quite
extensively in golf. Because much o f the research has been based on novices on putting
tasks in artificial laboratory conditions in skill acquisition studies, the generalizability of
these findings to competition in natural environments is questionable. It is also not
apparent how well these studies related to higher skilled and elite athletes. Despite these
limitations, which extend to the entire field of sport psychology (see ecological validity
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problems as discussed by Meyers et al., 1996), imagery strategies employing positive
thought content have typically been associated with improved performance.
Woolfolk, Murphy, and Gottesfeld, (1985) investigated the effects o f using imaginai
strategies incorporating positive and negative outcomes in a controlled experiment with
50 male students on a simple motor skill accuracy task (putting a golf ball). Findings
indicated lower performance in conditions employing negative outcome imagery.
Enhancement of performance resulted from positive outcome imagery. Self-efficacy was
correlated with performance. The authors interpreted this as being most likely due to “the
strong relationships between these variables and performance on the previous trial.”
Nonetheless, imaginai strategies related sport outcome had stronger influence on
performance than brief mental rehearsal o f movements. In a different controlled study,
Woolfolk, Parrish, and Murphy (1985) examined imagining positive and negative
outcomes on golf putting using 30 students. Positive imagery led to significantly more
improvement compared to controls, whereas negative imagery resulted in worse
performance. Imagery influenced self-confidence as well.
Meacci and Pastore (1995) studied the effects o f different imagery modalities for golf
putting acquisition and retention with 80 student participants who registered for
beginning golf classes. Putting performance was measured for visual contact with
imagery, nonvisual contact with imagery, visual contact, and control conditions. Putting
acquisition was significantly higher among the combined no vision and visual imagery
condition participants than it was among the combined visual practice with the ball and
no imagery participants. In addition, no differences were found for the no vision imagery
condition compared with visual imagery for acquisition or retention of putting skill.
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Martin and Hall (1995) conducted a controlled experiment with 39 beginners to
examine the influence o f a golf putting-related imagery intervention on golf putting
practice and task specific self-efficacy. The imagery group used significantly more
putting practice, set higher goals, had more realistic self-expectations, and had higher
outside lab practice adherence than did controls.
Imagery functions are thought to be cognitive and motivational and may be directed
toward specific or general performance goals (Hall et al., 1992; Paivio, 1985). Short,
Bruggeman, and Engel (2002) conducted a controlled experiment with 83 participants to
examine the potential interaction between imagery function and imagery direction on golf
putting performance. Participants were randomly assigned to either a 1) cognitive specific
only; 2) motivational general mastery only; 3) cognitive specific and facilitative imagery;
4) cognitive specific and debilitative imagery; 5) motivational general mastery and
facilitative imagery; 6) motivational general mastery and debilitative imagery, only; or 7)
a no imagery control group. A 3 (imagery direction) x 3 (imagery function) x 2 (gender)
ANCOVA indicated higher mean performance for the facilitative compared to the
debilitative group. Results reflected an interaction as predicted, which suggested that
“imagery direction and imagery function can affect self-efficacy and performance and
that males and females respond differently to imagery interventions” (Short et al., 2002,
p. 48).
Smith and Holmes (2004) conducted a controlled investigation o f different modalities
o f delivering imagery interventions go experienced golfers. Participants were randomly
assigned to control or experimental conditions. Experimental participants were delivered
personalized image interventions via either written, audio, or video scripts. Control
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participants spent equivalent time reading golf literature. Post-tests indicated video and
audio groups performed significantly better than did written script and control groups,
suggesting that imagery intervention format is important for intervention success (Smith
et al., 2004).
Not all studies have found that imagery facilitates performance. Lutz, Landers, and
Linder (2001) found that mentally practicing a good task outcome produced better
performance than mental practice o f task form with golfers. The effectiveness o f imagery
depended on level o f skill, however. Highly skilled golfers’ performances actually
deteriorated after mental practice, whereas performance improved for less skilled
participants. Studies using imagery have also demonstrated no effects on performance
(Andre & Means, 1986).
Paradoxical effects have been studies in imagery as well. A paradoxical effect may
occur when negative imagery suppression leads to the opposite experience, the activation
o f the negative imagery, making reduced performance more likely. Beilock, Afremow,
and Rabe (2001) examined the frequency and impact o f paradoxical performance in golf
using a controlled 3 x 2 imagery type (positive, suppression, suppression-replacement) by
imagery frequency (before every or every third putt) factorial design using 126 novice
golfers. The positive imagery group was instructed to imagine motor functions leading to
eventual performance success. The suppression group was instructed not to imagine
missing. The suppression replacement condition was instructed not to imagine missing,
but they were instructed that if they did, they should try to replace the image with one of
performance success. Performance in the positive imagery condition improved for both
imagery frequencies. The suppression and suppression-replacement imagery groups’
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accuracy improved with low frequency imagery, but performance deteriorated with
higher frequency (i.e., when imaging before every putt). The author concluded that
suppressive imagery was deleterious to performance and that efforts to replace negative
images with positive ones did not restore performance to positive levels (Beilock et al.,
2001 ).

Interventions incorporating imaginai rehearsal are thought to improve performance by
better preparing athletes for competition. “By confronting possible problems, practicsing
[sic.] means o f coping with them, and overcoming them in mental imagery, the athlete
should be better able to cope in the reality o f the sports competition (Biddle, 1995, p.
185).” The diverse collection o f practices that constitute imaginai rehearsal typically
includes closing the eyes and visualizing motor skills, and can include auditory, visual,
and emotional stimuli (Suinn, 1993). Research suggests that more experienced athletes
benefit from mental practice when compared to novices (Suinn, 1993), although many
studies demonstrate the positive effects o f imagery on performance for novices as well,
and inconsistent finds are prevalent. Imaginai rehearsal has been shown to be effective
alone (Lutz et al., 2001; Rawlings et al., 1972; Short et al., 2002, Smith et al., 2004;
Woolfolk et al., 1985a; 1985b) and when combined with additional interventions
(Kendall et al., 1990).
Imagery has been studied quite extensively in relation to sport performance. As we
have seen throughout this review, this research has used retrospective and indirect
measures rather that dealing with imagery more directly and immediately. The present
study will attempt to examine whether imagery and other inner experiences occur during
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golf performance using a more direct and immediate method o f examining inner
experience.
Self-Confidence & Self-Efficacy
According to Bandura (1977), psychological processes influence self-efficacy, one’s
perceived capability for successful action, and related expectations determine behavior.
Self-efficacy is thought to by determined by performance accomplishments, vicarious
experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states, with the more consistent
experiences being more influential on self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). This theory has been
extended to sport performance behavior, as the relationship between previous and
subsequent performance is thought to be mediated by self-efficacy (Krane & Williams,
1992). Like most internal process related constructs. Hardy and colleagues (1996)
suggest that research is characterized by a “general lack o f consensus over how selfconfidence should be both conceptualised [sic] and operationlised [sic].” Nonetheless,
Hardy and colleagues (1996) conceptualize confidence as a being both a global construct
“associated with overall performance expectancies in sport” (p. 45) as well as a state-like
phenomenon related specifically to performance tasks. Self-efficacy is typically seen as
“situation-specific self-confidence” (Hardy et al., 1996, p. 46).
Two specific types o f statements received prior to performance appear to improve
performance. Motivational statements seem to inspire greater effort, generate a positive
mood, and increase self-confidence, whereas task-relevant instructional statements may
enhance performance by directing desired behavior on tasks through focusing on strategy
execution (Hardy et al., 1996). Motivation and attention to technical skills appear to be
key factors in performance enhancement efforts.
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Efficacy is thought to lead to effort and determination and is typically enhanced via
modeling, observational learning, ensuring successful accomplishments in practice, and
verbal persuasion. Through enhancing efficacy, arousal, which is cognitively appraised as
readiness for performance, may increase, thus increasing the probability o f enhancing
performance (Singer et al., 1993). Anxiety has been proposed as being inversely related
to self-efficacy as performance expectations may lead to worry, negative thinking, and
behavior change (Feltz, 1992). Thus performance expectations are believed to directly
influence an athlete's level o f cognitive anxiety, or worry, and athletic performance
(Krane & Williams, 1992). Self-efficacy strategies, self-statements, and simply focusing
on arousal to increase arousal state self-awareness have been incorporated within with
mental preparation strategies to improve performance (Meyers et al., 1996).
Unfortunately, efficacy may be an effect o f successful performance rather than its
cause, a possibility overlooked by correlational designs. Research has identified a
tentative reciprocal influence between performance and self-efficacy (Feltz, 1982, 1988;
Feltz & Mugno, 1983). Krane and Williams (1992), however, failed to find support for
the relationship between performance and state confidence, citing different measurement
techniques as a likely cause. State confidence was the best predictor o f golf performance
in a different study of female college golfers, however (Krane & Williams, 1987).
Despite the hypothesized relationship between self-efficacy and performance, the
direction o f the relationship is difficult to determine. For instance, Highlen and Bennett
(1983) found that self-reported confidence distinguished qualifiers from nonqualifiers in
wrestling and diving. Woolfolk and colleagues (1985a) found that imagery was positively
related to self-confidence in golf. Nonetheless, it is not evident whether confidence leads
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to performance success or reverse causation occurs. Unfortunately, simple linear
deterministic views of the confidence-performance relationship are omnipresent in
conventional circles, and to some extent this has been encouraged by researchers such as
Bob Rotella, the author o f G olf is a Game o f Confidence (1996). An example o f when
simple unidirectional models fail occurs when, similar to arousal and anxiety, excessive
confidence may be deleterious to performance. In fact Kirshenbaum, O ’Connor, and
Owens (1999) found that when golfers o f different skill were overly optimistic (e.g.,
positive illusions) about their skill, decreased performance success on challenging holes
resulted. The authors suggested this may have resulted from overly aggressive shot
selection. In addition, McAuley (1985) found that precompetitive anxiety measures did
not predict performance among college golfers, but golf performance significantly
predicted o f post competition cognitive state anxiety and self-confidence. Thus selfconfidence may be an effect of successful performance rather than its cause. Finally,
recall that Hardy et al. (2004) found that self-confidence played a moderating role
between anxiety and performance. Self-confidence may therefore be related to
performance other in a more complex multidimensional manner.
In summary, self-confidence and self-efficacy have been studied quite extensively in
relation to sport performance. Consistent with our recurring theme, research on imagery
in sport has used retrospective and indirect measures rather that dealing with selfconfidence and self-efficacy more directly and immediately. The present study will
attempt to examine whether these and other inner experiences occur during golf
performance using a more direct and immediate method o f examining inner experience.
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Performance Enhancement Interventions that Target Cognitive Processes
As evident from the review o f emotion research in sport performance, interventions
from the cognitive-behavioral perspective dominate the field of sport psyehology. Over
the last few decades, several researchers examining performance enhancement
interventions adopted the fundamental assumptions that 1) behavior is determined by
internal processes such as thoughts and emotions and, 2) cognitive processes ean be
modified to facilitate optimal performance behaviors. Albert Ellis (1982), as well as
Williams and Leffingwell (1996), acknowledged the pervasiveness o f irrational beliefs in
sport, which are so common they have become cliches (e.g., “no pain, no gain,” “winning
isn’t everything, it’s the only thing”). Thus performanee difficulties were hypothesized to
be related to disturbed cognitive patterns, whieh could be identified and restructured into
logical and positive cognitive patterns. Optimal internal processes, desired behavior, and
enhanced performance were expected to follow.
Thought content associated with optimal performance has been examined in several
investigations. Greenspan and Feltz’s (1989) review of performance enhancement
interventions suggested that successful athletes have reported using cognitive strategies
differently than did less successful athletes, and the authors speculated that this may have
led to better performance. In a qualitative study, Gould, Eklund, and Jackson (1992)
interviewed all 20 members o f the 1988 Olympic wrestling team and found that wrestlers
reported their best performances after using mental preparation techniques targeting
confidence, optimal arousal, focusing attention, and tactics. In addition, golfers reported
more self-eonfidenee in tournament competition preceded by cognitive reinforcement
strategies (Cohn, 1991). Hundreds o f studies have evaluated the effectiveness of
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cognitive-behavioral interventions, many o f which seem to be multi-component
interventions (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989).
Meyers and colleagues (1996) performed a meta-analysis o f the effieacy o f several o f
the rapidly proliferating cognitive-behavioral interventions, including goal setting,
imagery and mental rehearsal, cognitive self-management, arousal management (as
previously discussed), and multi-component interventions that combine components o f
many o f these interventions. Goal setting emphasizes near term, midterm, and long term
performance goals that are specific, concrete, and measurable. Challenging and realistic
goals are evaluated in terms o f attainment with emphasis on process and effort over the
performance outcome. The effectiveness o f goal setting strategies on performance has
been equivocal, but research has been promising, and a small number o f studies
demonstrated moderate effectiveness (c/= 54, 5D = .15) according to Meyers and
colleagues (1996). Imagery and mental rehearsal involves interventions incorporating
strategies for visualizing specific factors assessed as essential to optimal performance.
The diverse collection o f practices that constitute imaginai rehearsal typically includes
closing the eyes, visualizing motor skills, and can include using auditory, visual, and
emotional stimuli (Suinn, 1993). Research suggested that more experienced athletes
benefit from mental practice when compared to novices (Suinn, 1993). Imaginai rehearsal
has been shown to be more effective when combined with additional interventions, and
multi-component interventions have been efficacious (Meyers et al., 1996). Mental
rehearsal was combined with relaxation and self-talk by Kendall and colleagues (1990)
and found to be effective for enhancing basketball performance during games. Cognitive
self-management interventions include attentional focus, self-instruction, self-monitoring.
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and cognitive restructuring. With the exception o f attentional focus and self-instruction
strategies, all interventions have demonstrated at least moderate efficacy when compared
with controls, according to Meyers and colleagues (1996). In addition, multi-component
interventions, consisting o f a combination o f the aforementioned interventions, have
demonstrated efficacy in controlled studies. Thus two existing literature review supported
the efficacy o f several cognitive-behavioral interventions (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989;
Meyers et al., 1996). Although these interventions have demonstrated efficacy, it is not
apparent how these interventions operate in relation to inner experience because few
studies have directly addressed this.
Cognition Summary
The notion that successful performance depends on control o f mental processes is
pervasive throughout the field o f sport psychology. The understanding o f these processes
is limited by the overwhelming reliance upon retrospective self-report evident in the field
o f sport psychology. Rather than directly assessing the experience o f these phenomena
during sport performance, the majority o f studies have dealt with cognitive processes
indirectly and retrospectively. Because the results o f so many studies depend on the
method o f retrospective self-report, embarrassingly little is actually understood about the
actual cognitive processes that occur during performance in general and golf performance
in particular.
Emotion <Sc Cognition Conclusion
A multitude of internal processes have been associated tentatively with successful
performance including optimal arousal, successful coping with stress, positive mood
states, positive and even negative emotions, positive self-talk, attentional focus, positive
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self- confidence, and positive imagery, although findings have been inconsistent.
Although cognitive-behavioral interventions have been generally effective (Greenspan &
Feltz, 1989) for both team and individual sports, for open-skill tasks such as soccer and
closed-skill tasks such as golf, and for tasks requiring accuraey, strength, and endurance
(Meyers et al., 1996), this does not imply the mechanisms through which these
interventions operate are understood.
Investigations of inner experience in sport performance that have been conducted to
date have typically been retrospective and indirect. Most o f these studies have been
conducted under the apparent assumption that athletes have the capacity simultaneously
to compete and to report about internal processes without significant distortions. This
assumption is contradicted by the acknowledged the limitations o f retrospective selfreport — these methods may be limited by participants’ verbal ability and self-awareness
(Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1989), social desirability, demand characteristics, social
and experimental expectations, and reactivity due to repeated assessments (see Raglin &
Hanin, 2000). A lack o f concordance between retrospective self-reports and daily reports
has also been found (Ptacek, Smith, Espe, & Rafferty, 1994). Problems with retrospective
self-report may lead to fundamental misunderstandings about inner experience. The
limitations of retrospective self-report measures may explain the prevalence o f
inconsistent findings in sport psychology research. Despite this, self-report measures are
quite frequently used to study inner experience in sport performance with little
consideration or use o f alternative methods. Alternative methods o f examining internal
processes such as directly investigating inner experience during sport performance may
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illuminate athletes’ experiences and overcome the inherent limitations associated with
retrospective self-report.
Few explorations have extensively examined inner experiences that occur during
sport performance, and even fewer have done so in golf. No study has ever been
conducted that that directly, immediately, and thoroughly examined the wide array o f
inner experiences in sport performance while giving equal attention to the presence o f
any and all possible inner experiences. The explorations o f these internal processes that
have been conducted to date have typically been retrospective, indirect, and rather
narrowly-focused. Notable exceptions to the latter include Klinger et al. (1981) and
Hudson et al. (2002), and these studied could easily be improved. Few studies have
examined the phenomenological frequency o f internal processes (e.g., emotions,
thoughts, etc.), the degree o f individual differences or similarities, and even the presence
versus the possibility they may be absent during athletic performance and competition.
Without methods that directly assess internal phenomena, the presence of these
phenomena during any period o f time is questionable. Conversely the a priori assumption
that specific internal phenomena are present during performance combined with the
delivery o f specific retrospective self-report instruments to measure them may encourage
unintended response biases.
The current study sought to examine these processes extensively, methodically, and
inductively during sport performance in a naturalistic context with both moderately and
highly skilled athletes, following past methodological suggestions (Greenspan & Feltz,
1989; Hardy et al, 1996; Meyers et al, 1996). Idiographic descriptions provided by the
method may further illuminate the experience o f internal processes assumed to exist in
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sport performatice, processes that are far from well-understood. Findings generated by
the current study may support or undermine existing theories or observations, but in
either case, information will be provided to better inform future investigations. The
following chapter will describe methods for how this will be accomplished by
considering inner experience sampling methods in general, the rationale for the current
study, and a methodological overview o f the current study. Thus the following chapter
largely departs from research in sport psychology and discusses inner experience
sampling methods, with a notable emphasis on studies that have been conducted in sport
performance when they have been conducted.
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CHAPTER 2

INNER EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHODS
The purpose o f this chapter is to examine inner experience sampling methods relevant
to the current study. This will be accomplished in two ways. First, methods of sampling
inner experience in general will be reviewed. Second, a rationale and an overview o f the
methods for the current study will be provided.
Methods o f Exploring the Phenomena o f Inner Experience: A Review
In this section, five methods o f sampling inner experience will be sequentially
reviewed. Examples o f studies from each o f the different methods will be used. Speeific
emphasis will be plaeed on studies that have been conducted in sport performance if they
could be found. If no studies were found, examples o f studies will be used from outside
the field of sport performance. Finally, the relative strengths and weaknesses o f these
methods will be examined.
Introduction
Renewed interest in the study o f inner experiential phenomena such as cognitions and
emotions has led to the development o f methods to examine inner experience (Ericsson,
2003). Methods that attempt to circumvent the inherent limitations of both retrospective
self-report as well as those o f traditional introspeetion have emerged in recent decades.
The five sampling procedures that will be described target specific moments o f inner
experience immediately after their occurrences in order to reduce memory distortions
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(Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987 ) and enhance ecological validity by sampling phenomena
in more natural environments (Hormuth, 1986).
The think aloud method has participants report their thoughts out loud continuously
while performing a task o f interest. Thought and Mood Sampling randomly or quasirandomly prompts participants to respond to questionnaires related to their thought
content and often their emotional experience. Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA)
prompts participants to report about inner experience phenomena as they occur in the
natural environment using a broad range o f flexible measures (Jones-Forrester, 2004),
and information about the elements o f the environment related to momentary experience
is also collected (Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999). The Experience Sampling Method
(ESM) typically asks the same set o f questions about thinking, mood, and the
environment, typically using a narrower range o f self-report measures than does EMA.
The latter collects more information about the elements of the environment related to
momentary experience (Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999). Descriptive Experience
Sampling (DES) randomly prompts participants to report about momentary inner
experience and provides narrative descriptions o f the details o f experience. All o f these
methods attempt to reduce distortions o f memory associated with retrospective self-report
and enhance ecological validity. O f these methods, we will see that DES 1) is the least
likely to be influenced by the limitations o f self-report because it avoids using these
measures to examine inner experience, 2) goes to the greatest length to reduce
experimenter bias, 3) goes to the greatest length to facilitate accurate reporting by
extensively training participants in the method, and 4) provides the most extensive
description of momentary inner experience.
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Researchers have described momentary experience sampling methods by their
inherent attributes (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Payne, 1994), the techniques they use and
the type of data they generate (Hurlburt, 1997), the degree of focus on environmental
factors (Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries (1999), and the interval used to signal participants’
reporting (Reis & Gable, 2000). Ericsson and Simon (1993) described the think aloud
method by its attributes. The think aloud approach has participants continuously report
their thoughts out loud while performing a task of interest (Payne, 1994) such as a
problem-solving task, and many times verbalizations are reeorded on tape (Yang, 2003),
after which the researcher analyzes and codes verbal reports. In 1997, Hurlburt reviewed
three experience sampling methods: Thought and Mood Sampling, ESM, and DES. The
common feature described included that fact these methods have participants carry
beepers that signal at random or quasirandom intervals, and sampling occurs in natural
environments. Two o f these methods. Thought and Mood Sampling and ESM, were
lumped together as “loose categories o f quantitative methods” (p. 941), as both typieally
have participants fill out quantitative questionnaires at beeped intervals. The third, DES
was categorized as qualitative because it has participants write a short narrative
description o f the experience and attend a subsequent interview. Stone, Shiffman, and
DeVries (1999) distinguished EMA from ESM as the former examines elements o f the
environment related to momentary experience as well as momentary inner experience.
Other researchers even have categorized sampling methods based on the interval used to
signal participants’ reporting (Reis & Gable, 2000). Reporting can depend on an event
that occurs (event-contingent), a chosen time period (interval-contingent), or a randomly
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generated signal (signal-contingent), and the latter has been more typically recommended
due to its potential to reduce sampling bias (Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003).
Although researchers have described momentary experience sampling methods in
several ways, this review will use methodological attributes and the type o f data they
generate to distinguishes them from one another. As we will see, the common feature of
these methods is their purpose. These sampling procedures all target specific moments o f
inner experience immediately after their occurrences in order to reduce memory
distortions (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987) and seek to enhance ecological validity by
sampling phenomena in more realistic if not natural environments. The five prominent
methods for sampling inner experience that will be reviewed are the think aloud method.
Thought and Mood Sampling, EMA, the ESM, and DES. These five methods will be
reviewed because o f their similar purpose.
Studies that have explored inner experience related to sport performance using these
methods will be used as examples methods during this review. Since few studies have
accomplished this however, examples o f sampling studies outside o f sport performance
will be discussed when sport studies are absent. Thus sampling literature will be reviewed
by providing two types of studies: 1) sampling and 2) sport-related sampling studies.
Finally, the strengths and weaknesses o f experience sampling methods will be presented.
The Think-Aloud Method
The first sampling method that will be described is the think aloud method. This
method has participants report their thoughts out loud continuously while performing a
task of interest (Payne, 1994). Examples o f tasks include problem-solving as well as sport
performance-related processes. Verbalizations are often recorded on tape (Yang, 2003).
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Finally, researchers organize, analyze, and code verbal reports (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).
In this section, first the think aloud method will be described in more detail. Next, five
studies that were found that used the think aloud method to examine thoughts related to
sport performance will be described. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses o f this method
will be discussed.
In 1980, Ericsson and Simon developed a framework for using verbal reports of
thoughts as data. Ericsson and Simon (1980) believed that accurate verbal reports could
be obtained by having participants think aloud rather than relying solely on retrospective
self-report. Think aloud participants have been instructed to “say out loud everything that
you say to yourself silently” (p. 376) or “tell me EVERYTHING you are thinking” (p.
378) while in the process o f doing something such as solving math problems or
anagrams. Concurrent verbal reports were recommended so processing and verbal reports
could coincide in time, thus avoiding reliance on participants’ inferences about their
mental processes and memory distortions (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1993). To
accomplish this, think aloud studies have tape recorded verbal reports for later analysis
(Ram & McCullagh, 2003). Thus the goal o f the think aloud method is to examine the
actual concurrent sequences o f thoughts from verbal reports during experimental
activities (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).
Five think aloud studies were found that examined thoughts related to sport
performance. Four of these studies sampled experience indirectly related to sport
performance by sampling outside o f the actual competitive setting, using the think aloud
method in skill acquisition, analogue sport situations, and during an intervention. Only
one study examined thinking directly by interrupting sport performance. First, the four
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indirect studies will be described. After this, the only study to directly examine inner
experience by interrupting actual sport performance will be described.
The first o f these studies, by McPherson (1993), used the think aloud method to
examine the influence of player experience on problem solving during a baseball batting
analogue situation. Twelve experts (college baseball players), one o f their coaches, and
12 novices (undergraduates) watched one half-inning o f a college baseball game and
were instructed to assume the role o f the batter and think out loud during standard fixed
intervals immediately before batting and between each pitch o f their simulated at bat.
Verbal reports were transcribed verbatim and coded into 3 categories — conditions,
actions, or goals. Conditions were reports related to the performance situation (e.g., the
pitch, the pitcher, the base runner). Actions involved performance behaviors (e.g., hitting,
movement, visual tasks). Goals were experiences directed at influencing the outcome of
the game (e.g., driving in a base runner, avoiding a double-play, winning). Results
indicated that experts reported a significantly greater number o f thoughts about
conditions (M = 69.3, SD = 30.3) than did the novices {M = 40.2, SD - 23.2). In addition
to the number o f thoughts reported, which were greater on average for experts compared
with novices, the relative within-group frequencies o f condition, action, and goal related
thoughts were reported. No differences in the relative frequency o f these categories of
thought were found between the groups as groups reported similar frequencies of
conditions, actions, and goals. Experts’ reported thoughts were categorized as much more
sophisticated and based on problem-solving strategies compared to novices. For instance,
most experts thought about four well-defined condition concepts: a) past patterns, b) their
position as a hitter, c) game status, and d) the position o f the runners. Thus the rules that
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were described from experts’ reports reflected “more tactical, refined, and associated
compared to novices’ rules” (p. 304). In other words, thinking processes that emerged
from experts’ reports were more sophisticated, more extensive, more specific, and more
task-relevant than those o f novices. Expert reports also more frequently reflected selfregulatory strategies that allowed them to generate and modify their predictions o f pitcher
characteristics. The coach’s responses were generally similar to those o f the players.
This study was an indirect examination o f inner experience in sport performance
because a simulated videotaped analogue game situation was used. A direct examination
would sample inner experience during actual performance. Thus it is somewhat
ambiguous whether experts would use similar strategies during actual performance.
Nonetheless, differences between experts and novices would most likely stem from the
obvious difference between the groups in terms o f expertise. As both quantitative o f
qualitative data reflected, relatively consistent differences between experts and novices in
information processing during an analogue sport situation. This study demonstrates the
quality o f information that may be gained from immediate methods o f sampling inner
experience related to sport performance.
The second think aloud study found was a skill acquisition study that indirectly
examined of inner experience related to sport performance. Hare & Graber (2000)
investigated thinking misconceptions related to sport performance with fifth-grade
children (10-11 years o f age) learning floor hockey and soccer skills in physical
education classes. They non-randomly chose four participants including two high ability
males, one average ability female, and one low ability male from a class with 27 students.
Thoughts were collected during class instruction in sport skills. During this, participants
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were instructed to think aloud at non-random times in the presence o f a researcher who
encouraged participants to “say what you are thinking” (p. 62) into a wireless microphone
that transmitted to a receiver and was recorded via tape cassette. Raters then rated these
tapes to examine participants’ misconceptions. Misconceptions were assessed by
observations, interviews, open-ended daily question self-report cards, and interviews
asked about thinking that occurred after the think aloud procedure. Participants had three
to four recorded think aloud sessions each and were subsequently interviewed by
researchers in videotape-recorded session, although the authors failed to indicate how
much time elapsed between tape recordings and interviews. According to the authors, the
think aloud interviews were “the least valuable o f all procedures employed” because
“students had tremendous difficulty describing what they were thinking” (p. 71) and were
even discouraged from reporting by teachers for being “disruptive” (p. 71). Many times
they were silent or failed to comply. Thus participants only rarely conveyed what they
were thinking. Additional methodological problems occurred with the interviews
including short duration and limited compliance with participation, and daily question
self-report cards indicated participants’ difficulty in answering questions. These problems
call into question the results o f the study, which were qualitatively analyzed, but this did
not prevent the authors from drawing conclusions that misconceptions were “best
described as naïve conceptions” (p. 73), conclusions based mainly on interviews. Thus it
appears essential to consider individual factors (e.g., verbal ability, cognitive ability) as
well as contextual factors (e.g., group size) and interactions in designing sampling
studies.
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A third study by Ram and McCullagh (2003) used the think aloud method during an
intervention. Five intermediate-level volleyball players were administered an intervention
in a multiple baseline design. First, a baseline videotape o f other athletes performing
unrelated tasks in other sports was shown to participants to train them in the think aloud
task prior to the self-modeling intervention. The think aloud method instructed
participants to “verbalize what you notice on the videotape and how the videotape makes
you feel” (p. 228) while watching the video. Then, the think aloud method was used to
examine inner experience during a self-modeling intervention aimed at enhancing
volleyball performance and self-efficacy. This intervention had participants observe
videotaped segments of their best serve prior to performing 10 serves. Increases in serve
accuracy were observed, but the intervention was not found to be effective in terms of
increasing reported self efficacy. Five themes emerged from the verbalizations in
volleyball: description o f the sequence of movement (e.g., hitting the ball), description o f
movement process (e.g., keep eye on the ball), description of scenery (e.g., “there is
white on the wall in the background”), thoughts and affect (e.g., “this guy is sort of
boring,” “I love it”), interpretation o f the physical action (no examples provided), and
surprise and shock. Regarding the latter, participants found the images o f themselves on
videotape to be “shocking,” saying phrases such as “Oh God it’s m yself’ and “Oh my
goodness” (p. 234). Participants reported no shock seeing others during the baseline
video. One participant said “1 hope this isn’t going to be seen by anybody else” and “my
first reaction to it was that I looked horrible” (p. 238). Think aloud results indicated that
participants verbalized 24% fewer words in the intervention compared with the baseline
condition. A greater amount o f silence was also observed in the intervention compared
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with the baseline condition. The authors interpreted the greater amount o f silence and
fewer number o f words during think aloud and the intervention implied the intervention
was “demanding o f cognitive resources” (p. 220), which is consistent with Ericsson and
Simon’s interpretations when fewer words have been elicited (1993). In addition, the
authors believed that cognitive attention may have been “diverted from verbalization to
images of the se lf’ (p. 238), however without directly addressing this in a more detailed
interview, it seems difficult to explain exactly what “shocking” meant, and whether it
was experienced similarly or differently among participants. Nonetheless, the think aloud
method generated information during the intervention that would likely have otherwise
have been missed, which could explain the lack of intervention effectiveness. Relatively
detailed description o f inner experience is an advantage o f this method, although it will
become evident that the method to be used in the current study generates even more
extensive descriptions o f inner experience.
The fourth study was the first think aloud study to be found that sampled inner
experience directly during sport performance. Führer (1985) examined the thinking
process with 22 table tennis beginners by having them think aloud during experimentally
inserted interruptions o f the game. This study was a direct examination o f inner
experience in sport performance because it interrupted inner-experience during actual
performance. As such, this study partially resembles the Thought and Mood Sampling
method, which will later be described. Verbal reports suggested “a high percentage of
reported cognitions were related to the action o f playing table tennis” (p. 194), which
Führer stated was consistent with the notion that “playing table tennis is thought to
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involve action-related cognitions” (p. 194). No differences however were found between
winners and losers in terms o f action-related or non-action-related thoughts.
The fifth study also directly examined inner experience during performance. In 1995,
Langley examined cognitive focus with 20 undergraduate participants learning how to
bowl in a 10 week bowling class, a skill acquisition situation. Four sources o f data were
collected: daily participant reports (written responses to a 20-item skill learning
questionnaire), researcher observations and interpretations of behavior, informal
interviews, and verbal reports o f participants’ thoughts during think aloud sessions.
During these sessions, a subset o f the sample including 7 participants were instructed to
“tell what you are thinking” (p. 28) and reported their thoughts into a wireless
microphone that transmitted a signal to a tape-recorder for 20 minutes during practice o f
the bowling task. Results revealed that participants’ perspectives and thoughts were
generally related to mechanical errors and psychological mistakes during task
performance. Results from the think aloud sessions reflected “a central theme involving
error in task performance” (p. 30). According to Langley, “physical and psychological
states” (p. 30) and “improper bowling mechanics” were major cause[s] o f errors” (p. 31).
This study was also a direct examination of inner experience in sport performance and
partially resembles the Thought and Mood Sampling method, which will later be
described.
Davison, Robins, and Johnson (1983) modified the think aloud method to create the
Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS) method. This method
provides open-ended verbal reporting o f thoughts as they are experienced during an
emotional reaction. In the ATSS method, participants listen to an audiotaped scenario
and image that they are an active part of the interaction. After a brief segment o f the
tape is played, they are asked to articulate their thoughts for 30 seconds. The tape
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then continues, followed by another pause for artieulation, and so on. (Eckhardt,
Barbour, & Davison, 1998, p. 260).
As an example, Davison and colleagues sought to examine thoughts in laboratory
conditions that simulated social situations with 33 male undergraduates. Participants
listened to experimental and control tapes o f simulated situations and were instructed to
imagine themselves in the recorded event. Experimental tapes had participants imagine 1)
talking with a teaching assistant to increase their grade or 2) overhearing others speak
negatively about the participant in conversation. The control tape consisted o f
overhearing a conversation unrelated to the participant. After listening to these scenarios,
participants were instrueted to speak their thoughts aloud into a tape reeorder. Both
experimental and control situations led to reports o f thoughts related to evaluation, but
more thoughts related to critical evaluation, harm, positive evaluation of and defense of
self were reported after experimental conditions. ATSS methods provide participants
with analogue situations, have participants report thoughts, and use a broad range o f
situations to elicit thoughts. ATSS methods have been used to examine thoughts
predictive o f smoking cessation and relapse (Haaga, Davison, McDermut, Hillis, &
Twomey, 1993), thoughts in maritally violent men during anger (Eckhardt, Barbour, &
Davison, 1998), and thoughts o f about anti gay hate erimes Rayburn & Davison, 2002),
but no studies could be found that used ATSS in sport situations.
Issues o f compliance, reactivity, and validity in think aloud studies have been
reviewed. Compliance problems were evident in the study by Hare & Graber (2000).
Eriesson and Simon (1993, 1998) believed compliance could be enhanced by extensive
training in the think aloud method, and that non-reactive reports o f cognitive processes
can be obtained when the think aloud method relies on thinking as inner speeeh. Thus the
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authors suggested that the think aloud method focus on actual concurrent verbal thought
process rather participants’ explanations and inferences about how and why thoughts
happen. In 1993, Ericsson and Simon addressed the validity of the think aloud method by
reviewing studies that used different instructions for verbalization. One type of study
instructed simple concurrent think aloud reports. The second type o f study included
concurrent think aloud reports as well as asking participants for the reasons and
explanations for thoughts. Instructions to think aloud only changed the accuracy o f
performance compared to silent controls with the second type o f instructions. The second
type o f question, which calls for causal inferences into thought processes, was later
referred to as “overshadowing” (Ericsson, 2002, p. 981). In 2002, Ericsson stated that the
think aloud method eneourages participants to give free and spontaneous verbal thought
expression elicit valid and non-reactive verbal reports. In contrast, overshadowing
procedures require participants to produce prescribed types of verbalizations (e.g., telling
them how to verbally describe thoughts). So question like “how did that make you feel”
that have been used (Ram & McCullagh, 2003) should be strictly avoided. Ericsson
believed the reactive effects o f overshadowing were due to the requirement o f producing
prescribed verbalizations and are not caused by spontaneous verbal expression of
thought.
The think aloud method has allowed participants to provide thoughts in laboratory
conditions while solving problems or analogue situations. As such, this method has made
inherent improvements compared to retrospective self-report methods. Think aloud
studies have evident strengths and weaknesses. Strengths of the think aloud method
include the examination of thoughts more immediately, thus overcoming memory
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distortions, and typically less reliance on participants’ causal inferences about thoughts.
In addition, more detailed inner experience is typically provided. By sampling experience
that more closely resemble natural settings rather than relying on retrospective
generalization about past inner experiences the think aloud method provides enhanced
ecological validity compared to retrospective self-report methods. Compared with the
other sampling methods that will subsequently be described however, think aloud studies
have been more frequently conducted in laboratory or analogue situations, which
increases the degree of experimental control over situations presented to participants.
Nevertheless, the think aloud method has inherent weaknesses. Nisbett & Wilson (1977)
criticized the use o f verbal reports about inner experience in general because they
believed that people have little ability to observe directly or report accurately about inner
experience, this criticism is valid for think aloud methods that fail to sufficiently train
participants in the method. Another concern related to the think aloud method has been
the potential for the reporting process to alter the experience being reported, which was
discussed by Payne (1994) This may more likely occur with the think aloud method
compared to the other four sampling methods because the think aloud method samples
thoughts non-randomly, which may allow participants’ expectations to intrude upon
thinking and verbal reports (e.g., reactivity), although think aloud protocols have
included training in the method to reduce this problem (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). In
addition, since the think aloud method has focused specifically on thoughts that are
verbalized, reports may have more readily focused on inner speech at the possible
expense o f other thought processes (e.g., images) and emotions that may be related to
domains o f interest. Think aloud studies that used self-report questionnaires may have
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been susceptible to socially desirable responding as well (see Schwarz, 1999). Finally,
think aloud studies have typically been eonducted in laboratory or analogue situations,
which may reduce ecological validity compared with the following four methods of
sampling experience. Overall, think aloud studies have added improvements over the
more traditional retrospeetive self-report methods in sampling inner experience, but we
shall see how other sampling methods may further improve the examination o f inner
experience.
Thought and Mood Sampling
The second sampling method. Thought and Mood Sampling, originated from research
in 1974 independently by Hurlburt (1976) and Klinger (1978-1979; Hurlburt, 1997). This
method will be described, examples o f studies will be provided, and one study related to
sport performance that was found will be reviewed. Reliability o f Thought and Mood
Sampling will also be diseussed. Finally the strengths and weaknesses o f the methods
will be described.
Thought and Mood Sampling methods have prompted participants to sample at
random or quasi-random intervals into their natural environments. Some methods have
had researchers deliver prompts at quasi-random intervals and let events determine
prompts (see Klinger, Barta, & Glas, 1981), but other methods have had partieipants
carry beepers that signaled randomly (Klinger & Cox, 1987-1988; Hurlburt & Sipprelle,
1978). After the signal, participants have been instructed to write narrative deseriptions o f
internal experience, respond to rating scales, or both (Hurlburt, 1997) in their natural
environments.
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Klinger and Cox (1987-1988) examined consciousness or thought content in everyday
life with 29 undergraduate students, who were given a random beeper for 7 days.
Participants used the beeper for as much o f each sampling day as they comfortably could.
When the device signaled, participants completed four brief questionnaires; a thoughtsampling questionnaire, a questionnaire about what they were doing, a state measure o f
depression, and a state measure o f anxiety. Participants completed the thought-sampling
questionnaire by reporting immediate thought content and rated their thought content on
4-point scales such as how clear or specific the inner experience was, how much detail or
color there was, how visual or auditory the experience was, and whether there was
interior monologue. Participants described inner experience for a total o f 1,425 moments.
Factor analyses yielded eight independent factors including Visual Modality, Auditory
Modality, Operantness, Attentiveness to External Stimulation, Controllability,
Strangeness, Past Time Orientation, and Future Time Orientation. In addition, the authors
noted that inner speech and the “visual modality” (p. 105) was reported for most
individuals. Finally, about one-third o f thought was reported as undirected, one-third was
reported as “stimulus-independent,” and “about one-quarter contained at least traces o f
dream-like elements” (p. 105).
Hurlburt and Sipprelle (1978) described the case o f a 48-yr-old male with debilitating
anxiety attacks. The cause of the attacks was difficult to determine because he described
a highly satisfying family life and career and a pleasant upbringing by his two parents.
The participant was given a pocket-sized beeper that signaled randomly (an average of
once every 45 minutes) through an earpiece. Upon hearing the random signal, the
participant was instructed to write down the thought or thoughts he experienced and rate
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his level o f anxiety at the moment just before the signal, and samples were discussed with
researchers. From an analysis o f two days o f thought sampling, a large percentage o f his
thinking was categorized as feelings o f annoyance with his 3 young and active children to
whom he was emotionally attached. His anxiety was dramatically alleviated by
discussion and acceptance of his feeling o f annoyance.
The first sampling study o f experience directly related to athletic performance was
conducted by Klinger and his colleagues in 1981. Thus study investigated thoughts
during brief slumps and hot periods during basketball play to examine attention and
content o f performance-related thoughts. The authors speculated that slumps may occur
because “something in the game — perhaps a slight reversal or strong challenge —
distracts attention from the flow o f concentrated play and focuses it instead on a selfconscious interaction with oneself’ (p. 113). They suggested that “this may then impede
play further, thus producing a vicious circle that constitutes the slump” (p. 113). Due to
the limitations o f sampling internal processes during an open skill team sport, players on
the bench were interrupted semi-randomly by the researcher and thoughts were sampled
by audio tape. In addition, thoughts were sampled non-randomly when athletes came off
of the court due to substitution. Responses were coded into a priori constructed categories
with acceptable interrater agreement. Few thoughts were unrelated or irrelevant to
performance, whereas most were more suggestive o f associative attention. In addition,
significantly more negative self-exhortation/evaluation thoughts were found during
slumps, whereas task-related problem-solving/pereeptual were significantly more
common during hot periods. Thus results seem to support the positive relationship
between team performance and associative thought.
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Two studies examined the properties o f Thought and Mood Sampling. In 1979,
Hurlburt proposed examining the cognitions in everyday life by randomly sampling
thoughts and behaviors. Interrater reliability o f narrative descriptions was coded by two
independent raters on six categories including tense, affect, sex, aggression,
interpersonal, and relatedness. Interrater reliabilities ranged from 0.66 to 0.89 for these
scales. Questionnaire and thought sampling data were compared by Hurlburt and
Melancon (1987b) by conducting five studies with different student participants using
different methodologies on the imaginai processes inventory (IPI) data. Methods of
gathering data were manipulated by immediate versus retrospective recall, single versus
multiple-moment questions, and questions about specific thoughts or general
observations were delivered in a between-subjects design. The main comparison of
interest was immediate, single moment, specific methods such as thought sampling
against other methods. Results suggested that “questionnaires and thought sampling
methodologies provide broadly similar results” (p. 698); however a closer look revealed
that retrospective questionnaires may have lead to distortions o f how frequently internal
processes occur, minimizations o f the strength o f affect, and a misinterpretation of the
relationship between specific internal processes. As we shall see, this has important
implications for experience sampling procedures.
The strengths and weaknesses o f Thought and Mood Sampling methods will now be
discussed. An added advantage over think aloud studies includes the potential reduction
in reactivity involved in Thought and Mood Sampling with beepers that emit a random
signal, which may reduce the intrusion of expectations. In addition. Thought and Mood
Sampling studies have focused not only on thoughts, but emotions have been examined
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as well. Thought and Mood Sampling studies have also been extended beyond laboratory
or analogue situations, which may increase ecological validity. Thought and Mood
Sampling studies have yielded both quantitative (e.g., Klinger & Cox, 1987-1988) and
qualitative data (e.g., Hurlhurt & Sipprelle, 1978), demonstrating the versatility o f the
approach. Reliability o f Thought and Emotion Sampling has also been adequately
demonstrated. The weaknesses o f Thought and Mood Sampling compared with the think
aloud method are fewer in number and it seems less likely they would seriously impact
Thought and Mood Sampling methods. The possibility that verbal reports about inner
experience have been subtly influenced by participants’ causal inferences exists (see
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Data from Thought and Mood Sampling studies that used selfreport questionnaires may have been influenced by socially desirable responding as well
(see Schwarz, 1999). Reactivity may have been less likely, especially with studies that
used random intervals, although to some extent it may have still existed due the use of
repeated measures.
Ecological Momentary Assessment
The third method. Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA), has participants
immediately report inner experience in natural environments on different schedules.
Although no studies could be found that used EMA in sport situations, EMA studies will
he briefly described with example studies provided. Next, computerized sampling will be
described. After this, compliance and reactivity will be addressed. Finally, the strengths
and weaknesses of this method will be discussed.
EMA is a method that obtains information from participants’ reports about inner
experience phenomena as they occur in the natural environment on a signal- and or event-
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contingent schedule. Information about the elements o f the environment related to
momentary experience is also collected (Stone, Shiftman, & DeVries, 1999). Random
signal-contingent schedules occur when a beeper device or wristwatch signals the
moment about which to respond on a random time interval. This schedule has been used
to reduce sampling bias over event-contingent methods that ask participants to respond
immediately after the occurrence o f an event, potentially allowing participants greater
influence over when to respond (Barrett & Barrett, 2002; Christensen, Barrett, & BlissMoreau, 2003). Regardless o f the sampling schedule, EMA requires participants to
respond to relatively specific items on a questionnaire immediately after the specified
moment. Thus this procedure samples inner experience in natural settings using selfreport questionnaires to yield quantitative data, but unlike most Thought and Mood
Sampling Studies, EMA also collects data about the environment.
Shiftman and colleagues (1994) used EMA to explore the link between smoking and
drinking behaviors in the natural environment. Participants were 57 cigarette smokers
enrolled in a smoking cessation program. Participants retrospectively reported their
smoking history (e.g., how much they tried to restrain drinking) at baseline and how
many drinks they consumed in a typical week. Hand-held computers randomly prompted
participants to enter data about inner experience during smoking and non-smoking
periods during all waking hours of the day. After participants were trained to use the
hand-held computers, sampling began. Closed-ended questions were administered on the
computers including questions about whether alcohol had been consumed within the past
15 minutes, negative mood, arousal, attention disruption, activity (e.g., work,
eating/drinking, leisure, social interaction, inactivity), intrinsic interest in the current
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activity (e.g., was this something you wanted to do?), smoking regulation (e.g., were you
permitted to smoke in the setting?), social setting (i.e., alone or with others), and finally
location (e.g., home, work, bar or restaurant, vehicle). Data confirmed an association
between drinking and smoking that was independent of situations. The hypothesis that
alcohol increases smoking by disinhibiting a person’s restraint was not supported because
alcohol use had no more effect on smoking among those who reported attempting to limit
their smoking than those who did not. Drinking was equally likely to cue smoking
regardless of how much arousal or cognitive impairment was reported during sampling.
Compliance to the EMA method has been addressed. Litt, Cooney, and Morse ( 1998)
used EMA to assess the antecedents to relapse in 27 treated alcohol abusers. Participants
recorded urge to drink alcohol, mood state, situation, and alcohol on 5 x 7 inch cards on
a random schedule from a wristwatch. Although compliance was reported as 81 % and
drinking and drinking urges were reported relatively rarely, significant methodological
problems such as long delays in recording from about 5 minutes to several hours were
may have compromised the results. Collins, Morsheimer, and Shiffman (1998) used
EMA to assess predictors o f self-reported excessive drinking in a sample o f heavy
drinkers. This study found high participant compliance in terms o f EMA use and
reporting. The authors suggested this may have resulted from EMA training. Thus
complianee appears to be enhanced when participants are trained in EMA.
The advent of handheld computers and other similar devices has provided additional
options for signaling and recording responses in experience sampling methods. Handheld
computers and similar devices may be used by most if not all of the five experience
sampling methods reviewed, but since EMA and ESM have often used these devices.
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computerized sampling will be discussed here. Computerized sampling procedures reflect
the effort toward increased automation in sampling studies. Computerized sampling can
be used in ESM or other sampling procedures by incorporating hand-held computers or
personal data assistants (PDA’s) that typically serve the dual function o f signaling the
moment about which to respond and providing a media through which to record the
response (Barrett et al., 2002; Christensen et al., 2003). Cellular phones have even
recently been used. Collins, Kashdan, and Gollnisch (2003) compared the responses of
social drinkers randomly assigned to either paper-and-pencil (PP) self-monitoring or
eellular phone (CP) monitoring conditions. Ten PP participants were instructed to
“randomly choose 4 times each day” (p. 76) to write responses on cards whereas ten CP
participants responded at randomly generated intervals into a voice interactive system
over their cell phones. In general, the authors found fewer significant group differences
between PP and CP in terms o f alcohol use, compliance, and satisfaction than non
significant differences, but compliance with self-monitoring was actually significantly
lower in the CP group (e.g., failure to report drinks). Conversely, the PP group reported
significantly greater difficulty rememhering to complete morning sampling, but they
perceived themselves as more suceessful at overall Reporting. Despite these problems,
since more similarities in responding were found than differences the authors cautiously
suggested that CM could provide useful advantages such as instantaneous entry o f data,
date and time stamping o f data, and easy integration into daily life. Higher compliance in
the PP group however, seems to suggest than paper-and-pencil methods may be safer.
The advantages o f automatized computer sampling include precisely controlled
timing o f signals, better tracking o f participant compliance, potentially reduced human
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error (Barrett et al., 2002; Christensen et al., 2003), and the higher appeal to participants,
which is seen as an advantage to recruitment (Barrett et al., 2002). The ease o f data entry
may be increased as well (Collins, Kashdan, & Gollnisch, 2003). This advantage could
plausibly lead to the recruitment o f individuals with lower motivation and interest in the
study however, which could possibly even increase attrition if the novelty o f the
technology is insufficient to maintain participant interest. Training the user is also a
potentially time-consuming issue for samples less experienced with technology, although
this is perhaps less of a problem with college student samples. Disadvantages include
programming the software, setup and maintenance (e.g., errors, storage, restricted battery
life) (Barrett et al., 2002), practical problems with PDA’s (e.g., participants playing with
palmtops and wasting battery life), damage, loss, cost, and data management (Christensen
et al., 2003).
Hufford, Shields, and Shiffman (2002) examined behavioral and motivational
reactivity with EMA among 33 undergraduates identified as having drinking problems
using palmtop computers. Participants completed questionnaires that assessed alcohol
abuse and dependence, positive and negative, self-efficacy, motivation for change, and
social desirability. After this, participants were trained to use electronic diaries on the
palmtop and were instructed regarding about how to record when they consumed any
alcohol and when they experienced any change in temptation to drink. Random signals
prompted participants to responds to questions about activities, setting, mood, and
alcohol urges. Data entry was disallowed after two minutes by the computer program to
ensure immediate reporting. In addition, participants were instructed enter data on an
event-contingent basis whenever they experienced any subjective increase in their
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temptation to drink or if they consumed any alcohol. Compliance was high (over 80%),
and real-time monitoring o f drinking behavior for short periods did not produce
significant overall changes in drinking quantity and frequency, suggesting participants’
level o f reactivity to EMA is small. This was quite different from the mixed evidence o f
behavioral reactivity and lower compliance by Collins and colleagues (1998). Hufford
and colleagues (2002) suggested their findings o f less reactivity were due to the short
(two-week) period they used compared to the long (eight-week) period used by Collins
and colleagues (1998) (8 weeks). Thus shorter intervals may lessen reactivity.
To summarize, EMA collects data about participants’ environment and inner
experiences immediately after their occurrence using event and/or signal contingent
sampling schedules. Compared with methods such as Thought and Mood Sampling and
ESM, EMA collects more information about the environment and uses broader and more
flexible measures (Jones-Forrester, 2004). One o f the strengths o f this method is
enhanced ecological validity compared to retrospective self-report methods (Shiffman &
Stone, 1998), and this is a relative strengths over many think aloud studies as well.
Reactivity may be less problematic than with think aloud studies, especially when
random signal-contingent strategies are used because the likelihood o f intrusions o f
expectation influencing inner experiential phenomena is probably reduced. EMA studies
have also been broader in focus than think aloud. Thought and Mood Sampling, and
ESM. EMA studies have been extended beyond the exclusive focus on thoughts —
studies have examined emotions as well. Reactivity and compliance to EMA is
acceptable, and is may be better over shorter intervals. Weaknesses o f EMA include
some problems with compliance and reactivity due most likely to repeated measures and
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extended intervals (Collins et al., 1998). Although EMA samples immediate experience
in natural environments, EMA has often relied on self-report, which depends on the
awareness and accurate description of experiences by participants. In addition social
desirability may influence responses (Scollon et al., 1993). Finally, rich detailed
descriptions afforded by idiographic studies have usually been shunned in favor o f the
opportunity to generate nomothetic comparisons.
Experience Sampling Method
The fourth method, the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) uses random signals
notifying participants to complete self-report questionnaires (e.g.. Experience Sampling
Form) immediately after the beep (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). Well over 300
articles and dissertations have been conducted using different methods o f experience
sampling according to Scollon, Kim-Prieto, and Diener (2003), and hundreds of articles
and dissertations have used ESM. Despite this, only two studies could be found that used
ESM to sample experience related to sport performance. ESM will be described in further
detail, examples of ESM will be provided, and validity and reliability will be discussed.
Next, the two ESM sport performance studies will be reviewed. Finally the strengths and
weaknesses o f the method will be examined.
ESM uses devices that emit signals on fixed or random intervals to prompt
participants to respond to self-report questionnaires (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983).
This method has been distinguished from EMA, as the latter tends to examine more
elements of the environment related to momentary experience as well as momentary
inner experience (Stone, Shiffman, and DeVries, 1999) and tends to use broader and
more flexible measures (Jones-Forrester, 2004). ESM methods attempt to obtain
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ecologically valid momentary samples of inner experience to overcome the memory
distortions associated with retrospective self-report. ESM requires participants to respond
to relatively specific items on a questionnaire immediately after the specified moment.
Thus this procedure samples inner experience in natural settings using self-report
questionnaires to yield quantitative data.
ESM studies have examined a broad range o f topics related to inner experience. For
example, studies have been conducted on work activities (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski,
1982), the relationship between attachment styles and emotions (Torquati & Raffaelli,
2004), and the relationship between environmental faetors and happiness
(Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter, 2003), and the relationship between mothers’ self-esteem
and activities (Wells, 1988). Computerized sampling, described earlier, has also recently
been used in ESM (Barrett & Barrett, 2002; Christensen et al., 2003). Thus ESM is one o f
the most widely-used experienee sampling methods (Scollon et al., 2003).
ESM evolved from observations of everyday experience using dairy techniques
(Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983), which later advanced to the use an electronic pager
that signals randomly borrowed from the behavioral paradigm. Eventually this device
was applied to inner experiential states (e.g., activities, thoughts, feelings) by having
participants report experience each time the pager signaled on self-report measures such
as questionnaires (Hunter & Csikszentmihalyi, 2003). In practice, ESM studies typically
sample many participants, generate a large number o f ratings, and involve quantitative
analyses. For instance, Csikszentmihalyi and Figurski (1982) used ESM to sample inner
experience (e.g., thoughts, feelings) during work activities with 107 adults over 7 days,
which yielded over 4,800 self-reports.
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Specifically, respondents are given an electronic paging device to carry for eight
days: one practice day, a full work week, and one week-end. This instrument
emits signals (beeps)...according to a schedule randomized within two-hour
periods.... Accompanying the pager is a booklet of Random Activity Information
Sheets... [questioning] the respondent’s activity, thoughts, and moods “as you
were beeped....” The responses to these items provides the data.
(Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, p. 17-18, 1982).
A positive relationship was found between emotional experience and perceived
voluntariness. Self awareness, on the other hand, was associated with emotional
experience depending upon perceived volition — when an activity was reported to be
voluntary rather than obligatory, self-awareness was associated with lower affect,
activation, and personal involvement. Thus self-awareness was reported as an aversive
experience depending on the voluntariness o f the task (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski,
1982).
ESM has also examined the relationship between personality and inner experience.
Considering the positive relationship between secure attachment and psychological well
being, Torquati and colleagues (2004) sought to examine the relationship between social
context (e.g., alone, with others) and attachment style (e.g., secure, insecure) with inner
experience. Social contexts and emotions o f 69 young adults who differed in global
attachment style were sampled using ESM. Participants initially completed an attachment
style questionnaire. Sampling occurred during 2-hour blocks o f time between 9:00am and
9:00pm during the school semester, and signals occurred randomly. After the signal,
participants responded to a questionnaire on social connection and energy level as well as
several different emotions later categorized as positive or negative with moderate to high
internal consistency. Significantly more positive affect, higher levels o f energy, and more
connection were reported among secure individuals when they were alone. In social
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contexts and in isolation participants that scored high in attachment reported more
extreme positive emotions, whereas those that scored low in secure attachment reported
more extreme negative emotions, but this was especially true when both groups were
alone. Thus the emotional experience o f young adults with secure and insecure
attachment tendencies differed in social contexts and in isolation (Torquati et al., 2004).
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson ( 1992) reviewed studies that supported the reliability
and validity o f ESM. ESM reports correlated highly with diary methods (Robinson, 1977;
Szalai, Converse, & Feldheim, 1972), r = 0.93 (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992).
Individual consistency over a week has been estimated as moderate to high. Participants’
self-esteem was measured in an ESM study using data from the first half and second half
o f the week, which yielded a correlation o f r = 0.86 (statistically significant) and
Cronbach’s alpha o f 0.94 (Wells, 1985). Pawlick & Buse (1982) correlated students’ the
frequency o f responses from the first and second half o f the week and obtained
correlations o f 0.75 for locations, 0.76 for moods, and 0.80 for motives. So despite the
possibility that behaviors and internal states may fluctuate, ESM responses appear to
have been relatively reliable (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). Evidence o f the
convergent validity o f ESM measures has been inferred from the convergence o f diary
and ESM measures (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). Additional psychometric support
o f ESM, as reviewed by Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1992), includes: 1) ESM reports
o f behavior correlated predictably and significantly with the physical conditions such as
heart rate (Hoover, 1983); 2) reports o f self-esteem were predictably significantly
different when mothers were taking care o f children than when involved with leisure
(Wells, 1985); 3) reports o f psychological states correlated with situational factors such
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as activity, location, and social context (Larson, Csikszentmihalyi, & Graef, 1982); 4)
measures o f individual differences based on ESM (e.g., motivation, activity) correlate
with independent measures o f similar constructs (e.g., enjoyment) (Hamilton et al, 1984);
5) and ESM reports differentiated significantly and predictably between disordered
groups such as those with schizophrenia and other patient groups such as those with
affective disorders on severity o f disordered thought, thought-action congruence, and
affect (deVries et al., 1986; deVries, 1983). Although these studies seem to support the
reliability and validity o f ESM, activity stability (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992) and
convergent validity has not always been found. Petra & Baltes (1999) found little
convergence between interviews and ESM with older adults, and this was only partially
explained by older age and declining cognitive ability. Reactivity due to repeated
measures has also been mentioned as potentially problematic (Scollon et al., 1993). Lack
o f compliance with the sampling task has been problematic with blue collar workers but
not with clerical workers (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992), and appropriate incentives
for participating may increase motivation and compliance (Scollon et al., 1993).
Two ESM studies were conducted on inner experience in sport performance using
ESM with martial arts athletes. Both o f these studies sampled irmer experience indirectly
insofar as they sampled inner experience prior to performance but did not sample during
performance.
The first the two ESM sport studies was conducted by Cerin and colleagues (2001) to
examine whether the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is appropriate for assessing
emotions prior to competition. Participants were 66 male tae-kwon-do practitioners that
were randomly assigned to one o f three groups. Two groups had momentary assessments:

103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1) the ESM group was assessed randomly (3 times a day 1 week before and 1 hour before
competition), and 2) the repeated measurements was assessed non-randomly (7 days, 4
days, 1 day, and 1 hour before competition). The last group was 3) a retrospective
assessment group that was assessed non-randomly and retrospectively (2 days after the
competition). The ESM group was assessed on pre-eompetitive emotions (e.g., anxiety)
using the CSAI-2, positive and negative emotions using the Positive-Negative Affects
Questionnaire, and cognitive intrusions using a single item - “To what extent is/was the
competition occupying your mind at this/that stage?” (p. 31). Participants were prompted
randomly to report by a pager. Immediately after this participants responded to these
measures at three random times a day for one week before the competition and finally
one hour before competition. The repeated measures group was assessed on a less
frequent sehedule (7 days, 4 days, 1 day, and 1 hour before competition) with the same
questionnaires as the ESM group, albeit non-randomly. All three groups were finally
assessed retrospectively two days after the competition, and o f course this was only the
second assessment o f the retrospective group. This meant that the two momentary groups
were sampled immediately after experience whereas the retrospective group was asked
two days after competition to recall how they felt 7 days, 4 days, 1 day, and 1 hour before
competition. The authors suggested that ESM might “artificially increase intensity o f
negative emotions and cognitive intrusion and affect temporal patterns o f pre-eompetitive
emotions” (p. 27) because the repeated assessment o f psychological variables may cause
changes in people’s experience, an issue o f reaetivity. Evidence o f this was not found as
no differences between the timing and intensity o f emotions were detected between the
ESM and the repeated measures groups, however, the ESM group reported less cognitive
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intrusions. The retrospective group was compared to the two momentary groups on
responses to emotion and cognitive intrusion questions. A between-group comparison
revealed differences in recalled positive affects between the momentary and retrospective
assessments. Differences were also found between momentary and retrospective
assessments on negative affect as well as cognitive intrusion; the retrospective group to
gave less accurate ratings o f pre-eompetitive emotions, which suggested memory
distortions. Surprisingly, significant differences between the ESM and the repeated
measures group in accuracy o f recall o f emotions and thoughts were observed, with the
latter group being more accurate; however the authors suggested that the repeated
measures group may have responded according to what they recalled their responses
being because they only had one report per day. This may have artificially inflated their
recall.
The second o f the two ESM sport studies was conducted by Cerin in 2004. This study
used ESM with 22 martial artists to examine affect, proximity o f competition and
personality traits as predietors o f anxiety direetion, and the role o f personality in
moderating the relationship between anxiety direction and affective states. These
participants completed personality measures that assessed neuroticism and extraversion,
which were measured initially. Participants were given a pager and were paged three
random times a day for one week prior to a competitive event. Participants responded to
momentary measures on this schedule including intensity and direction o f competitive
anxiety (CSAl-2) and positive and negative affect. Results of a multi-level regression
analysis indicated cognitive anxiety intensity, positive affect, proximity to competition
and extraversion were signifieant predictors o f cognitive anxiety direction. Several
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complex interactions were found including proximity to competition and neuroticism,
neuroticism and negative affect on cognitive anxiety direction, and “somatic anxiety
direction was a function of positive affect, somatic anxiety intensity, proximity to
competition and the interaction effects of neuroticism and somatic anxiety intensity and
neuroticism and proximity to competition” (p. 497). In light o f these two studies, Cerin
(2004) stated ESM could potentially eontribute greatly to the explanation o f intra- and
inter-individual differences in anxiety direction.
ESM typically samples experience in natural settings rather than relying on reactions
evoked in laboratory conditions that may not necessarily reflect o f real-life situations
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). Thus enhanced ecological validity is one o f the
relative strengths o f ESM over many think aloud studies. Reactivity may be less
problematic for ESM than with other nonrandom sampling methods because ESM studies
have used random signals more often, thereby probably reducing intrusions of
expectation that could influence inner experiential phenomena. As with EMA, ESM
studies have also been broader in focus than previous methods, studying processes
beyond the exclusive focus on thoughts - studies have examined emotions as well. The
validity and reliability o f ESM appear to be strong (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992),
although not all studies have supported these properties with ESM (Csikszentmihalyi &
Larson, 1992; Petra & Baltes, 1999). Weaknesses of ESM include problems with
compliance (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992) and reactivity due to repeated measures.
Although ESM randomly samples immediate experience in natural environments, ESM
has typically relied on self-report, which depends on the awareness and accurate
description o f experiences by participants. In addition social desirability may influence
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responses (Scollon et al., 1993). Finally as with EMA, ESM has shunned rich detailed
descriptions afforded by idiographic studies have in favor of the opportunity to generate
nomothetic comparisons.
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). The fifth sampling method. Descriptive
Experience Sampling (DES) sampling experience in natural settings by using random
signals to notify participants to immediately write down information in a notebook to cue
them about inner experience for interviews that are conducted within 24 hours. Since no
studies have used DES to sample experience related to sport performance, DES will be
described in detail, examples o f DES studies will be provided, validity and reliability will
be discussed, and finally the strengths and weaknesses o f the method will be considered.
DES evolved from the Thought and Mood Sampling method. The goal of DES is to
describe the main characteristics o f inner experience by randomly sampling immediate,
single, specific moments in time. The most substantial difference between DES and other
methods is the type o f data generated. DES provides narrative descriptions of inner
experience, and therefore qualitative data. This is accomplished by a process containing
four steps (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002); 1) Participants wear a device that emits a random
audible tone (beep) via earpiece. Using this device in their natural environment,
participants record their discrete inner experience at the moment o f the beep in a journal
or notebook when the beep signals. Between 5 and 8 instances of inner experience are
recorded per session. 2) Participants are interviewed within 24 hours, either the same day
or the next day, about their inner experience. Interviews about inner experience
phenomena are conducted in a methodical, non-leading manner (Hurlburt, 1990; 1993;
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002), in which experienced researchers “obtain as detailed a
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description o f that particular sampled inner experience as possible, all the while
suspending our own preconceptions about what that person’s experience might be like”
(Hurlburt, 1990, p. 18). This continues over a series o f sampled moments as inner
experiences are described with the cooperation o f the participants. Next, researchers write
descriptions o f inner experience. 3) Researchers review the set o f all descriptions and
describe and summarize patterns o f inner experiences or other salient characteristics. 4)
Researchers examine, summarize, and describe frequent characteristics o f participants’
inner experience (see Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999). Thus the results o f the expositional
interviews are narrative descriptions o f inner experience generated from interviews
between participants and researchers. In addition, inner experiences are coded based on
categories derived from prior studies such as inner speech, image, just doing,
unsymbolized thinking, feeling, and sensory awareness (Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999;
Hurlburt, Koch, & Heavey, 2002); however, DES is an open method, which means that
new categories are created if experiences fall outside the range o f pre-existing categories
(see Monson & Hurlburt, 1993).
DES studies have established the existence o f different forms o f inner experience. In
2000, Hurlburt and Heavey developed a codebook for 16 different categories of inner
experience (see Appendix A). The reliability o f DES was examined by Hurlburt &
Heavey (2002). Results indicated acceptable reliability as interobserver-reliability kappas
from .52 to .92 were found on five categories o f inner experience, and median reliability
was 0.76. Spearman-Brown adjustments indicated reliabilities o f .92 to .98. This was
described as “comparable to highly reliable questionnaires” (p. 135). These five were the
most frequently-occurring categories, and although participants experienced the other
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eleven categories o f inner experience, the five most frequent were analyzed “because
reliability statistics may be unstable” (p. 139) with less frequent categories. These
categories o f inner experience will be described to illustrate some of the forms through
which inner experience has been found to take shape.
The most frequently occurring five categories of inner experience found by Hurlburt
and Heavey (2002) were images (referred to in current DES research and from now on in
this study as inner seeing), inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, feeling, and sensory
awareness. First, inner seeing is seeing something internally that is known not to be
externally present. Second, inner speech is the experience of speaking words in one’s
own normal voice without the external sound actually being produced. It is typically
experienced as very similar to how one might speak aloud, but it typically contains no
external sound. Third, unsymbolized thinking is the experience o f a mental event without
the experience of words, inner seeings, or any symbol o f inner experience. It may be, for
instance, a hoping, wishing, or wondering thought process without inner speech or inner
seeing. Fourth, feeling is an emotional experience that includes such experiences as
anger, guilt, sadness, and so on. Fifth, sensory awareness an internal (e.g., hotness,
coldness, itchiness) or external (e.g., brightness, shininess, blueness) sensory experience
that is, in and of itself, a major theme o f an inner experience. Sensory awareness is often
experienced as being absorbed in the sensory details o f an inner experience (see Hurlburt
& Heavey, 1999).
DES has been used to study inner experience in normal samples as well as samples
suffering from psychological disorders, but to date, no study has ever been condueted on
the inner experience o f sport performance using DES, and few sampling methods have
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been used to accomplish this to any extent. Because no DES sport performanee studies
exist, DES studies will be described to illustrate the application of the method.
DES emerged in the 1980s with the publication o f an article that described the inner
experience o f individuals with schizophrenia (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987a). DES was
extensively described when Hurlburt eompared normal individuals and those with
schizophrenia using DES (1990). Large difference between the groups came to light,
differences that had not been found by other methods. For instance, individuals with
schizophrenia had “extremely clear emotional experiences” (p. 254) rather than shallow
or blunted affect and this occurred even when affect appeared to be externally blunted. In
addition, color seemed to have more prominence in inner experience for individuals with
schizophrenia than others, and inner visual experience occurred more frequently as well.
Quite surprisingly, images occurred even “more concretely for schizophrenics than for
normals” (p. 255), but images were frequently “goofed up” as well (Hurlburt, 1990, p.
256; see also Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987a). For instance.
Bob described an image o f a sweater that was in reality being knitted by the person
next to him, except that the imagined sweater was blue and white tweed while the real
sweater was blue and green stripes; Sally described an image where the books and
papers were missing from a clearly seen shelf. (Hurlburt, 1990, p. 256).
It appeared to take individuals with schizophrenia much longer to experience the beep
compared to normal participants. Words were seen to move in schizophrenic experience
and were even experienced as independent objects “stripped o f their meaningful
connections” which allowed “the words of a sentence to be seen in jumbled order” (p.
257). When decompensating, individuals with schizophrenia may have had no inner
experience at all. Thus Hurlburt suggested that schizophrenia may be a disorder that
consists o f image disorganization rather than the commonly-held belief that
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schizophrenia is a disorder o f association. In addition, Hurlburt suggested that depressive
symptoms found in schizophrenia may not result from negative self-thoughts. Instead,
depression may stem from the relative absence o f words and images.
Also in 1990, Hurlburt found evidence o f a mental process described by participants
as “implied or assumed experience” (p. 78), or understanding “with unspoken meaning”
(p. 90). Hurlburt referred to this process as unsymbolized thinking. In 1993, Hurlburt
described the inner experiences o f individuals with psychological disturbances .
Unsymbolized thinking was defined as a thought process with clear meaning, but without
1) any type o f symbol, 2) without words, 3) without images, and 4) without bodily
sensations. Unsymbolized thinking was frequently experienced by almost all o f the
participants o f this study, and individuals who were depressed, anxious, or bulimic
generally experienced a large number o f unsymbolized thinking experiences. The
features o f unsymbolized thinking were complex and differentiated, specific, and usually
very difficult to describe, perhaps because of the prejudice that all thinking is in words
(Hurlburt, 1993; 1997). In fact unsymbolized thinking was often first reported in words
but with much less confidenee, more confusion, and/or discomfort. As participants
became more experienced in the sampling procedure further investigations in the
interview setting could rule out the presence of words at least in the participants’
awareness (Hurlburt, 1993), increasing certainty as to the presence o f unsymbolized
thinking. In other words, participants may think that all thinking occurs in words, but
what they often find is that they lose confidence in this and find that there is thinking that
occurs that uses no words, which surprises them. The process o f unsymbolized thinking
is a wonderful example o f the potential o f DES to uncover inner experiential phenomena
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that are unrecognized or perhaps even misunderstood and/or misreported by other
methods.
Descriptive experience sampling collects data about inner experience at random
intervals immediately after the occurrence o f internal phenomena. This method has
inherent strengths and weaknesses. Participant causal inferences about inner experience
(see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) are much less likely to distort data than with studies that
have relied on retrospective self report and even other sampling methods because: 1) in
an interview setting, DES researchers may often observe when this happens in sampling
training (e.g., I was having an image about my mother because she made me angry), 2)
researchers take measures to reduce future reoccurrences by direct communication o f the
goals of DES with participants (e.g., focusing on the actual inner experience rather than
causes o f it), 3) researchers avoid the deliverance o f questions leading to causal inference
responses (e.g., why did you have that image?). Thus DES participants become better
trained observers o f inner experience than are participants of other methods that causally
accept self-reports with little training or scrutiny. In addition since researchers meet with
participants after each sample is obtained in interviews, simple methodological problems
(e.g., how to best wear the beeper, what situations may be less appropriate),
noncompliance, and reactivity can be discussed and reduced in sampling training sessions
prior to experimental sessions. Questions and confusions can also repeatedly be
addressed. Reactivity may be less problematic for DES than with other nonrandom
sampling methods because due to the exclusive use o f random signals, which probably
reduce intrusions o f expectation (e.g., when the beep will occur) that could influence
inner experiential phenomena (e.g., by changing situations or behaviors). Addition
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methods to reduce reactivity and measure noncompliance include allowing participants to
keep certain experiences private and asking them to report when this happens and when
beeps are spoiled or missed. As with EMA, ESM, and later Thought and Mood Sampling
studies, DES studies have studied thoughts, emotions, behaviors, and situations. DES
goes further than these methods however, by using 1) an open system o f evolving
categories rather than assuming all experiences will fit into a few a priori categories, 2) a
bottom-up approach to coding that maintains the integrity o f inner experiences rather than
forcing them to conform to categories, and 3) an inductive approach to generalizing about
participants that is shaped by empirical observation rather than a deductions from a priori
theories or personal presuppositions. DES samples experience in natural settings, so
enhanced ecological validity is one o f its relative strengths over many think aloud studies
that have collected data in artificial settings. Interobserver reliability was found to be
strong for the predecessor o f DES, Thought and Mood Sampling (Hurlburt, 1979), as
well as the method itself (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002). Weaknesses o f DES include
potential problems with compliance, although this is evident in other sampling methods
as well. In addition social desirability may influence responses, however the presence of
interviewers that may build rapport, observe, and encourage even socially undesirable but
accurate reports constitutes and improvement over other sampling methods. Thus the
weaknesses o f DES are fewer and may be repeatedly observed and compensated for
when one considers those o f other methods. Finally, the most significant improvement
afforded by DES compared to other methods is the provision o f rich idiographic
descriptions that enable researchers to uncover processes that could otherwise go
unrecognized by participants and researchers.
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Disadvantages and Advantages to Experience Sampling Methods
A brief summary o f the disadvantages and advantages o f experience sampling
methods will now be provided. It is suggested that DES provides the greatest number of
advantages of the experience sampling methods reviewed.
One common criticism o f methods that seek to examine inner experience was also
directed at introspection. This issue will be discussed with an emphasis on how DES
most sufficiently addresses it. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) critically reviewed o f
introspective endeavors that have advanced inferences about higher order mental
processes by assuming that internal processes mediate the relationship between stimuli
and responses. The authors criticized introspective approaches for reliance on reports
from individuals who may be unaware o f 1) the existence of a stimulus that may have
influenced a response, 2) unaware o f the response itself, and 3) unaware if stimulus
affected the response. Thus Nisbett and Wilson (1977) suggested that introspective
reports “are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments ahout the extent to
which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause o f a given response” (p. 233). Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) were more critical o f causal inferences based on introspective reports than
they are on the content o f introspective reports. In fact they stated that accurate reports
“will sometimes” occur “when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes o f
the responses they produce” (p. 233).
It seems likely that there are regularities concerning the conditions that give rise
to introspective certainty about cognitive processes. Confidence should be high
when the causal candidates are (a) few in number, (b) perceptually or memorially
salient, (c) highly plausible causes o f the given outcome (especially where the
basis o f plausibility is an explicit cultural rule), and (d) where the causes have
been observed to be associated with the outcome in the past. (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977, p. 255)
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Thus the ability o f people to provide information about causal relationships is in doubt.
(Examples o f questions about cognitive processes criticized by the authors are mainly
“why” questions.) It is possible that the investigation o f internal processes may more
safely proceed if individuals’ reports are separated from a priori causal theories, and if
their levels of confidence and the clarity o f their experiences are considered. Techniques
for achieving this use more disciplined, contemporary methods o f sampling experience,
and in the case o f DES, skillful judgments are made about the specific nature o f inner
experiential phenomena that occur at discrete moments observed in time, which are
separated from a priori causal theories.
Perhaps the greatest advantage to experience sampling methods is the enhanced
ecological validity that is provided by sampling inner experience in natural settings.
Experience sampling procedures are not immune to weaknesses. As would be expected
with repeated measures, reactivity may increase self-reflected awareness, influence
phenomena, but this may be less o f a problem (Cruise et al., 1996) because the stability
o f emotion ratings across time is fairly good (Feldman Barrett, 1998). And as Barrett and
Barrett pointed out (2001), additional evidence suggests that reactivity has occurred when
participants try to change the behavior o f interest (McFall, 1970). This may be reduced
by random sampling, although participants ultimately have a high degree o f control over
when they sample. In addition, compliance has been mentioned as a potential burden to
participants (Feldman Barrett, 1998), although a review by Hurlburt (1997) suggests that
compliance is typically favorable, and DES provides practical suggestions for discrete
use of the beeper. Participant attrition can be considerable given the series o f repeated
measures, and thus a large degree of effort is requested from participants. Nonetheless,
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attrition has been higher than that of most laboratory studies according to Barrett and
colleagues (2002). In response to this, Barrett and colleagues (2002) have used an
incentive schedule to keep motivation high and express appreciation (e.g., movie ticket,
earned lottery tickets to win palmtops, university clothing, gift certificate donated by
local businesses). Thus many o f the limitations o f experience sampling procedures may
be easily addressed, and as previously discussed, DES goes to greater lengths to
maximize the strengths of sampling inner experience in natural environment and
minimize inherent weaknesses.
Current methods o f exploring inner experience provide seven advantages over
retrospective self-report methods: 1) Immediate, single-moment, specific investigations
o f inner experience see to minimize memory distortions by less reliance on memory and
reconstruction (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). 2) Experience sampling methods can
be conducted in natural environments, allowing the researcher to gain access to ongoing
internal experiences that are otherwise difficult to examine, especially in artificial
laboratory settings. Thus sampling methods enhance ecological validity (Hormuth, 1986).
3) Although discrete moments may not be representative of others, (Hurlburt &
Melancon, 1987b) if a sufficient number of single moments are collected,
representativeness may increase, especially in comparison to retrospective self-report. 4)
Sampling methods increase the resolution o f internal processes by placing a higher
degree o f focus on immediate inner experience. 5) Higher fidelity o f individual
descriptions results from the participants’ immediate observation o f internal processes
and the researchers’ subsequent examination, although we shall see how the extent to
which researchers examine this processes varies by sampling method. 6) Richer
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description o f internal experiences is afforded by the reduction o f memory distortions and
the opportunity to engage in qualitative examination o f subjective experience (Hurburt &
Heavey, 2001; 2004). 7) Finally, sampling methods ground o f responses in concrete
experiences in place o f generalities. Sampling methods are more grounded in immediate
concrete moments and potentially less filtered by participants' generalities about
themselves (see Christensen et al., 2003; but also see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This
makes it more likely that reported inner experience was observed when and how it
actually occurred, thus improving the accuracy of reports (Hurburt & Heavey, 2001 ;
2004). These advantages have important implications for the exploration o f inner
experience in sport performance. In the following section we will examine these
implications and describe the present study.
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CHAPTER 3

THE CURRENT STUDY
Rationale for the Current Study
Unlike other subfields o f psychology, sport psychology has devoted more attention to
the development and evaluation o f effective interventions. Relatively less attention has
been directed to assessment (Anderson, 2002; McCann, Jowdy, & Van Raalte, 2002), that
is, the evaluation o f inner experience during performance. When internal processes have
been evaluated, sport psychology research has traditionally relied on retrospective selfreport obtained well after performance. These methodologies are susceptible to a wide
range o f problems that lead to questionable validity o f obtained results because
1) reporting bias may be present on the part o f participants due to memory problems such
as the hindsight bias (see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990), foresight bias, and/or overconfidence
(see Koriat & Bjork, 2005), availability and/or representative heuristics (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974); 2) participants may exhibit inaccurate styles of responding such as
minimization or exaggeration (Overholser, Spirito, & Difilippo, 2000); 3) researchers
may unwittingly influence results by imposing demand characteristics on subjects,
researchers may frame leading questions, and/or subjects may tailor their responses based
on researchers’ interests (Norenzayan & Schwartz, 1999); 4) participants may be unable
to accurately engage in the cognitive and motor functions necessary for effective
performance and, simultaneously, to attend, process, encode, store, and later retrieve the
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phenomena o f internal processes during performance. Competing effectively and
simultaneously remembering aspects o f inner experience are difficult behavioral and
cognitive tasks, and the ability of participants to accurately report the about internal
processes under sport performance conditions is largely unknown. Nonetheless,
participants’ abilities to accurately sense, perceive, remember, and report their internal
processes during performance are unfortunately widely unquestioned, if not taken
completely for granted. This has made it difficult to know more precisely what is
happening in metaphorical “the space between your ears’’ during sport performance.
More literally, the present study proposed a less restricted, broader, novel approach for
examining the internal processes that occur during golf performance.
When internal processes have been assessed, sport psychology research had
traditionally used two main methods - questionnaires and interviews. Previous sport
psychology research has relied on retrospective self-report, but more immediate selfreport techniques and a greater reliance on interview techniques have recently emerged.
Thus attitudes toward utility o f qualitative methodologies have become more favorable
(Hardy et al., 1996). The current study seeks to advance the trend o f using a qualitative
methods o f examining internal processes related to athletic performance using descriptive
experience sampling, (DES), a method that relies on random-sampling o f internal
experience and subsequent interview.
The genesis o f the present study was rooted in 1) the need to address the limitations
o f traditional sport psychology research examining golf performance, and 2) the
expectation that a less restricted, broader, novel approach for examining the internal
processes that occur during golf performance may provide a more accurate and consistent
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picture o f inner experience with the potential to uncover processes previously
unrecognized.
This study was the first descriptive experience sampling study to be conducted during
performance. It sought to demonstrate that DES could be used to advance the existing
knowledge about inner experience that occurs during human performance by better
observing and describing the factors thought to influence performance.
The current study sought to explore inner experience during golf performance to
address very basic scientific questions including 1) what is inner experience during golf
performance, 2) what are the similarities and differences between golf and daily life inner
experiences, and 3) what is the relationship between inner experience and the quality of
golf performance, if any?
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CHAPTER 4

METHOD
Participants
Twelve golfers were recruited from contacts in the Las Vegas community. Two
participants dropped out of the study. One moderate handicap group participant dropped
out before starting sampling for unknown reasons. The other was a low handicap group
participant that dropped out before golf sampling due to an injury incurred outside o f the
study. The remaining ten participants all completed the study. Five participants
represented the moderate handicap (moderate skill) group, and the other five represented
the low handicap (high skill) group. Within the moderate handicap group, handicaps
ranged from 13 to 26 with a mean of 17.6. Three o f these five participants (60%) had
registered handicaps. Within the low handicap group, handicaps ranged from 2 to 7 with
a mean of 4.2. All five participants (100%) had registered handicaps.
Materials
Beeper. This device is 4.15 by 2.4 by 0.85 inches and emits an audible signal or beep
at random intervals through an earpiece that can be worn with minimal interference with
behavior (Hurlburt, 1979). This device can be worn using its clip on the waistline or
within a pocket. When the device is “on,” it emits an audible continuous 700 Hz tone that
is reset with the push o f a button. Volume can be adjusted by the user during sampling.
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Notebook. A 3 x 5 inch notebook was issued to participants to record any notes they
needed to cue themselves about the details o f their inner experience that occurred at the
moment o f the beep. In addition, participants filled out a label that they stuck to the
notebook page where they described the details o f their inner experience. This label asked
them to record when beeps occurred (i.e., which hole and stroke) and what they were
doing at the moment o f the beep (e.g., waiting, hitting the ball, etc).
Local G olf Course. The final stage o f the study took place on at Tuscany G olf Course
in Henderson, Nevada.
Demographic Form. Basic demographic information including age, gender, and
ethnicity was obtained using a paper and pencil form. In addition, participants were asked
to provide their handicap and current telephone number(s). (See Appendix B.)
Procedure
Twelve adult golfers were recruited through contacts within the local community for
this study and ten completed the study. The duration o f the study was approximately six
months, taking place from about March to October 2006. Participants took part in the
study for approximately one month each.
This study contained two phases: 1) standard DES training and daily life sampling
and 2) an on-the-course golf tournament.
Phase 1: Standard DES Training
Participants were trained in the DES method for approximately three sessions (range
two to four) during the first stage o f the study. Participants were instructed on how to use
the beeper, options for wearing it, and how to use the notebook to record anything they
needed to cue themselves about the details o f their inner experience that occurred at the
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moment o f the beep, about which they were asked during interviews. For training
sessions, participants were asked to wear heepers during times o f their choosing until
they collected six beeps. Within 24 hours, participants met with the researcher for the
DES expositional interview about those beeps. Beeps collected outside o f 24 hours were
not analyzed. The expositional interview asked open-ended, non-leading questions to
explore inner experience. All interviews were videotaped. The specific number of
training sessions depended on individuals’ time needed to train to the task o f reporting
about inner experience, which was determined via agreement between the two primary
investigators o f the study. After training was complete, participants moved on to Phase 2.
Phase 2: On-the-Course G olf Tournament
The 18-hole on-the-course golf tournament took place at Tuscany G olf Club.
Participants were greeted by the researcher and provided space in which to warm-up for
approximately 15 minutes. After warm-up, participants wore the beeper during
competition in the on-the-course golf tournament. Participants completed a record o f their
scores, which were verified by researchers. When the heeper signaled, golfers were
trained first to note the features o f their experience in the notebook; then to write down
what they were doing at the moment o f the beep, the hole on which they were competing,
and their current stroke. In the event that a participant is in the act o f swinging at the
moment of the beep, they were required to take a “do-over” shot at the place o f the
original shot. Participants competed in groups of 2, 3, or 4 participants, and participants
individually competed for one overall tournament first place cash prize o f $50. Beepers
were worn for the duration o f competition (18 holes). The beeper was set to randomly
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signal at an average frequency o f one signal every 25 minutes. Finally, golfers were
interviewed within 24 hours in a standard DES expositional interview.
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CHAPTER 5

INTRODUCTION OF RESULTS
This study presents two types of results. First, idiographic descriptions will illustrate
the salient characteristics o f each individual participant’s inner experiences. One chapter
will be devoted to each o f the 10 participants. These chapters are organized by the skill
group membership o f the participants. Thus the salient characteristics o f each o f the five
moderate handicap (moderate skill) group participants will be described, including John,
Brad, Caleb, Samuel, and Will. This will then be followed by the five low handicap (high
skill) group participants, Tom, Chris, Mike, Ryan, and Aaron. Second, nomothetic results
will be described. This will include across-participant descriptions that will illustrate the
most salient characteristics o f all participants’ inner experiences together during golf and
daily life as well as between group descriptions that will illustrate the most salient
characteristics of the two separate skill group inner experiences during golf and daily life.
The Categories o f Inner Experience Defined
In the DES subsection o f Chapter 2, it was noted that DES research has shown that
inner experience takes different forms. The most frequently-occurring forms o f inner
experience were described as five reliable categories o f inner experience by Hurlburt and
Heavey (2002). These included what used to be termed images and what we now refer to
as inner seeing as well as inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, feeling, and sensory
awareness. To refresh the reader, these categories will be briefly revisited and defined. To
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further prepare the reader at the outset o f exploring inner experience during golf
performance, examples of each o f these inner experiences will be provided from the
participants o f this study.
First, inner seeing is seeing something internally that is known not to necessarily be
externally present. John experienced inner seeing in Sample 2.1, for example. At the
moment of the beep he is innerly seeing him self and his friend sitting under a tree
smoking cigars as he sees a green tree, metal tables, and two chairs as well as him self and
his friend in less detail.
Second, inner speech is the experience of speaking words in one’s own normal voice
without the external sound actually being produced. It is typically experienced as very
similar to how one might speak aloud, but it typically contains no external sound. In
Tournament Sample T.2, Aaron was lining up to make a putt saying to himself internally,
“This is left to right,” and externally seeing a brown spot on the green where he will aim
the ball. The phrase he is saying internally is an example of inner speech.
Third, unsymbolized thinking is the experience o f a mental event without the
experience o f words, inner seeings, or any symbol o f inner experience. It may be, for
instance, a hoping, wishing, or wondering thought process without inner speech or inner
seeing. In Tournament Sample T.IO, John experienced unsymbolized thinking when he
was looking at the swelling in his finger to and is wondering if it has gotten bigger
without words or inner seeing present.
Fourth, feeling is an emotional experience that includes such experiences as anger,
guilt, sadness, and so on. John also experienced a feeling in Sample 2.1. At the same time
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he is experiencing an inner seeing of himself and a friend smoking cigars in this sample,
John is also experiencing relaxed enjoyment at the moment of the beep.
Fifth, sensory awareness is an internal bodily (e.g., hotness, coldness, itchiness) or
external (e.g., brightness, shininess, blueness) sensory experience that is, in and o f itself,
a major theme o f an inner experience. Caleb experienced sensory awareness in
Tournament Sample T.6 when he was absorbed in the brightness o f the sun’s reflection
shining on the metallic coin. Sensory awareness is often experienced as being absorbed in
the sensory details of an inner experience (see Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999).
In Chapter 2, it was also mentioned that DES is an open method, which means that
new categories are created if experiences fall outside the range o f pre-existing categories
(see Monson & Hurlburt, 1993). As we will see, this occurred during the current study
with three categories o f inner experience - perceptual awareness, golf-related content,
and mental preparation strategies. These categories o f inner experience will now be
defined to further prepare the reader for what follows.
Perceptual awareness is a process o f focusing on objects o f the environment for their
objective or instrumental qualities, often for the purpose o f a task. Perceptual awareness
is a form of inner experience that is often visual, as the seeing o f an object as part o f
conscious experience for its objective, instrumental qualities. Perceptual awareness is
different from sensory awareness. Sensory awareness, by contrast, focuses awareness on
the sensory aspects o f an object, regardless of the object’s objective or task-related
qualities.
M ike’s Tournament Sample T.IO, for instance, is an example o f perceptual
awareness. Mike was preparing for a shot, planning where he is going to hit the ball. This
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is experienced as actively looking down the right side o f the fairway, an external visual
experience. There are two carts out there, but Mike is looking past them, focused on the
fairway as part o f his planning o f where to hit the ball. His focus is broad and without
much specific detail aside from the general area o f the fairway in his visual awareness.
This is a perceptual awareness because Mike is viewing this scene for its instrumental
significance; he is looking to see where he should hit is next shot. He is not absorbed in
the sensory aspects o f the scene: he is not particularly interested in the shade o f green of
the grass, the patterns o f shadow the trees throw, or the like.
In contrast, Caleb’s Tournament Sample T.6, which was previously-mentioned, is an
example o f sensory awareness. Caleb was reaching down to pick up his ball mark, a coin,
off the green. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is paying attention to the brightness o f
the sun’s reflection shining on the metallic coin. Caleb is absorbed in the brightness o f
the coin and experiencing a mild sense o f aesthetic satisfaction with the brightness o f the
coin. This is a sensory awareness because Caleb is more involved in the sensory aspects
(brightness) than the instrumental aspects (ball marker) o f the coin.
Perceptual awareness is a specific category o f inner experience we refer to as a form
of inner experience. Perceptual awareness describes how the inner experience occurs. In
contrast, golf-related content is a category o f inner experience we refer to as the content
of inner experience. The term golf-related describes what the contents o f the inner
experience were. In Tournament Sample T.IO, M ike’s experience o f the general area of
the fairway in his visual awareness is golf-related. In contrast, Caleb’s involvement in the
sensory brightness o f his coin is non-golf-related. He is absorbed in the brightness o f the
coin as opposed to the objective, golf-related, ball marker qualities o f the coin.
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Mental preparation strategies are inner experiences with future-oriented golf-related
content that serves the purpose o f preparing for a golf (or sport) performance task. M ike’s
Tournament Sample T.IO, for instance, is also an example o f a mental preparation. In this
sample, Mike was getting ready to make a shot and was looking down the fairway o f the
last hole. At the moment o f the beep, Mike is planning where he is going to hit the ball by
experiencing perceptual awareness of the right side o f the fairway. Mike also experienced
a mental preparation strategy, but during golf practice when he was collecting samples in
his daily life in Sample 1.1. In this sample, he was on the driving range hitting balls to
warm up before beginning his round. He is addressing the ball when the beep catches
Mike in his backswing innerly saying the word “Tempo” to himself rhythmically in his
own voice. Also at the moment o f the beep, Mike is actively focused on the ball, paying
attention to the center o f the ball by looking at it, an instance o f perceptual awareness.
An evident advantage o f categorizing inner experiences as we have done to this point
is the heuristic value o f illustrating inner experience in an organized manner that
expedites the reader’s understanding o f inner experiences. As Monson and Hurlburt
(1993) explain, however,
categories we might advance to organize phenomena of inner experience will not
have clear, unambiguous borders; categories of inner experience do not end abruptly
but fade into one another... introspectionists’ referred to a ‘continuum o f vagueness
( p .2 5 )/
Thus the reader is advised to take advantage o f these categorizes in order to illustrate and
organize inner experience with the cautionary caveats that 1) the borders o f categories o f
inner experience are imprecise, 2) nascent categories such as perceptual awareness, golfrelated content, and mental preparation strategies are more likely to be imprecise
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compared to the more established categories, and 3) these nascent categories are open and
may naturally evolve as DES research progresses.
The following 10 chapters will provide idiographic descriptions to illustrate the
salient characteristics of each individual participant’s inner experiences during golf and
daily life. The aforementioned categories will be evident throughout these idiographic
descriptions o f the inner experiences o f John, Brad, Caleb, Samuel, and Will as well as
Tom, Chris, Mike, Ryan, and Aaron. After this, nomothetic results will be described.
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CHAPTER 6

JOHN
John is a 44 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap o f 13. He was
recruited by one o f the researchers. He completed his first two sampling days by
obtaining 12 samples from his daily life at work, driving, and at home. He colleeted his
daily life samples at the end o f the spring. He participated in the golf competition
sampling in the beginning o f the fall and collected 12 golf samples. John shot 83, which
is 11 strokes over par, 2 strokes lower than his handicap of 13. As a result, John finished
5*^ in the golf competition.
John took to the sampling method with relative ease; he became adept at describing
his inner experience very quickly. He was very engaged in exploring his inner
experience, and he seemed quite interested in the nature o f his own inner experience.
John exhibited a very good ability to apprehend his inner experience at the moment of the
beep, and he had little difficulty describing the details o f his inner experience throughout
all three of his sampling days.
Perceptual Awareness
In 7 of 24 or 29% o f John’s samples, he was experiencing perceptual awareness at the
moment of the beep. O f these experiences, only two occurred during John’s daily life
samples; both were instances o f active, goal-directed perceptual awareness. For example,
in Sample 1.2 John was starting up his new laptop, staring at the screen waiting for the
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laptop to run its initial security programs so he can open his file. At the moment o f the
beep, John is visually going back and forth from looking at his screen and looking at his
finger on the mouse pad. He is not sure whether his screen or his finger is in his
awareness, but he is sure only one o f these is in his awareness at the moment o f the beep.
This visual process is the most prominent aspect o f his awareness at the moment of the
beep. Also at the moment o f the beep, John is experiencing a mental feeling o f
impatience in his head that is related to waiting for his laptop.
John also experienced active, goal-directed perceptual awareness in Sample 2.6 when
he was working on his computer with several windows open. He had received a message
that told him to log on and put in a password. At the moment o f the beep, John is taking
in the visual scene with conscious awareness, studying it actively to see if one of the 5
windows cues him to which one has the password. Also at the moment of the beep John
is wondering, without any words or inner seeing associated with it, which o f the five
open windows has his password on it. Thus this is a clear active visual process with an
associated mental wondering, both clearly present at the moment o f the beep.
Most John’s perceptual awareness experiences were active, goal-directed experiences.
John had one passive, idly-looking perceptual awareness experience, but it still had an
active aspect to it present just before the moment o f the beep. In Tournament Sample T.9,
John’s bunker shot had come up short. He was inspecting a divot he had made in the
bunker. He wanted to see where he started to take the sand compared to where the ball
had been. He had already made the decision that he had been way behind the ball, about
five inches fat. At the moment o f the beep, he is having an experience o f externally
seeing. In addition to this seeing, he was looking with awareness at the big divot at the
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moment o f the beep. He is not aware of the previous analysis o f how fat the swing was;
he is just externally looking and aware o f his divot. There are no other thoughts or
emotions present at the moment o f the beep. At the moment o f the beep, this is a passive
perceptual awareness experience in that he is looking without the active process he had
been engaged in being present (the perceptual inspection process). Since his judgment
occurred before the moment o f the beep, John’s momentary experience is passive
external looking with awareness o f the divot at the moment o f the beep. This passive idle
looking experience was different than the purest passive idle looking in that John had a
sense o f setting it in motion actively just before the moment o f the beep, whereas
intentionality was often absent in other participants’ pure experiences o f passive
perceptual awareness even just before the moment o f the beep.
The majority o f John’s perceptual awareness was active focusing on visual stimuli as
the function of a task. So far we have seen how his perceptual awareness occurred in his
daily life; however, as we will see, most o f his perceptual awareness occurred during the
golf tournament. H alf o f John’s perceptual awareness experiences co-occurred with other
forms of inner experience at the moment o f the beep.
Unsymholized Thinking
In 6 o f 24 or 25% o f John’s samples, he was experiencing unsymbolized thinking at
the moment of the beep. In Sample 2.2, John experienced unsymbolized thinking with no
other inner experience present at the moment o f the beep. Before the beep, John was
leaving the house and his hands were full, so he was closing the gate with his foot. He
was walking away from the gate and waiting to hear the gate shut; he does not like it
when the gate does not shut. Still before the beep, he was looking across the street at a
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Terminex truck and thinking to himself, “why would any o f our homes have termites out
here.” At the same time as this, but still before the beep, he wanted the gate to be closed,
and he was waiting for it to close. The gate made a rattling sound as it finally closed. At
the moment o f the heep, John is in the process o f turning his head to look, not yet seeing
the gate, and he is experiencing a mental sense o f conquering the gate without words,
inner seeing, or emotions. His sense of conquering the gate is experienced as if to say
“Yeah, you better have closed,” although no words are present at the moment of the beep.
At the moment o f the beep, he has no words, inner seeing, or feelings in his conscious
experience, nor is he aware o f walking, the things in his hands, or worrying about
dropping them. He is also in fact raising one o f his eyebrows as if he has conquered the
gate by getting it to close, but this is not part o f his conscious awareness at the moment,
nor is anything other than his unsymbolized mental sense o f conquering the gate.
John experienced unsymbolized thinking with a simultaneous inner seeing during
Sample 2.4. John was driving to work in a car he was borrowing at about 65 or 70 miles
per hour with the rest of the traffic, slightly faster than his usual speed he drives in his
convertible, which is 60 miles per hour. Before the moment of the beep, he was
approaching a red beat-up Toyota in the middle lane that is driving slower, about 55 or 60
miles per hour, than other cars that have been passing. John passed the Toyota on the
inside lane and was looking back in his rear view mirror at the front o f the slower car,
condemning the other car with frustration, and thinking “what an idiot,” still before the
moment o f the beep. At the moment of the beep, John is looking through the rear view
mirror and experiencing an understanding of the other driver by considering a number of
reasons all at once that might be causing him to drive slower. It is occurring to John that
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this is how he drives when he drives his convertible slower than the other traffic, that
maybe there is some reason why the driver has to do this, maybe this is the car's top
speed, maybe the wind is too loud to hear his radio (like in John's convertible). This is a
mental epiphany that is justifying the other driver's slowness, a mental understanding of
several attributions all at once. He is experiencing this as just getting it, that the other
driver may be having the same experience John has in his convertible. There are no
words or feelings associated with this epiphany at the moment o f the beep. At the
moment o f the beep, John is also seeing an external image o f his car, transposed upon the
Toyota. John is projecting an image o f the front o f his silver Mercedes upon the red beatup Toyota, seeing the front o f his car as if it is externally out there. To summarize, at the
moment o f the beep John is experiencing a simultaneous unsymbolized thinking and
external image. He has an epiphany, an understanding all at once, o f the slower driver,
and he is having and an external image o f his slower car transposed upon the red beat-up
Toyota. He is no longer condemning the other car with frustration and no longer thinking
“what an idiot” at the moment o f the beep.
O f John’s instances o f unsymbolized thinking, 5 of 6 or 83% co-occurred with other
forms o f inner experience (e.g., perceptual awareness, sensory awareness, inner seeing)
present at the moment of the beep. The content o f John’s unsymbolized thinking
experiences included three instances o f wondering and one instance each o f having a
mental sense, experiencing understanding, and hoping.
Feeling
In 6 of 24 or 25% o f John’s samples, he was experiencing a feeling at the moment of
the beep. In Sample 1.6, for instance, John was in the office at the printer picking up
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some paper from a project he was working on. Before the moment o f the beep, he saw
someone in the comer o f his eye in the waiting room, and he was wondering if the person
in the waiting room was waiting for him. At the moment of the beep, John was having a
mental irritation experience, being bothered that this person might be waiting for him
(which, incidentally, would interfere with completing his project, not in his awareness at
the moment). John is not sure whether the person is still in his visual awareness at the
moment of the beep, but they had been before the moment of the beep.
In Sample 2.1, John experienced a feeling with a simultaneous inner seeing. John was
retrieving a missed call on his cell phone. He saw the number on his phone that indicated
the call was from a friend of his, Anthony, whom he will meet the next morning at
Starbucks. At the moment of the beep, he is innerly seeing himself and Anthony sitting
under a tree smoking cigars. He sees a green tree, metal tables, and two chairs. He also
sees two people without much detail to them that are known to be himself and Anthony.
John also is experiencing relaxed enjoyment at the moment of the beep. This emotion is
felt physically as tension going away in his shoulders. Together the inner seeing and the
emotion are experienced almost as if he is there at Starbucks.
In 4 of John’s 6 feelings, 67%, he was experiencing co-occurring other forms o f inner
experience including inner speech, inner seeing, sensory awareness, and perceptual
awareness. In 4 of 6 or 67% o f his feelings, John’s feelings that were experienced
mentally, whereas 2 of 6 or 33% were experienced bodily. John’s feelings included a
mental feeling o f impatience, mental irritation, mental excitement, mild mental sorrow,
bodily panic, and the bodily experienced relaxed enjoyment.
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Inner Seeing
In 5 o f 24 or 21% of John’s samples, he was experiencing an inner seeing at the
moment o f the beep. As previously discussed, John experienced a feeling along with a
simultaneous inner seeing in Sample 2.1 when he imagined being at Starbucks and
experienced relaxed enjoyment. In Sample 2.5, John experienced an inner seeing with no
other inner experience present at the moment o f the beep. He was editing a page on his
company’s website. He had just finished typing some text, saved it, and had posted it to
the site. At the moment o f the beep, he is internally visualizing the text within the borders
of the website to see if it fits. He is seeing the text in deep blue-colored 18-point Book
An tiqua font on a white background. In the same inner seeing, he is also seeing the edges
o f the website with green on the left side and off-gray on the right. His seeing is the way
he thinks it will look rather than how it actually looks. There is no central focal point in
the inner seeing. Both the text and the borders are equally prominent in his awareness. No
awareness o f what he is looking at externally is present at the moment o f the beep.
John’s unsymbolized thinking experience in Sample 2.4 occurred with a simultaneous
seeing experienced externally. At the moment o f the beep, John has an epiphany about
the slower driver, and he is seeing an external seeing o f his slower car transposed upon
the red beat-up Toyota. John is projecting an image o f the front of his silver Mercedes
upon the red beat-up Toyota, seeing the front o f his car as if it is externally out there.
O f John’s inner seeings, 4 o f 5 or 80% were experienced internally, and I was
experienced externally as projected on the visual field. As we will see, 1 o f these 5 was a
kinesthetic inner seeing. Two of his 5 inner seeings or 40% co-occurred with other forms
o f inner experience (feeling, sensory awareness).
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Inner Speech
In 4 o f 24 or 17% o f John’s samples, he was experiencing inner speech at the moment
of the beep. During Sample 1.4, for instance, John was driving his car. He was mentally
listing out things he had to do in chronological order and had arrived at the realization
that there is no liquor in the house, and he is thinking if he wants a Martini he should stop
at Von’s for some gin and olives. At the moment o f the beep, John is saying internally “1
should probably stop at Vons and pick up some gin and olives” one word after another at
the same speed and tone o f his own normal voice. This is said definitively, and it is the
last item o f the list he had been mentally experiencing before the moment o f the beep.
During Sample 1.5, John was in the office, editing a word document. He was reading
the first line o f a proposal letter he had written last year and editing it to make it relevant
to this year. He was three quarters o f the way through the first line of the letter. At the
moment o f the beep, John is reading the word “Golf.” He is saying the words to himself
internally blurred altogether, “Golf,” as if they are all one word. He is reading and saying
this word to him self in his own normal internal reading voice. John's eyes are aimed at
the words, but he is not aware o f them. John is only aware of his inner-spoken blurredtogether words. All of John’s inner speech involved his normal voice spoken internally,
and only 1 of 4 or 25% o f these had a co-occurring other form o f inner experience (e.g.,
feeling) present at the moment o f the beep.
Inner Experience During Golf
John collected 12 Tournament Samples. His perceptual awareness, unsymbolized
thinking, inner seeing, inner speech, and feeling experiences will be described as well as
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his mental preparation and emotion regulation strategies and his golf-related content.
Finally, a comparison of his inner experience during golf and daily life will be provided.
Perceptual Awareness
John experienced perceptual awareness in 5 o f 12 or 42% o f his golf tournament
samples. Although perceptual awareness did not occur with as much frequency during his
daily life samples (2 o f 12 or 17%), it was the most frequent category o f his golf
tournament samples.
In Tournament Sample T.2, John experienced perceptual awareness with no other co
occurring experience. John was on the 2”*^hole, his 3"^^ stroke. He was feeling like his
group was not playing quickly enough, like they needed to hurry up. John had turned his
head to look at the group o f golfers behind him to see if they were holding the other
golfers up. At the moment o f the beep, he is looking broadly at the other group
consciously to evaluate whether his group is holding the others up. He is making external
visual contact at the moment o f the beep, without having yet arrived at a perceptual
evaluation. (After the beep, he saw his group was not holding the others up.) This was an
active form o f perceptual awareness that consisted o f looking broadly and actively for the
purpose of evaluation without evaluation having occurred yet at the moment o f the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.3, John experienced active perceptual awareness along with
co-occurring unsymbolized thinking. John was on the 2"*^ hole. Will was on John's putting
line. John was hoping Will would hit his ball all the way to the hole so John could see the
break. At the moment of the beep, John is looking at the black inset on the face o f W ill’s
putter as Will is getting ready to putt. He has no awareness of the details of the rest o f the
putter; his eyes are just focused on the center part o f the black inset o f the putter’s face.
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This is an active process o f putting a good deal o f attention into looking at the putter, a
clearly focused external visual activity. The hope that Will will hit the ball close to the
hole is most likely still in his awareness at the moment o f the beep, although John is not
eompletely certain about this. This hope occurs without words or inner seeing present at
the moment o f the beep.
O f his perceptual awareness experiences during golf, one was a passive instance of
not doing much but looking and remainder were active looking as a function o f a task
experiences. O f these perceptual awareness experiences, 4 o f 5 or 80% perceptual
awareness occurred with no other simultaneous inner experience during golf. In contrast,
both o f his perceptual awarenesses during daily life had co-occurring inner experience at
the moment o f the beep. Four of five or 80% o f his perceptual awarenesses during golf
were related to golf in content.
Unsymbolized Thinking
In Tournament Sample T.IO, John experienced unsymbolized thinking. John’s finger
had been in pain. At the moment o f the beep, he was looking at the swelling in his finger
to determine if it has gotten bigger since the last swing. He is looking to get information
but has not yet had time to make a perceptual judgment about whether it has gotten
bigger. Also at the moment o f the beep, he is wondering if it has gotten bigger without
words or inner seeing present. The wondering is the most prominent aspect o f his inner
experience at the moment of the beep. He is not feeling pain at the moment o f the beep.
All but one o f John’s unsymbolized thinking experiences, 5 o f 6 or 83%, co-occurred
simultaneously with other forms o f inner experience (e.g., perceptual awareness, sensory

140

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

awareness). Only 1 o f 3 or 33% of his unsymholized thinking experiences was related to
golf in content.
Other Inner Experiences During Golf
John experienced 2 of 12 instances of inner seeing, the same amount of inner speech,
and the same amount o f feeling experiences during golf (17% each).
In Tournament Sample T.12, John experienced a shapeless inner seeing with no other
form of inner experience present. John is on the tee o f the 17‘^ hole. He had been looking
for the tee box marker, which is purple. He had found a marker, but he could not see if it
was green or purple. Then he saw it was purple. At the moment o f the beep, John is
having an inner seeing, a shapeless uniform field o f purple. This is not an after-image o f
the actually seen marker, but an inner seeing, which John experiences as being the answer
to his question about whether the tee box is green or purple.
In Tournament Sample T.7, John had both a feeling and inner speech present at the
moment o f the beep. John was waiting for his

stroke o f the 6'*’ hole. He was watching

W ill’s shot, which is traveling too fast, roll across the green. At the moment o f the beep,
John is experiencing a negative feeling and saying something to him self internally in
words. John is feeling bad for Will, a feeling mild sorrow that is experienced mentally
and not bodily. At the same time as this feeling, he saying to him self “bad shot” in his
own internal voice in a sorrowful way. John is also visually focusing on W ill’s white ball
moving across the green about half way to the hole; he is narrowing focused visually on
the ball.
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In both o f John’s tournament feeling samples, and in both o f his tournament inner
speech sample experiences, he had golf-related experiences. He had golf-related content
in only one o f his two inner seeings at the moment o f the beep.
Mental Preparation & Emotion Regulation Strategies
The beeper captured one mental preparation and one an emotion regulation strategy
that John was using at the moment o f the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.l 1, John was engaged in a kinesthetic inner seeing for
mental rehearsal. John was in his cart before his tee shot on the 15*'’ hole, which is a par
3. The distance to the hole is the same as the par 3 a few holes back. He had hit a bad shot
and missed the green on that hole. At the moment o f the beep, he is mentally rehearsing
his next shot. He is internally picturing his backswing. He sees a little bit o f his shoulder,
his feet, and the ball as if he is over the ball at the top o f his backswing getting ready to
hit the ball. This inner seeing also has two kinesthetic, bodily components. The first is
what he would like to do; he is purposefully trying to lead with his hips. The second
kinesthetic component is less prominent in his experience; he is feeling what his hips are
doing in the inner seeing rehearsal, which feels like he is not leading enough with his
hips. This is an imaginary process with two related kinesthetic experiences o f
purposefully leading with his hips and feeling what his hips feel like in the inner seeing.
This is a less a visual experience and more o f a kinesthetic experience.
In Tournament Sample T.4, John was experiencing inner speech during an emotional
regulation strategy. John was on the 3"" stroke o f the 5* hole. He had just lit a cigar, taken
a puff, and he was thinking he had had a bad stroke with the nine iron on the last hole. At
the moment o f the beep, John is saying “that nine iron was a bad shot; it’s time to smoke”
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in his own internal words, just as if he had said it out loud. He has already taken a puff,
so this thought is like a reflection back, a thought validating his smoking. John has a
sense that this phrase is in the future tense, but the meaning o f the phrase is in the past
tense; he has already lit up. (Incidentally, John reported that his routine is to light up a
cigar when he has made a bad shot to take the edge off, to keep from getting too
frustrated with the game. He does this to give him self something to “fiddle around with,”
something to do to derail the negative emotional process. This was apparently working
because he was not experiencing frustration at the moment o f the beep.)
Golf-Related Content
O f John’s Tournament Samples, 8 o f 12 or 67% contained golf-related content.
Examples o f golf-related content experiences include thinking and having a feeling about
another golfer’s performance, looking actively or passively at golf-related stimuli, and
mental preparation or emotion regulation strategies.
Comparing Inner Experience During G olf and Daily Life
In both golf and daily life, John was engaged in what he was doing. His golf and daily
life inner experiences were typically related to what he was doing at the moment o f the
beep. During golf, he had 67% golf-related content, and during his daily life, he had 75%
doing-related content (e.g., working on his computer and having an inner seeing of what
he was looking at). His irmer experiences were also typically very clear and detailed
during both golf and daily life.
John had fewer feelings during golf than daily life. He had feelings during 2 o f 12 or
17% of his golf samples and during 4 o f 12 or 33% or his daily samples. H alf o f his four
feelings during daily life were positive (e.g., relaxed, excited), whereas both o f his two
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feelings during golf were negative but neither were about his own performance (e.g.,
panic about being in the wrong place, sorrow for another golfer’s performance).
John had more perceptual awareness during golf than daily life. He had perceptual
awareness in 6 o f 12 or 50% o f his golf samples and 2 o f 12 or 17% o f his daily samples.
Two o f these during golf were passive instances of not doing much but looking and
remainder were active looking as a function o f a task experiences.
Discussion
John took to the sampling method with relative ease, and he was very engaged and
seemingly interested in exploring his inner experience. John’s inner experience was
typically quite clear, detailed, and differentiated in comparison to some o f the other
participants.
John’s most salient inner experience was perceptual awareness. The majority of his
perceptual awarenesses were active focusing on visual stimuli as the function o f a task.
Only one experience was passive perceptual awareness, and John had a sense o f setting
this in motion actively just before the moment o f the beep, unlike in other participants’
experiences o f passive perceptual awareness as we will see.
John’s next most salient inner experience was unsymbolized thinking. The content o f
John’s unsymbolized thinking experiences included several instances o f wondering, a
mental sense experience, an understanding, and a hoping experience; these occurred in
the absence o f associated words or inner seeing. He experienced about an equal amount
o f unsymbolized thinking in his daily life and golf samples. John experienced as many
feelings as he did instances o f unsymbolized thinking. Most o f his feelings were
experienced mentally, whereas a couple were experienced bodily. John’s mental feelings
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included a impatience, irritation, excitement, and sorrow; whereas his bodily feelings
included panic and relaxed enjoyment.
John experienced a variety o f inner seeings. Most o f were experienced internally. In
contrast with this, one inner seeing was experienced externally as projected on what he
was seeing with his eyes, and another was a kinesthetic inner seeing for golf preparation.
All of John’s inner speech involved his normal voice spoken internally.
Nearly half o f John’s Tournament Samples contained perceptual awareness, which
was an increase in frequency from his daily life samples. All but one of these experiences
contained golf-related content. He also experienced several unsymbolized thinking, inner
seeing, inner speech, and feeling experiences. In both o f John’s feeling and inner speech
tournament sample experiences, he had golf-related experiences. Only one of his two
inner seeings had golf-related content.
The beeper caught John using two mental preparation strategies and one emotion
regulation strategy. One o f his mental preparation strategies involved clearing his mind,
and the other involved inner seeing. His emotion regulation strategy involved inner
speech related to smoking a cigar, which was apparently working given the absence of
emotion at the moment.
Most o f John’s Tournament Samples (67%) contained content related to golf at the
moment o f the beep including thinking and having a feeling about another golfer’s shot,
looking actively or passively at golf-related stimuli, and mental preparation or emotion
regulation strategies.
In both golf and daily life, John was engaged in what he was doing; his inner
experiences were typically related to what he was doing at the moment o f the beep. John
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had fewer feelings during golf than daily life and more negative feelings during golf than
daily life. He had more perceptual awareness during golf than daily life. His inner
experiences were typically very clear, detailed, and differentiated during both golf and
daily life.
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CHAPTER 7

BRAD
Brad is a 30 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap o f 15. He was
recruited by one o f the researchers. Brad was a previous participant in DES training,
which involved repeated DES sampling and interviewing to assist in the training of new
DES researchers. Thus Brad was very familiar with the DES procedures. He completed
his first two sampling days by obtaining 10 samples from his daily life in at the end o f the
spring. He participated in the golf competition sampling at the beginning of the fall
semester collected 7 golf samples. Brad shot an 87, which is 15 strokes over par, even
with his handicap o f 15. As a result. Brad finished 6* in the golf tournament.
No Inner Experience
In 5 o f 17 or 29% o f his samples. Brad had no inner experience present at the moment
o f the beep. All but one o f Brad’s instances o f no inner experience at the moment of the
beep occurred during golf competition. Brad had a sense that some o f these instances o f
no inner experience were somewhat closer to the threshold o f awareness than were
others, but he was convincing about the absence o f inner experience at the moment o f the
beep in all these cases. Tournament Sample T.l was the closest to the threshold o f an
experience in conscious awareness. Brad was on the 3"" hole and had just pulled his cart
up to the tee box. It had been about an hour without having had a beep, and Brad was
turning the volume dial o f the beeper when the beeper went off. At the moment o f the
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beep, Brad’s eyes are aimed at the dial, and he is turning the dial o f the beeper with his
finger. He has no visual awareness of looking at the dial and no tactile awareness o f
feeling the dial as he turns it. Brad thinks this experience is akin to driving with no
awareness. Nothing is present in his inner experience at the moment of the beep, but of
Brad’s instances of no inner experience, he thinks this experience is the closest to the
threshold of having visual awareness at the moment o f the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.2, Brad was on the 5'*’ stroke of the 5* hole, and he was
standing on one side o f the green with the beeper in his pocket. At the moment o f the
beep, he was looking across the green, his eyes aimed at fellow golfer John standing on
the far side o f the green. However, neither John nor the green itself were in his
awareness; in fact, nothing seemed to be in his awareness at the moment o f the beep. This
was very similar to the last instance o f no inner experience, except in one case his eyes
were aimed at the beeper and in the other his eyes were aimed at a fellow golfer. In both
cases, he does not think he ever would have been aware o f what he was looking at if not
for the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.5, Brad had no inner experience with a sense o f even less
awareness. Brad was sitting in the cart having just finished the 10‘*’ hole. At the moment
o f the beep. Brad’s eyes were aimed at the beeper and there was nothing in his awareness.
This experience was similar to the other instances o f no inner experience just described,
but this time there seems to be even less awareness. He knows his eyes were open, but he
somehow has even less awareness.
Brad had little difficulty articulating these instances o f no inner experience, but he
apologized and said he felt guilty for having no irmer experience. He was serious about
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articulating his inner experience, but in several instances, no inner experience could be
found. He had more instances o f no inner experience during golf; during golf, 4 o f 7 or
57% of his samples contained no inner experience. Brad’s instances of no inner
experience were clear, but for some o f these instances. Brad thought it was more possible
than others that he had could have had very slight awareness usually of visual stimuli.
These instances ranged from having very slight possible awareness usually o f visual
stimuli to much less possibility o f awareness present at the moment of the beep.
Unsymbolized Thinking
In 4 o f 17 or 24% Brad’s samples, he experienced unsymbolized thinking. In Sample
2.5, Brad was reading an abnormal psychology textbook. He then began typing the word
“social” on his computer. At the moment of the beep. Brad is wondering if there is a
DSM diagnosis for social anxiety. He knows that social phobia is in the DSM at the
moment o f the beep but is wondering if social anxiety is in the DSM. This is a mental
process without words, inner seeing, or other inner experiences. In Tournament Sample
T.3, Brad was on the 8* hole standing at the tee and talking to John. Before the beep.
Brad had just said his beeper has only gone off twice. After this but also before the beep,
he had experienced an inner seeing o f another beeper that is in his bag, along with a sense
that he could switch to that beeper. At the moment o f the beep, he is having two related
thoughts. First, he is thinking about switching beepers to his second beeper. This thought
about switching beepers is an unsymbolized, mental sense, an understanding that he
could switch beepers. Second, he is thinking about the beeper in the bag. This
unsymbolized thought is related to the other and was about where the beeper was in his
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bag. Both thoughts are equally prominent. Brad’s unsymbolized thinking experiences
were clear inner experiences without words or inner seeing.
Other Inner Experience
Brad experienced an equal number o f several other forms o f inner experience at the
moment o f the beep. These include two instances o f each of the following: inner seeing,
inner speech, feeling, and multiple awareness. These forms inner experience each
occurred in 2 o f 17 or 12% o f his samples. One example o f each o f these instances will
be described. After this, an example o f inner hearing, the only one that occurred during
sampling, will be described.
Brad experienced an inner seeing during Sample 2.6. At the moment o f the beep.
Brad is imagining talking in front o f his class as if he is giving a presentation there. He is
innerly seeing the room o f his one o’clock class without motion as if he is on the right
side o f the room looking up and slightly to the left comer of the room. The entire room is
more dim in lighting than his class would typically be. At the center of the inner seeing is
the side wall on the left hand side of the room. He sees a few students (two or three)
where they typically would sit outside the center o f what he is seeing. He sees these
things with relatively equal clarity. Further outside o f this in terms of direction, he is
seeing an obscured section o f the room as if is right cheek is blocking this imagined
vision. One additional component of this inner seeing experience is that it experienced as
if he is somehow having more inner experience coming through his right side than his
left.
During Tournament Sample T.7, Brad experienced inner speech. Brad was on the 15*'’
hole after his first stroke. He was sitting in the golf cart watching his fellow golfer, John.
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John had a wooden club that he used for short distances. John had called it a “5” wood
before, and Brad couldn’t believe it was because he hit the ball so short with it. At the
moment o f the beep. Brad is saying to himself “What is that wood?” in his own voice,
which is normal in volume with an inquisitive tone. This is an instance o f clear inner
speech at the moment o f the beep with not much doubt about it.
Both of Brad’s feelings co-occurred with other forms o f inner experience. One of
these. Sample 2.4, occurred when Brad was playing online chess with a human opponent
named Joe. At the moment o f the beep, Brad is looking at the Joe’s knight take Brad’s
bishop as part o f his inner experience. This visual perceptual awareness is about 70%
prominent in his conscious experience. In addition to this. Brad is experiencing an
aggressive feeling in his chest just below the surface o f his skin, which is an aroused
experience. He feels a sense o f stimulated lightness as if there is increased blood flow to
his chest. This is a bodily and an emotionally negative experience that is not very intense,
about 3 out or 10 (if 10 were to be the highest). This feeling is about 30% prominent.
Brad had a multiple awareness experience in Sample 2.3. This was a co-occurring
instance o f experienced listening to a voice recording and a looking and unsymbolized
thinking about chess. Brad was listening to his answering machine at work while playing
online chess, again with a human opponent named Mark. At the moment o f the beep, the
most prominent part o f Brad’s experience (about 65%) is listening to the person he works
with, Sarah, on the recording say “just got to know one.” Brad is tracking the sound of
the Sarah’s voice and some o f its meaning, but he is not very focused on the details of
what she is saying. Also at the moment o f the beep Brad is looking at his M ark’s bishop,
which is in the process of moving and taking Brad’s knight. This experience o f looking is
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more than merely his eyes being aimed at the screen with no awareness at the moment o f
the heep. The experience o f looking is a conscious aspect of his experience at the moment
of the beep. The looking experience is less prominent than the experience o f listening
(about 25%). Brad is also wondering why his Mark is moving, which is experienced both
as a sense of mental confusion and emotional negativity without bodily awareness. This
is a mental process with an emotional quality, a thought/feeling, without words or inner
seeing and is the least prominent o f his three simultaneous inner experiences (about

10%).
Brad experienced just one instance o f inner hearing. In Tournament Sample T.6, Brad
was on his 4*'’ stroke of the 11'*’ hole. He was walking across the green to the ball on the
back of the green. He had a Bob Dylan song in his head frequently during the day. At the
moment o f the beep, it was fainter than usual it had been, but he is hearing Bob Dylan
singing a phrase. He is hearing it just as it is in the real song with some words unclear
because Bob Dylan mumbles when he sings. He is hearing “you can take your [mumble]
put it in a [mumble].” Brad is experiencing the song as if it is coming at him at the
moment o f the beep, but before the moment o f the beep, the thinks he had started the
song playing himself. It is possible that another inner experience is also present at the
moment o f the beep. If so, it is even fainter and therefore not possible to determine if it is
actually present. This possibly present inner experience is a feeling of surprised
satisfaction about the shot he just hit that had been diminishing before the moment o f the
beep.
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Inner Experience During Golf
Brad collected seven Tournament Samples o f inner experience during golf
competition. Most o f these samples, 4 o f 7 or 57%, were instances o f no inner experience
at the moment o f the beep. Brad also had an unsymbolized thinking, an inner speech, and
an inner hearing experience during golf, which were described earlier. Brad’s golf-related
content will be discussed, followed by a comparison o f Brad’s golf and daily life inner
experiences.
Golf-Related Content
O f the Tournament Samples collected during golf performance, 6 of 7 or 86% were
not related to golf in content. Since 4 o f these 6 Tournament Samples were instances of
no inner experience at the moment o f the beep, it seems unlikely there could be content
without inner experience. Taking the instances o f no irmer experience out of
consideration, 2 of Brad’s remaining 3 irmer experiences or 67% were not related to golf.
Thus most o f Brad’s Tournament Samples o f inner experience during golf competition
were not related to golf.
Comparing Inner Experience During G olf and Daily Life
Brad’s irmer experiences from his golf samples were similar to his daily life samples
with respect to two forms o f irmer experience; these forms were inner speech and
unsymbolized thinking. His inner experiences from his golf samples were different from
his daily life samples with respect to one form o f inner experience; this form was no inner
experience at the moment of the beep.
Brad experienced a similar amount o f inner speech during his daily samples (1 o f 10
or 10%) as he did during his golf samples (1 o f 7 or 14%). He had also a fairly similar
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amount o f unsymbolized thinking during his golf samples (1 of 7 or 14%) as he did his
daily samples (3 o f 10 or 30%).
Brad experienced more instances o f no inner experience during his golf samples than
during his daily samples. Brad had instances o f no inner experience at the moment o f the
beep in 4 o f 7 or 57% o f his golf samples and in 1 of 10 or 10% o f his daily samples.
Brad’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily life were similar with
respect to the amount of inner speech he had and fairly similar with respect to the amount
of unsymbolized thinking he had. His inner experiences were different during golf
compared with his daily life with respect to no inner experience. Brad had a notable
increase in no inner experience present at the moment o f the beep during golf.
Discussion
Brad’s inner experiences were typically very clear and differentiated. Brad had
previously sampled, and he took to the sampling process with ease. This was a notable
difference in comparison with some o f the other participants in this study. Brad
frequently experienced unsymbolized thinking during daily life, and he had one
unsymbolized thinking experience during golf. He also frequently experienced instances
o f no irmer experience present at the moment o f the beep during golf, and had one of
these during daily life. In addition. Brad experienced an equal number o f instances of
inner seeing, irmer speech, feeling, and multiple awareness. When he was golfing, his
irmer experiences were most often not related to golf in content. His golf irmer
experiences were similar to those o f his daily life with respect to the amount o f irmer
speech and unsymbolized thinking he had, and different with respect to the amount o f no
irmer experience he had.
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CHAPTER 8

CALEB
Caleb is a 64 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap o f 16. He was
recruited by one o f the researchers. He completed his first three sampling days by
obtaining samples from his daily life, sometimes at work, but mostly at home. The
samples from Caleb’s first day were not analyzed because they were collected three days
before the expositional interview. The remaining three expositional interviews were
conducted within 24 hours o f his sampling - two daily life sampling days and his golf
tournament sampling day. These last three sampling days were used for the descriptions
o f Caleb’s inner experience that follow. He collected his 15 usable daily life samples at
the end o f the spring. He participated in the golf competition sampling in the middle o f
the same summer collected 9 golf samples. Caleb shot an 85, which is 13 over par, 3
strokes lower than his handicap o f 16. As a result, Caleb finished in a tie for 3"^ in the
golf competition.
Perceptual Awareness
In 9 o f 24 or 38% of Caleb’s samples, he was experiencing perceptual awareness at
the moment o f the beep. Caleb experienced two different kinds o f perceptual awareness.
In some o f his samples, he was not doing much other than looking at something at the
moment o f the beep. In these instances, he was just idly looking with much less
concentration on what he was looking at, a passive form of perceptual awareness. In other
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samples, he was looking at something with much more concentration at the moment of
the heep, an active form o f perceptual awareness. This active looking typically served the
task he was doing or a task he was preparing to do.
Passive Perceptual Awareness: Idly Looking
In Tournament Sample T.2, Caleb experienced not doing much other than passively
looking at something at the moment o f the beep. Caleb had just finished his tee shot on
the fourth hole and was picking up his tee. A t the moment o f the beep, he is looking at
the tee and picking it up. He has no awareness o f the task he is doing other than idly
looking at it, and he is not particularly interested in the details o f the golf tee; he is
visually focused on the tee and just picking it up with no other inner experience at the
moment o f the beep. In Tournament Sample T.3, Caleb was on the 5*'’ hole watching
Chris tee up his ball and address it. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb has no inner
experience other than just watching what Chris is doing. He is not particularly focused on
the details o f what he is looking at; he is just idly watching Chris. Thus there is not much
inner experience at the moment o f the beep, he is just passively focusing in what is
visually present.
Active Perceptual Awareness: Goal-Directed Looking
In Sample 2.5, Caleb experienced the type o f perceptual awareness that involved
actively concentrating on what he was looking at as a function o f the task he was doing.
Leading up to the moment o f the beep in this sample, Caleb is taking inventory of spare
sprinkler parts. At the moment of the beep, he is looking at parts and noticing he has only
two riser caps. This is a mental process of recognizing that he has only two parts as a
function of looking at the parts, which incidentally means he needs to buy more (although
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the latter is not in his awareness at that moment). In Sample 2.7, Caleb was cleaning rust
off of his gate prior to the moment o f the beep. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is
visually inspecting the top horizontal crossbar o f the gate to check the gate for rust. This
is a visual inspection process Caleb was doing to figure out which part o f the gate he
would later sand; this process occurs with no other simultaneous inner experience.
Whether they were active or passive experiences, Caleb’s perceptual awareness
experiences were matter-of-fact visual experiences. His perceptual awareness experiences
were often related to the tasks he was doing, but they lacked the richness and depth o f
experience he had with other irmer experiences (with the exception o f two just doing and
one just listening experiences). Caleb experienced his perceptual awareness as not having
much inner experience at the moment of the beep other than passive visual experience or
active visual experience related to a task at hand.
Sensory Awareness
In 9 of 24 or 38% o f Caleb’s samples, he had sensory awareness experiences. He
experienced two different types o f sensory awareness. Caleb had sensory awareness
experiences that involved bodily sensation (6 o f 9) and also visual sensory experiences (3
of 9). Bodily sensory awareness instances involved experiences o f internal physical
sensations. Visual sensory awareness involved being absorbed in the sensory qualities of
external visual stimuli.
Caleb experienced visual sensory awareness in Sample 2.1, where he was getting
ready to take an Aspirin pill. At the moment of the beep, Caleb is paying particular
attention to the yellowness o f the pill. He is particularly immersed in the intense mustard
yellow color o f the pill, being impressed by its shade of yellowness. Caleb experienced
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one instance o f external sensory awareness during golf. During Tournament Sample T.6,
Caleb was on the 11* hole. He had picked up his ball and marked it; now he was reaching
down to pick up the ball mark on the green and replace the ball. At the moment o f the
beep, Caleb is paying attention to the brightness of the metallic coin, the reflection o f the
sun shining on the coin. Caleb is absorbed in the brightness o f the coin and experiencing
a mild sense o f aesthetic satisfaction with the brightness o f the coin he is seeing. This
satisfaction is part of the experience o f being absorbed in the brightness o f the coin.
Caleb experienced bodily sensory awareness during Sample 2.4. At the moment of
the beep, Caleb is experiencing stiffness, soreness, and tingling in his right hand. The
stiffness and soreness are equally prominent in his experience, and the tingling is less
prominent by comparison. These painful sensations are mild in intensity at the moment.
In addition to this, Caleb is sorting out whether these pains are due to carpal tunnel
syndrome, arthritis, or a cut on his finger, and Caleb is considering consulting his
physician. This is a mental process that occurs without any words present in his
experience. The mental process is more prominent than the stiffness and soreness. Caleb
also experienced an instance o f bodily sensory awareness during golf. In Tournament
Sample T.7, Caleb had finished his third stroke on the 14* hole. At the moment o f the
beep, Caleb is feeling weak from the heat and saying to himself “it's getting steamy” in
his own normal voice. His inner speech is the most prominent o f the experiences at the
moment o f the beep. At the same time, however, Caleb is feeling weak, which is
experienced as tiredness felt mostly in his arms. He may also have a slight headache as
part o f the weakness experience at the moment o f the beep. Caleb was sure he was hot,
and had been attending to this as a very constant bodily experience around this time, but
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he is not attending to it at the moment of the beep. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is
saying “it’s getting steamy” internally and feeling weakness in his arms.
Caleb’s sensory awareness experiences had much more personal conscious
involvement, richness, and depth than his perceptual awareness experiences. His sensory
awareness experiences involved being absorbed or immersed in the qualities o f external
visual phenomena or the qualities o f personal internal physical sensations such stiffness,
soreness, tingling, and weakness.
Unsymbolized Thinking
In 5 o f 24 or 21% o f Caleb’s samples, he had unsymbolized thinking experiences.
In Sample 2.2 for instance, Caleb had been aware that the beeper had not gone off in a
while leading up to the moment o f the beep. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb was
wondering if the beeper was turned off. This was a mental process without words. This
process was the most prominent part o f his awareness. In addition to this, Caleb was
checking the beeper in his pocket to see if it was turned off, which is a simple physical
action that he is doing at the moment of the beep. The wondering experience is directly
related to the physical doing process at the moment o f the beep.
In Sample 2.6, Caleb had a feeling and an unsymbolized thinking experience. At the
moment o f the beep, Caleb was in his garage retrieving a piece o f wire that has dropped
on the floor while retrieving a can o f naval jelly. In addition to this action, Caleb is
feeling mildly irritated and frustrated at the fact o f having to get in an awkward position
to perform this action at the moment o f the beep. This irritation/frustration is experienced
to be an emotional process that takes place in his head. Finally, Caleb is experiencing an
unclear mental awareness that the activity he is doing, picking up the piece o f wire he
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dropped, is not directly related to his overall goal o f fixing his sprinklers. This mental
process occurs without words at the moment o f the beep. These two experiences are both
equally prominent at the moment o f the beep.
Caleb’s unsymbolized thinking often co-occurred with other forms o f inner
experience. In 4 o f 5 o f his unsymbolized thinking experiences, there were co-occurring
inner experiences such as sensory awareness, feeling, or just doing a task.
Inner Speech
In 3 o f 24 or 13% o f Caleb’s samples, he had inner speech experiences. For example,
in Sample 3.5 Caleb was walking down the hall to get his sampling notebook. At the
moment of the beep, Caleb is rehearsing what he is going to write for the prior beep. He
is saying the phrase “reaching for a loaf o f bread” in his own normal voice. This is a
clear, unambiguous inner experience. Also at the moment o f the beep, Caleb is walking
down the hall and feeling the coldness and hardness of the tile floor, which feels good,
but Caleb is not entirely certain that this sensory awareness is in his awareness at the
moment o f the beep. He thinks it more likely than not that it is remotely in his awareness,
a much less prominent experience than his inner speech. Caleb is walking at a faster pace
than normal, but he not entirely certain about whether or not this faster pace is in his
awareness at the moment o f the beep. He thinks it is more likely his fast walking pace is
not part of his conscious awareness o f it at the moment of the beep. Caleb also
experienced irmer speech during golf. In Tournament Sample T.7, which was described
earlier, Caleb is saying “it’s getting steamy” internally in his own normal voice and
feeling weakness in his arms at the moment o f the beep.
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Caleb’s inner speech experiences involved words internally said in his own normal
voice. Two o f his three inner speech experiences co-occurred with other forms o f inner
experience, and all three were clear inner experiences. Caleb may have experienced a
fourth inner speech experience during Tournament Sample T.5, but he was not exactly
sure if words were present, as we shall see.
Feeling
In 2 o f 24 or 8% o f Caleb’s samples, he experienced feelings. In the previouslydescribed Sample 2.6, Caleb had a feeling o f irritation/frustration along with an
unsymbolized thinking experience at the moment o f the beep. In Tournament Sample
T.5, Caleb had a partially unclear multiple awareness that involved a very unclear inner
mental experience, a clear anxiety feeling, and looking at the moment o f the beep. In this
sample, Caleb was riding from the 9* green to the 10* tee with Chris. At the moment o f
the beep, Caleb is wondering if his beeper is working. This seems to be a mental process
o f some kind. It is not entirely apparent whether this is a pure mental process without
words or inner seeing or if Caleb has words related to it. If there were words, Caleb
thinks he is saying to something to him self in his own normal voice with words like “1
hope this device is plugged in and working. I’d hate to be messing up this experiment.”
Caleb is not sure o f the exact words, so the actual words may be different from these but
with the same meaning. This is the most prominent o f Caleb’s inner experiences. Also at
the moment o f the beep, Caleb is experiencing an anxious feeling related to whether his
beeper is working. He is not aware o f any bodily experience o f anxiety. This anxiety is
more of a mental experience related to but separate from the wondering process that may
or may not have been in words. Finally, Caleb is also looking at the color codes on the tee
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markers to identify which one is his at the moment of the beep, but this is a less
prominent aspect of his inner experience. He is just looking for his tees, which were red.
This is a multiple awareness experience that has a very unclear inner mental experience
with or without words, a clear anxiety feeling, and a looking at the moment o f the beep.
Both o f Caleb’s feelings co-occurred with mental experiences. His feelings also had
much more personal conscious involvement, richest, and depth than his perceptual
awareness experiences.
Inner Experience During Golf
Caleb experienced perceptual awareness in 4 of 9 or 44% o f his golf tournament
samples. For comparison, perceptual awareness occurred in 5 o f 15 or 33% o f his non
golf samples. O f his perceptual awareness experiences during golf, two were passive
(instances o f idly looking) and three were active (looking as a function o f a task)
experiences.
Caleb’s two passive perceptual awareness experiences were Tournament Samples T.2
and T.3, described earlier. In Tournament Sample T.2, Caleb is idly looking at the tee and
picking it up no awareness o f the task he is doing and without interest in the details of the
golf tee. In Tournament Sample T.3, Caleb is idly watching Chris tee up his ball and
address it with no inner experience other than just watching what Chris is doing.
Caleb experienced three instances o f active perceptual awareness. As an example o f
these, in Tournament Sample T .l, Caleb had just finished his first shot o f the day. He was
putting his golf club back into his bag. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is looking in his
bag to try and locate the place where the club belongs. He is paying visual attention to the
bag for the purpose o f finding the place where his club belongs. At the moment o f the
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beep, he has not yet found it but is in the process o f visually finding it. This is an active
visual perceptual activity. In Tournament Sample T.4, Caleb was on the 7* hole and
watching Chris tee up. He has started looking at the group ahead of them to see if they
are out of Chris’s range. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is looking at the group ahead
of them and in the process o f making a perceptual judgment about whether or not they are
out of Chris’s range. He has not arrived at an actual judgment about whether or not they
are out of range, rather he is in the active process o f making the judgment to see if they
are far enough out o f Chris’s range for Chris to safely hit the ball.
Caleb had two sensory awareness experiences during the golf tournament (22% of his
golf tournament samples). In Tournament Sample T.6, Caleb experienced visual sensory
awareness. He is paying attention to the brightness o f his metallic coin; he is absorbed in
its brightness and experiencing a mild sense o f aesthetic satisfaction. In Tournament
Sample T.7, also described earlier, Caleb is experiencing a bodily sensory awareness
along with inner speech as he is feeling weakness in his arms from the heat and saying to
himself “it’s getting steamy” in his own voice.
Caleb had several other irmer experiences once each during the golf tournament
including an irmer speech, an unsymbolized thinking, a feeling, a just doing experience,
and a multiple awareness experience. In 5 of 9 or 56% o f his inner experience during the
golf tournament, Caleb’s inner experience was related to golf in content. In all but one of
these instances, Caleb experienced perceptual awareness related to golf as he was looking
either passively or actively at objects related to golf. His perceptual awareness
experiences during golf were mostly matter-of-fact visual experiences lacking the richest,
depth, and personal conscious involvement that was apparent in his sensory awareness.
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inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, a feeling experiences. His just doing experience
was much more matter-of-fact, similar to his perceptual awareness experiences.
Golf-Related Content
O f Caleb’s Tournament Samples collected during golf performance, 5 o f 9 or 56%
were related to golf in content. Examples of golf related content include paying visual
attention to finding the place where his golf club belongs by looking in his bag, focusing
visually on his tee while just picking it up, just passively watching what another golfer is
doing, looking at the group ahead in the process o f making a perceptual judgment about
whether they are out o f range, deciding as unsymbolized thinking about whether to hit the
ball over the water with a safer eight- or riskier nine-iron to the green.
Comparing Inner Experience During G olf and Daily Life
Caleb’s inner experiences from his golf samples were similar to his daily life samples
with respect to six forms o f inner experience; these forms were perceptual awareness,
inner speech, feeling, just doing, and multiple awareness. His inner experiences from his
golf samples were different from his daily life samples with respect to two forms o f inner
experience; these were sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking.
Caleb experienced a similar amount o f perceptual awareness during his golf samples
(4 o f 9 or 44%) as he did during his daily samples (5 o f 15 or 33%). He also had a similar
amount o f inner speech during golf (1 o f 9 or 11%) as he did during his golf samples (2
of 15 or 13%). Caleb had a similar amount o f feelings, just doing, and multiple awareness
during his daily samples (1 of 9 or 11 % for each of these three) as he did during his golf
samples as well (1 o f 15 or 7% for each o f these three).
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Caleb experienced less than half as many instances o f sensory awareness during his
golf samples (2 o f 9 or 22%) as he had during his daily samples (7 o f 15 or 47%). Caleb
also had less than half as many instances o f unsymbolized thinking during his golf
samples (1 o f 9 or 11%) as he had during his daily samples (4 of 15 or 27%).
Caleb’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily life were similar with
respect to the amount o f perceptual awareness, inner speech, feeling, just doing, and
multiple awareness he had. His inner experiences were different during golf compared
with his daily life with respect to sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking. Caleb
experienced about a decrease in sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking during
golf. Thus Caleb’s irmer experience during golf was mostly similar to his irmer
experience during his daily life.
Discussion
Caleb was surprised that most o f his samples were task specific and did not include
much o f what he considered inner experience. His inner phenomena were often matterof-fact occurrences that lacked the richness and depth that he expected to find. Whether
they were active or passive experiences, for instance, Caleb’s perceptual awareness
experiences were typically matter-of-fact visual experiences often related to the tasks he
was doing, but lacking the richness and depth o f experience he had with other inner
experiences such as sensory awareness. Caleb experienced his perceptual awareness as
not having much inner experience at the moment o f the beep other than passive visual
experience or as active visual experience related to a task at hand. His unsymbolized
thinking, inner speech, and especially his just doing experiences also lacked the depth
and richness he expected to find.
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Caleb’s feelings and sensory awareness experiences had more depth and richness than
his perceptual awareness, unsymbolized thinking, inner speech, and just doing
experiences. His feelings had more depth and richness, and in addition to this, his sensory
awareness experiences also had more personal conscious involvement as he was absorbed
or immersed the external visual phenomena or internal physical sensations.
Caleb’s inner experience during golf also contained a high frequency o f perceptual
awareness (44%), o f both passive and active forms. He also had 2 sensory awareness
experiences during the golf tournament (22% o f his golf samples). He had one instance o f
each o f the following during golf: inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, feeling, just
doing experience, and multiple awareness. In 5 o f 9 or 56% o f his inner experience
during the golf tournament, Caleb’s inner experience was related to golf in content. In all
but one o f these instances, Caleb experienced perceptual awareness related to golf,
looking at objects related to golf either passively or actively.
Only about half o f Caleb’s inner experiences during golf had golf-related content.
Caleb’s golf irmer experiences were similar to that o f his daily life with respect to the
amount o f perceptual awareness, irmer speech, feeling, just doing, and multiple
awareness he had. His golf inner experiences were different from his daily life with
respect to his decrease sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking during golf.
Caleb’s golf irmer experience was mostly similar that o f his daily life.
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CHAPTER 9

SAMUEL
Samuel is a 43 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap o f 18. He was
recruited by a contact o f one of the researchers. He completed his first three sampling
days by obtaining 15 samples from his daily life either at work or at home. He collected
his daily life samples at the end o f the spring. He participated in the golf competition
sampling in the middle o f the same summer and collected 9 golf samples. Samuel shot a
92, which is 20 over par, 2 strokes higher than his handicap o f 18. As a result, Samuel
finished 7* in the golf competition.
Perceptual Awareness
In 9 o f 24 samples, or 38%, Samuel experienced perceptual awareness at the moment
o f the beep. Samuel experienced two different kinds o f perceptual awareness. In some o f
Samuel’s samples, he was not doing much other than looking at something at the moment
o f the beep. In these instances he had much less concentration on what he was looking at,
he was just idly looking without doing much else. In other samples, he was concentrating
on what he was looking at right at the moment of the beep. This typically served the task
he was doing or a task he was preparing to do.
Idly Looking
In Sample 2.2, for instance, Samuel was not doing much but looking. Samuel had just
clicked the mouse key and a blank window had come up on his computer. At the moment

167

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

o f the beep, Samuel is looking at the window that had come up, which is blank. He may
also be waiting for something to come up in the blank window and expecting it to be
filled, but if he is, this is a very faint, matter-of-fact experience that is much less
prominent than his experience o f just looking at the blank window. At the moment o f the
beep, this a basic visual task experienced as idly looking, along with a possible waiting
experience.
In Sample 3.2, Samuel was also not doing much but looking. Samuel had been
watching a TV show, and his attention became drawn to his wife's face. At the moment
of the beep, he is seeing her face in the periphery o f his vision on the right side. His
attention is drawn to her face and the TV show has disappeared from his awareness. She
is closer to him than he was previously aware, although this is not part o f his experience.
This is a simple visual experience since Samuel is just looking at his wife's face using his
peripheral vision without any other inner experience.
One o f Samuel’s experiences of not doing much but looking came during the golf
tournament. In Tournament T .l, Samuel was on the first hole addressing the ball in
preparation for his first shot. He has set the ball on the tee and has the club in his right
hand. He has just begun to put both hands on the club. At the moment o f the beep,
Samuel is looking at the ball without attention to anything else and without attention to
any particular details about the ball. He is not aware of the fact that he is preparing to hit
the ball or thinking about anything else.
Goal-Directed Looking
In Sample 2.3, Samuel experienced the other type o f perceptual awareness, which
was concentrating on what he was looking at as a function of the task he was doing.
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Samuel had been part o f a telephone conference call leading up to the moment o f the
beep and using his computer. At the moment o f the beep, he is looking at a tab on the
computer to bring up a particular program. He is looking at the box in the bottom right
hand comer o f screen, and looking specifically at the

choice on a list of boxes called

“ideas.” He is seeing the box as a target to click and is focused mostly on the box. This is
an experience o f performing a skilled visual task. The voice from the conference call is in
his awareness, but very much in the background. He is hearing the voice that is speaking,
but is not listening at all to the details o f what is being said.
Two o f Samuel’s perceptual awareness experiences that involved concentrating on
what he was looking at as a function of a task occurred during the golf tournament. In
Tournament Sample T.2, Samuel was on the second hole. He was crouched down looking
and reading the green to prepare for a putt. At the moment o f the beep, Samuel is trying
to visualize the path his ball will take to the hole. He is doing this at the moment by
looking externally along a curving line. This experience has a sense o f motion involved.
He does not see the ball. This is an experience o f externally looking along a curving line
that represents the path his ball could take to the hole. At Tournament Sample T.4,
Samuel was on the 6th hole. He was watching M ike’s putt to see which way the ball will
break while Samuel was holding the flag. The ball was three quarters o f the way to the
hole. At the moment o f the beep, Samuel is concentrating on the ball, watching it move to
note its trajectory. This is a clear and simple inner experience of watching the ball to see
where it is going to go.
All of Samuel’s perceptual awarenesses were visual. In some o f these experiences,
Samuel was not doing much other than looking at the moment o f the beep. In others, he
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was concentrating more visually on the process o f doing something (or preparing to do
something). Because the borders o f these experiences are less clear than with other forms
o f inner experience, it is difficult to arrive at an exact number for how many times each
o f these two different types o f perceptual awareness occurred. Samuel’s not doing much
but looking experiences did have an idle, almost passive quality to them, whereas his
concentrating visually and doing or preparing experiences had more o f an active quality
to them.
Inner Speech
Samuel experienced inner speech in 4 o f 24 or 17% o f his samples. He experienced
one o f these during his daily life samples. In Sample 3.1, Samuel was going through his
w ife’s shopping bag to find a notebook. At the moment o f the beep, he is looking at a
purple Tupperware container that had been missing that he has now found. He knows that
it is purple, but is not caught up in the sensory aspects of the purpleness; he is more
interested in the perceptual awareness o f the Tupperware in that it is now found. Also at
the moment o f the beep, Samuel is innerly saying to himself “Oh, the purple
Tupperware” in his own normal voice. Samuel is also aware o f moving his hand by
seeing it and feeling his hand on the Tupperware and other objects in the bag, but this is a
less prominent part of his awareness.
Samuel experienced his other three instances o f inner speech during golf
performance. In two o f these three instances, Samuel had inner speech that was selfdirected and negative in content. In Tournament Sample T.5, Samuel was watching the
ball that Mike has putted. At the moment o f the beep, he is berating himself for leaving a
putt 10 feet short earlier by saying something in words. By the time o f the interview, he is
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not sure o f the exact words, but they would have been something like “stupid ass” or
“fucking idiot” or “moron.” It is not apparent to us or we think to Samuel exactly which
words were present at the moment o f the beep; by the time of the expositional interview,
he had forgotten which occurred exactly at the moment. This is spoken by him self to
himself and said in his head with a scolding tone o f voice and inflection. Samuel is not
experiencing any emotion separate from this inner speech. This is just an intense mental
experience. Samuel also has the sense that whatever words are present are one o f a
serious o f berating inner spoken words that had been ongoing leading up to the moment
o f the beep. His inner berating is 99% prominent, and seeing the ball is about 1% o f his
inner experience. Well before Tournament Sample T.8, Samuel had hit a bad shot
sending it only about 8 yards. He had then felt irritated and had been berating him self
with a series o f internally spoken expletives. Then he had had stopped saying the
expletives and had taken another shot. The result o f this shot was better, and he began
walking to his next shot. As he was walking, he started thinking about the bad shot again.
Now, at the moment o f the beep, Samuel is looking down at his feet and internally saying
something like “fucking idiot” or “dumb ass” with a negative tone and inflection in his
voice. These words are not as forceful as the previous expletives in Tournament Sample
T.5. Samuel is not remembering the past shot, nor is he feeling irritated at the moment of
the beep, but he is just berating himself in words at the moment o f the beep. Outside the
experience of saying internal expletives at the moment o f the beep, Samuel thinks he had
been having an ongoing series o f expletives that he has turned on and off at various
points in time. The last two samples occurred when the expletives had been on.
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Most o f Samuel’s sampled instances o f inner speech were during golf performance.
Two of his three inner speech instances during golf were self-directed berating comments
that had being part o f ongoing series before the moment of the beep. In both of these
instances, Samuel’s inner voice also had a negative tone, whereas his daily life inner
speech sample had a normal tone.
Just Doing
Samuel had instances o f just doing experiences in 3 of 24 or 13% o f his samples. He
experienced one o f these during his daily life samples and two during golf performance.
In Sample 1.2, Samuel was at work. He was visually scanning a list o f stocks until one
catches his eye. He was not looking for any specific stock and was not aware o f the
scanning process. At the moment o f the beep, Samuel is still scanning. This is an
automatic process without awareness, a skilled activity with no conscious experience.
Samuel thinks he is prepared to be stopped if he finds the right stock. The TV is on in the
background, but he's not listening or paying attention to it. In Sample 3.3, Samuel had
had an inflamed sore in his mouth for which he rinses his mouth with saltwater. At the
moment o f the beep, Samuel is swishing saltwater in his mouth. He is concentrating on
making the water in his mouth move in a swishing motion. In addition to this, he is
feeling a stinging sensation in the right side of his mouth that is located in his gums and
teeth. The most prominent experience is the action o f trying to make the water swish.
Although the stinging is an intense sensation, it is secondary to the swishing effort in
prominence.
In Tournament Sample T.3, Samuel was on his seeond shot o f the 5* hole. He had
just hit his shot and watched where it had gone. He was leaning down to pick up his
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putter from the ground. At the moment of the beep, he is looking down and seeing his
putter externally as well as picking up his putter. This is a simple and process o f looking
at the putter and picking it up at the moment o f the beep. This is a clear simple inner
experience.
Sensory Awareness
In 2 of 24 samples, or 8%, Samuel experienced sensory awareness at the moment o f
the beep. In Sample 3.3, for instance, Samuel had had a sore in his mouth for which had
to rinse his mouth with saltwater. At the moment of the beep, Samuel is swishing
saltwater in his mouth. He is concentrating on making the water in his mouth move in a
swishing motion. In addition to this, he is feeling a stinging sensation in the right side o f
his mouth that is located in his gums and teeth; this is the sensory awareness portion o f
this sample. The most prominent experience is the aetion of trying to make the water
swish, an example o f a doing experience at the moment of the beep. Although the
stinging is an intense sensation, it is secondary to the swishing effort in prominence. In
Sample 3.6, Samuel experienced one sensory and one perceptual awareness. At the
moment of the beep, Samuel is washing his hands under the water to rinse the soap off.
He is particularly interested in the temperature, noticing that it feels moderately warm.
Also at the moment o f the beep, he is seeing the wetness and soapiness o f his hands, a
simple perceptual awareness. Samuel experienced sensory awareness twice during his
daily life samples. In both o f these, his sense o f touch was the mode through which
Samuel experienced sensory awareness.
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Inner Experience During Golf
Samuel played the back nine in the golf competition. He collected nine Tournament
Samples o f inner experience during golf competition. Perceptual awareness occurred in 4
o f 9 or 44% o f these samples. Samuel experienced both not doing much but looking as
well as looking as a function o f a task during golf competition. Inner speech occurred in 3
o f 9 or 33% o f these samples, and 2 o f these 3 were self-directed berating inner speech.
Just doing experiences occurred in 2 o f 9 or 22% o f his Tournament Samples. Most o f
Samuel’s inner experiences during golf were clear, noticeably clearer than some of
Samuel’s inner experiences collected during daily life. All o f his sampled inner
experiences during golf included just one form of inner experience at the moment o f the
beep.
Golf-Related Content
O f the Tournament Samples collected during golf, 8 of 9 or 89% were related to golf
in content. The only inner experience not related to golf was collected during a break
from golfing. Examples of golf-related content include looking at the ball without
attention to its details, externally looking along a curving line that represents the path his
ball could take to the hole, seeing his putter externally and just picking it up,
concentrating on the ball another golf has just hit as it moves, looking at another golfer’s
GPS device and saying something internally like “wow, that’s cool,” watching another
golfer address the ball and focusing visually on the place where the ball and the club
meet, and berating himself about his golf performance with inner expletives with a
scolding tone o f voice (two samples).
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Comparing Inner Experience During G olf and Daily Life
Samuel’s inner experiences from his golf samples were similar to his daily life
samples with respect to just one form o f inner experience; this was perceptual awareness.
His inner experiences from his golf samples were different from his daily life samples
with respect to three forms o f inner experience; these were just doing, inner speech, and
sensory awareness.
Samuel experienced nearly the same amount o f perceptual awareness during his golf
samples (4 o f 9 or 44%) as he did during his daily samples (6 o f 15 or 40%). Samuel had
more just doing experiences during his golf samples (2 o f 9 or 22%) than he had during
his daily samples (1 o f 15 or 7%). Samuel also had more inner speech during his golf
samples (3 of 9 or 33%) than he had during his daily samples (1 o f 15 or 7%). Samuel
had less sensory awareness during his golf samples (0 o f 9 or 0%) than he had during his
daily samples (2 of 15 or 13%).
Samuel’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily life were similar with
respect to the amount o f perceptual awareness he had. His inner experiences were
different during golf compared with his daily life with respect to just doing, inner speech,
and sensory awareness.
Discussion
Perceptual awareness was Samuel’s most frequent inner experience in his daily
life and golf tournament samples. Samuel experienced two kinds o f perceptual awareness
- not doing much but looking and looking as a function of a task. The former were
passive experiences with not much attention and interest in the visual stimuli, whereas the
latter were active experiences with much more attention and interest in the visual stimuli
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and the task at hand. Samuel’s next most frequent inner experience was inner speech.
Samuel experienced two inner speech instances where the content o f what he was saying
and his tone of voice were both normal and benign. He experienced two self-berating
inner speech experiences than were negative in content and tone o f voice. Samuel also
had three just doing experiences, in which he was just doing a task at the moment o f the
beep with no awareness o f thinking about it at the moment o f the beep. He had two
sensory awareness experiences, both o f which involved his sense o f touch. Samuel’s most
frequent inner experience during golf competition was perceptual awareness, and nearly
all of his golf competition inner experiences were related to golf in content. Samuel’s had
about the same amount o f perceptual awareness during golf as he had in his daily life, but
he had more just doing and inner speech inner experiences and less sensory awareness
during golf than in his daily life.
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CHAPTER 10

WILL
Will is a 30 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap o f 26. He was
recruited by one o f the researchers. He completed his first two sampling days by
obtaining 11 samples from his daily life at work. He collected his daily life samples at the
end o f the summer. He participated in the golf competition sampling in the middle o f the
fall and collected 11 golf samples. Will shot 106, 34 strokes over par, 8 strokes higher
than his handicap o f 26. As a result, Will finished 9'^ in the golf competition.
Feeling
Will experienced feelings in 9 o f 22 or 41% o f his samples. During Sample 2.3, for
instance. Will was at work researching fantasy football leagues and feeling relaxed and
bored. At the moment o f the beep. Will is feeling mildly relaxed and bored. This is
experienced mentally and not physically, and as one feeling o f relaxation and boredom.
Also at the moment of the beep. Will is thinking about what to do after work; this may
occur to him as an inner seeing, but he is not sure because the details o f this inner seeing
are very ambiguous. Will is not sure if he is innerly seeing himself doing a chore or
errand, him self working out, or him self watching TV, but he thinks he sees him self in the
inner scene. It is not apparent from what perspective he is involved in the inner seeing,
whether he is seeing himself as if from a third person perspective or whether he sees
objects in the inner seeing from the first person perspective. He thinks this inner seeing is
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in motion and color. He also thinks he had been having several inner seeings near the
moment o f the beep but is only seeing one at the moment of the beep. This is a fairly
elear feeling o f relaxation and boredom with an unclear inner experience that might be an
inner seeing at the moment o f the beep. (Researching fantasy football is not in W ill’s
conscious experience at the moment o f the beep.)
In Sample 2.5, Will experienced another feeling and a simultaneous inner seeing.
Will is in his office preparing for a meeting at work. At the moment o f the beep. Will is
thinking about the best way to summarize the project. This is experienced as an inner
seeing o f the meeting in progress. Will sees people around a table in motion in some of
the same colors that are in this meeting room in reality. He sees different people wearing
different clothes with different hair colors; for example, he sees a woman with blonde
hair, a woman with black hair, a man with black hair, and others. Also at the moment of
the beep. Will is experiencing a positive feeling o f being occupied. This is experienced as
an overall feeling o f bodily contentment. W ill’s inner experience at the moment o f the
beep consists of a clear and differentiated visual and a rather clear internal emotional
experience.
Will experienced feelings o f bodily frustration, happiness and amusement, bodily
energized satisfaction, mental excited confident optimism, intense mental satisfaction,
mildly mental relaxation and boredom, overall bodily contentment, bodily over
stimulation (like having too much adrenalin), and mental frustration. Five o f 9 or 56% of
these were positive feelings (e.g., happiness, satisfaction), 3 o f 9 or 33% were negative
feelings (e.g., frustration), and 1 o f 9 or 11% was mixed (relaxation and boredom). Will
experienced 4 o f 9 or 44% of these feelings bodily, the same number mentally, and one

178

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was not experienced as having a location. In 7 of 9 or 78% o f W ill’s feeling experiences,
co-occurring inner experiences were also present at the moment o f the beep. These
included inner speech, inner seeing, inner hearing, unsymbolized thinking, and doing
with awareness. O f his feelings, 4 o f 9 or 44% were experienced in his body, 5 o f 9 or
56% were experienced as mental, and 2 o f 9 or 22% he was did not apprehend enough
detail to know if they were experienced in his body or as mental.
Inner Seeing
Will experienced inner seeing in 8 o f his 22 or 36% o f his samples. During the
previous Samples 2.3 and 2.5 described in the Feeling section. Will had an inner seeing
with a simultaneous feeling present at the moment o f the beep. In Sample 2.2, he
experienced inner seeing with no other simultaneous inner experience. During this
sample. Will had been working on a report at work when somebody distracted him by
giving him a birthday card to sign for his friend Tom. At the moment o f the beep. Will is
thinking about writing something personal in the birthday card. This thought process
involves multiple inner seeings o f Tom. In one o f these, he is seeing Tom playing golf.
This is a clear inner seeing o f Tom golfing on a green golf course on a sunny day with
three other people. This inner seeing has bright colors and vivid details. Will thinks this
inner seeing may be a memory o f having seen Tom golf because he knows he had seen
this before, although this knowledge comes to him well after the beep. Also at the
moment of the beep. Will is simultaneously experiencing an inner seeing o f people in an
office at work joking around. He is seeing people, including Tom, talking and laughing in
more dull colors and much less vivid detail than his other co-occurring inner seeing.
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W ill’s golf inner seeing is more prominent in his experience at the moment o f the beep
than the office inner seeing.
In Tournament Sample T.4, Will experienced an inner seeing with no co-occurring
inner experience. He was on the

stroke o f the

hole, and he previously had hit a

poor tee shot. He had had a series o f inner seeings in which he was seeing the negative
aspects o f the course before the moment o f the beep. At the moment o f the beep. Will is
preoccupied with an inner seeing specifically about the green o f the course. He is seeing
at the moment o f the beep a slow, wet, thick, soft, green with long grass. This a elear
inner seeing o f the grass on the green, a clear and vivid inner seeing he is seeing as if he
is standing and looking down at the green.
W ill’s inner seeings were typically detailed and differentiated experiences. In 5 o f 8
or 63% o f his inner seeings. Will apprehended the details of these inner experiences, and
in all these instances, he made distinctions between different aspects within the inner
seeing (e.g., color versus black and white, motion versus static), and he also made
distinctions among co-occurring but separate inner experiences (e.g., feeling, inner
speech). In 4 o f 8 or half o f W ill’s inner seeings. Will had co-occurring inner
experiences, 3 of which were eo-occurring feelings, and 1 o f which was co-occurring
inner speech.
Inner Experience During Golf
Will experienced inner speech during 7 o f his 11 golf samples (64%). He had inner
seeings in 4 o f his 11 golf samples (36%), feelings in 2 o f his 11 samples (18%), and I
instance of inner hearing (8%). He had golf-related content in his inner experience in 9 o f
11 o f his inner experiences during golf competition (82%). W ill’s inner experience
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during golf will be described including his inner speech, inner seeing, and feelings. This
will be followed by a description o f his golf-related content. Finally, comparison o f
W ill’s inner experience during golf and daily life will be conducted.
Inner Speech
All o f W ill’s instances o f inner speech occurred during the golf competition. He
experienced inner speech in 7 of 11 or 64% o f his golf samples, and 0 o f 11 or 0% of his
non-golf samples. During Tournament Sample T.2, for instance. Will was on the 2"‘‘
stroke o f the 2"^ hole. He had just taken his 2"*^ stroke and could not take a full backswing
because he was right next to a tree. At the moment o f the beep. Will is saying to himself
internally “tree’s in the way.” This is said in his own normal voice. (Will thinks this
inner spoken phrase was a way to minimize his frustration.) Also at the moment o f the
beep, but less prominent than his inner speech. Will is feeling mental frustration,
experienced as felt in his head. This is a negative feeling that is certainly mental, but it is
not apparent to us or Will, we think, exactly how this feeling takes place. He may be
experiencing the feeling as a lack o f mental clarity, a mental jumbledness, a feeling
experienced as closer to a thought and/or somehow experienced as located in his head;
this is a less prominent inner experience than his inner speech, so it is difficult for Will to
determine if this menfal frustrations is experienced as a lack o f mental clarity and mental
jumbledness at the moment of the beep. Thus Will is experiencing golf-related inner
speech and a less prominent feeling o f negative mental frustration that is certainly a
feeling, certainly negative, and possibly felt as a lack o f mental clarity and mental
jumbledness.
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In Tournament Sample T.5, Will was on the 5'*’ stroke of the 6* hole. He had just
finished chipping onto the green from directly behind a tree. He was walking to the green
and starting to relax, feeling less frustrated. At the moment of the beep, Will is thinking
that there were not enough options for hitting because o f the tree. This is experienced as
saying “not enough options for a good shot” or “not enough good options” or “not
enough options;” he does not remember if the word “good” was part o f the inner
experience at the moment o f the beep because he did not write it down right after the
beep, but he does remember the words “not enough” and “options” were present. Will
was not experiencing a feeling or any other inner experience in his conscious experience
at the moment o f the beep. Will thought that he was having an ongoing dialogue in inner
speech about this shot before the moment of the beep as well.
In Tournament Sample T.9, Will was on the 7**' stroke of the 14**’ hole. Will had just
finished putting and was feeling fatigued physically and mentally, but also more relaxed
and was not caring as much about the result o f his swings. At the moment o f the beep.
Will is saying to himself internally “I’m ready to quit” for the day, said in a fatigued and
slower manner than normal. The phrase means he is happy with how much he has played,
does not need to play any more, and he could quit right now. The thought that he could
quit is partially separate from the inner spoken phrase at the moment o f the beep, but it is
not exactly clear how it is separate from the inner speech experience. He is not
experiencing fatigue at the moment o f the beep as he had been before the moment.
Inner Seeing
W ill’s had inner seeing in 4 of 11 or 36% o f his golf samples. In Sample T .l, for
instance. Will was on the 4‘*’ stroke o f the

hole. He was waiting to putt and feeling
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nervous, jittery, and disoriented. He was also thinking about how slow the speed o f the
green was and how he will need to adjust to this. Will had difficulty sorting out exactly
what was in his inner experience and what was not when the beep occurred. At the
moment o f the beep. Will is certain he is imagining the sound the putter will make when
he hits the ball. He experiences this as innerly hearing the clicking sound the putter will
need to make to hit the ball hard enough. Will is much less certain about other things that
may be in his inner experience. For instance, he may also be experiencing a kinesthetic
imagined feeling in his hands also at the moment o f the beep, but he is not sure about
whether this is also present at the moment of the beep. Will may also be experiencing
something related to how hard he should hit the ball, but he was very uncertain about this
and lacked details to describe whether this was present at the moment. Will is certain
about his inner hearing o f the clicking putter, but any o f these others processes may or
may not have been in his inner experience. To speculate. Will may be uncertain about the
presence or absence o f other inner experiences because they were less prominent than his
inner hearing, or they may have occurred before or after the beep, leading to uncertainty
about their relation to the moment of the beep, or both o f these options. Will had felt
nervous, jittery, and disoriented before the moment of the beep, but none o f these feelings
are present at the moment o f the beep.
Feelings
Will experienced feelings in 2 of 11 or 18% o f his golf samples, and 7 o f 11 or 64%
o f his non-golf samples. During Tournament Sample T.2 for instance, which was
discussed in the previous Inner Speech subsection. Will experienced a negative feeling of
mental frustration, which was less prominent than his co-occurring golf-related inner
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speech. During Tournament Sample T.3, Will experienced another negative feeling with
co-oeeurring inner speech. Will was on the 5'^ stroke o f the 2"^ hole. His group had just
finished the 2"^ hole, and he was sitting in the golf cart. Will had been feeling like he had
too much energy, and leading up to the moment o f the beep, he was having an inner
dialogue about why he had too much energy and not enough focus. At the moment o f the
beep. Will is thinking about how he feels by saying internally to him self the words “too
much adrenalin,” a clearly spoken inner phrase. Also at the moment o f the beep. Will is
experiencing the feeling o f the too much adrenalin and energy. This is a feeling that he
experiences throughout his whole body, but more so in his head. Also at the moment of
the beep, W ill’s body was hot, but he is not experiencing this in his consciousness at the
moment o f the beep.
Both o f W ill’s feelings during golf were negative feelings with co-occurring inner
speech. Thus 2 o f 2 or 100% of his feelings during golf were negative, whereas 5 of 7 or
71% his feelings during his daily life were positive, and 1 of 7 or 14% was mixed. The
content o f one o f these was external, a tree being in the way, and the other was internal,
feeling too much adrenalin and energy.
Golf-Related Content
Nine o f 11 or 82% of W ill’s Tournament Samples contained golf-related content.
Examples o f golf-related content include internally hearing the sound the putter will
make when he hits the ball, internally saying to himself something to him self like “tree’s
in the way” and simultaneously feeling mental frustration felt in his head, internally
seeing a slow, wet, thick, soft, green with long grass, internally saying a phrase about
how there were not enough options for a good shot, internally saying “disjointed” to
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himself and simultaneously internally seeing the parts o f his disjointed swing, internally
seeing what his final score would be if he shot 7 on every hole by seeing “ 18 x 7” in
black, internally saying “better” about the green conditions, saying to himself internally
“I'm ready to quit” for the day in a fatigued manner, and remembering the best par 5 he
ever played by internally seeing the ball flying toward the hole from the side as if it is on
TV.
Comparing Inner Experience During G olf and Daily Life
The most salient feature o f W ill’s inner experience during golf was inner speech. He
had seven instances o f inner speech during his golf samples and none during his daily
samples, as was noted previously in the Inner Speech section. He had inner speech in 7 of
11 or 64% o f his golf samples and none during his daily samples. Five o f 7 or 71% o f his
inner speech during golf contained golf-related content.
The most salient feature of W ill’s inner experience during daily life was feeling. Will
had fewer feelings during golf than daily life. He had feelings in 2 o f 11 or 18% o f his
golf samples and 7 of 11 or 64% o f his daily samples. One o f 2 or 50% o f his feelings
during golf contained golf-related content. Both o f W ill’s feelings during golf were
negative feelings with co-occurring inner speech. Two o f 2 or 100% of his feelings
during golf were negative, whereas 5 o f 7 or 71% his feelings during his daily life were
positive, as mentioned in the previous Feeling subsection.
One of the other salient features o f W ill’s inner experience during both golf and daily
life was inner seeing. Will experienced the same amount of inner seeing in his golf
samples as his daily samples (36%). All four or 100% o f his inner seeings during golf
contained golf-related content. Another salient feature o f his inner experience was clarity.
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As noted previously in the Clarity subsection. Will had inner experienees that were
unclear in different ways during golf and daily life. During golf he had two unclear inner
experiences, and during his daily life he had two unclear indeterminate inner experiences.
Discussion
W ill’s golf and daily life inner experiences were typically fairly clear and detailed.
W ill’s most salient inner experience during golf was golf-related inner speech. He also
had salient golf-related inner seeings and feelings during golf.
During the golf competition, Will experienced seven instances o f inner speech and
inner seeing. He also experieneed two feelings and an inner hearing. Most o f his golf
competition samples contained golf-related content. His golf samples were similar to his
daily life with respect to the amount o f inner seeing he experienced. His golf samples
were different from his daily samples with respect to the amount o f inner speech and
feelings he experienced. His golf samples had a more inner speech and fewer feelings.
The feelings Will did have during golf were both negative feelings with co-occurring
inner speech. In contrast, 5 o f 7 or 71% his feelings during his daily life were positive.

186

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 11

TOM
Tom was a 19 year-old intercollegiate golfer with a handicap o f two. He was
recmited from a friend o f one of the researchers from the community. Tom participated
in the study during the summer, and he was practicing golf regularly during this time. He
chose to sample for his first two days during golf practice instead o f other life activities
so he could see what his inner experience was like during golf, and because it worked
best with his summer schedule. For the purpose o f this study, we will refer to golf
practice such as this with the term recreational golf from this point forward (More on this
in the nomothetic Chapter 16). Tom collected 12 samples during these two days.
On the third and final sampling day, Tom chose to wear the beeper during a twoversus-two competition with his friends the day before a college tournament. He
requested that he be allowed to do this instead o f competing in the golf tournament
designed for the study because he thought he would take the task more seriously, and
because he thought it would be a more realistic approximation o f how he is in natural
competitions. Although Tom’s team of two was in the lead for most o f the competition,
they lost after their opponents overcame their lead on the 18"’ hole. During Tom ’s golf
competition, he shot 70, 2 strokes under par, which is 4 strokes lower than his handicap
of 2. Tom ’s individual score was the 2”" best score in this study. He collected six golf
samples.
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Inner Seeing
In 56%, or 10 o f his 18 samples, Tom had inner seeing. These experiences were
typically very clear and differentiated. Most were golf-related in content as well. Tom ’s
inner seeing typically co-occurred along with other forms o f inner experience (e.g., inner
speech, sensory awareness).
Tom had three samples in which inner seeing co-occurred simultaneously with inner
speech at the moment of the beep. Sample 1.6, as an example, occurred on the first
sampling day while Tom was practicing golf. Tom had just hit a “bad” tee shot. His
coach had previously given him a “Nine Step Rule” to deal with anger, which consists of
allowing oneself to experience angry while walking. For nine paces, he can experience
anger, but by the tenth he must move on. At the moment of the beep, Tom is irmerly
seeing the number “6” in large black font with a small caption above it with the word
“six.” Tom is also counting to six and is saying the number “6” to himself internally in
his own normal voice at the moment of the beep.
Another example o f an inner seeing with inner speech. Sample 2.6, occurred when
Tom was finished with golf practice on the second sampling day. Tom was pulling out of
the parking lot on his way home when he saw his friend Joe, with whom he has an
intense, but friendly, disagreement about the quality o f a restaurant, El Bravo. Tom
believes that El Bravo has the best green salsa, but his friend does not. At the moment o f
the beep, Tom is experiencing an inner seeing of him self as if he is sitting at the bar. He
sees his arm and hand as if they are viewed from his own eyes. Tom is reliving the taste
and crunchiness o f the chips and salsa along with the inner seeing o f himself. Also at the
moment of the beep, in his imagination, Tom is saying to Joe “you're a real idiot” in his
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own voice. This was a clear, detailed, and differentiated inner experience not related to
golf, but his inner seeing and inner speech are related in content.
Tom had several inner seeings that occurred simultaneously with a related sensory
awareness. For instance with Sample 1.3, Tom was practicing golf and was on the
hole. His goal was to hit the ball over the water. He was taking a practice swing with his
left hand and his eyes were shut. At the moment of the beep, Tom is innerly seeing a
good result he had on the same hole yesterday. He is seeing a yellow flag internally and
the white ball from a close perspective. The ball is still and just a few feet from the hole,
and other details are known to be present but in the background such as the grass and
trees, but these are grey in color and out of the center o f his awareness. Also at the
moment o f the beep, Tom is aware o f the sensation o f nicking the grass with his golf
club, which he feels on the tips o f his fingers and from his forearm to his upper arm. So
this is an inner seeing that occurs simultaneously with the sensory awareness o f a
physical action.
Most o f Tom’s inner seeings were very clear and differentiated inner experiences.
Sample 2.1, for instance, occurred early in the morning. Tom was practicing on the golf
course and had hit his ball into a very wet muddy spot where it imbedded. Before the
moment o f the beep, he had been thinking about how it would “suck” if, in competition,
you did not get relief from a ball that imbeds as this one has. At the moment of the beep,
Tom is in reality looking at the lie with awareness o f it and is simultaneously having an
inner seeing o f him self hacking the ball out o f the mud with a nine iron with the ball
dribbling out about nine to fifteen yards; in this inner seeing he is wearing the same
clothes he’s wearing in reality that day. The inner seeing of himself hacking is more
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prominent than the ball he is looking at in the mud. He has no other inner experience at
the moment o f the beep. This was a clear, detailed, and differentiated golf-related inner
experience.
The majority of Tom ’s inner seeings were experienced simultaneously with other
forms o f inner experience such as inner speech, sensory awareness, feelings, and
unsymbolized thoughts. These usually occurred with only one other different form of
inner experience, but at one point it occurred with two other different forms. This
occurred in Sample 2.3 after Tom had finished practicing golf and was now lifting
weights. He is about half o f the way through his set. At the moment of the beep, Tom's
arms are fully extended and he is staring at the smooth part o f the barbell he is lifting and
noticing the smoothness o f the black shiny barbell and the way the light is hitting it to
cause a lighter-than-black colored reflection, an example o f sensory awareness. Also at
the moment o f the beep, Tom is imagining himself lifting weights with his arms fully
extended from the perspective o f a person who would be spotting for him. Also at the
moment o f the beep, Tom is saying to himself internally, “Man up!” vehemently in his
own words as if to mentally pump himself up. All three experiences (sensory awareness,
inner seeing, and inner speech) were clear, detailed, and differentiated.
Tom frequently experienced clear and differentiated inner seeings. Most o f these
experiences co-occurred with other forms o f inner experience including inner speech,
sensory awareness, and unsymbolized thinking. The co-occurrence of two or three forms
o f inner experience may not be uncommon, but it was certainly evident with Tom ’s
samples. Most o f these co-occuring forms of inner experiences were related to one
another in content. Since most o f Tom’s samples were collected during either golf
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practice or competition, most of these occurred when he was golfing. O f those that were
collected during golf, 75% o f his inner seeings were related to golf in content.
Kinesthetic Inner Seeing
A few o f Tom ’s inner seeings, 3 of 10, had kinesthetic components. As we saw before
in Sample 2.6, for example, Tom was having an inner seeing o f himself at the restaurant
bar and is reliving the taste and crunchiness o f the chips and salsa. Another instance of
this occurred in Sample 2.4 after Tom had left the gym and was practicing putting on the
putting green. He had been missing some o f his putts and was scooping some balls out of
the hole. At the moment o f the beep, Tom is thinking he may need to change putters,
which had been in words before the moment o f the beep. At the moment o f the beep, this
unsymbolized residual idea is in his inner experience without words. Also at the moment
o f the beep, Tom is innerly seeing him self taking off the cover o f another o f his putters.
He sees his arms taking off the red cover in motion and the insignia o f the brand on the
cover. Also at the same moment, Tom is hearing the velcro tearing internally along with
the related inner seeing. He also feels the resistance o f the velcro as if the putter cover is
there and as if he's really feeling it at the moment o f the beep. So Tom had an
unsymbolized idea of changing putters in mind, and an inner seeing o f him self getting out
the putter that has inner sensory components, both kinesthetic and auditory, that are
relived at the moment of the beep. This is a clear, detailed, and differentiated inner
experience that is golf-related.
Tom experienced another inner seeing with kinesthetic components during golf
competition. Tournament Sample T .l. Tom was playing a two versus two game against
his friends to prepare for a college match the next day. He was walking to his second shot
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on the second hole (a short par 4). He was trying to just stay in the moment, trying to
maintain a good feeling he has had. He was also actively trying to keep a positive
attitude. The swing he had made previously was very good, and he is trying to keep it in
his head to duplicate it for the next shot. He had started the process of keeping it in his
head and is doing so at the moment without effort. A t the moment of the beep he is
picturing the swing he had just made off the tee, seeing his arms go back in perfect
position. He is seeing a previous good tee shot internally just like it is from the same view
he had previously seen it externally. In the second seeing, he is seeing the swing and
feeling it too in no particular place in his body, but this is a good feeling. This was a
visual and kinesthetic re-experience used to prepare for the next shot.
Inner Speech
In 5 o f 18, or 28%, o f Tom ’s samples, he was experiencing inner speech. Most of
these, 4 o f 5 or 80%, were not golf-related. All o f his inner speech experiences occurred
along with other forms o f inner experience such as inner seeing or sensory awareness. All
o f his inner speech experiences also were related to the other co-occurring forms of inner
experience by the content o f the inner experience.
Sample 1.2 is an example o f an inner speech experience that is not related to golf. A
few minutes before the beep, Tom was waiting for his 2nd shot on the fourth hole of the
golf course when his cell phone rang. It was his doctor, who informed him that the
growth on his leg is not cancer. At the moment of the beep, Tom is sitting in the cart
feeling thrilled/relieved that he is healthy and saying to himself “what a relief!” internally
in his own normal voice. The feeling o f relief and the inner spoken phrase are both clear

192

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

aspects o f his inner experience. At the same time, Tom is sighing as he exhales. The sigh
is not part o f his conscious experience at the moment o f the beep.
Sample 1.6 was Tom ’s only sample with inner speech was an emotion regulation
strategy related to golf. Tom was practicing and had hit a bad tee shot, and was now
walking back to his cart. At the moment of the beep, Tom is innerly seeing the number
“6” in large black font with a small caption above it with the word “ six.” Tom was
simultaneously saying “6” to him self in his own normal voice as he counts 1-2-3-4-5-6.
This counting is part o f a “Nine Step Rule” his coach had previously given him to help
him deal with anger. This rule allows Tom to experience anger while walking for nine
paces, but by the tenth pace he must leave the anger behind. At the moment o f the beep,
Tom is also thinking that he is almost done with the nine step process; this thinking takes
place without words or inner seeing. Tom is probably angry in his body, but this is not
part of his conscious experience at the moment of the beep. Incidentally, Tom said that
his anger dissipated after this.
Tom experienced fairly frequent irmer speech that co-occurred with other inner
experiences. His inner speech was related to these other inner experiences by content, but
his inner speech experiences were typically not golf-related.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Five o f 18, or 28%, o f Tom ’s samples contained unsymbolized thinking. Most of
these unsymbolized thoughts eo-occurred with other forms o f inner experience, and most
were also golf-related in content.
Tournament Sample T.5 occurred during two-versus-two golf competition. Tom
experienced unsymbolized thinking o f a felt nature, like feeling like being in a specific
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situation before, without any other eo-oecurring form o f inner experience. Tom was on
the 13th hole, which is a par 5. He had just pulled out his club to hit his second shot,
trying to reach the green in two strokes. He was looking down at his bag and staring at
both the three-wood and five-iron while simultaneously imagining himself on this hole in
tomorrow’s tournament. This imagining occurs without words or inner seeing, an explicit
thought process containing the idea o f what he is going to do tomorrow, which club he'll
use, and where he wants to be hitting his shot from. Garret’s experience is exactly like
he's there at that moment while he's thinking about what plaee and club gives him the
best chance.
In Tournament Sample T.6, Tom experienced an unsymbolized awareness o f loss on
multiple levels along with a feeling o f disappointment. Tom was on the 18*^ hole. His
buddy, w ho’s on the other team, was putting. Before the putt, Tom had been feeling
confident that he’d win the match. But the buddy made the putt to win the hole and the
match. At the moment of the beep, Tom is feeling disappointed and is simultaneously
thinking, without words or inner seeing, that he has lost $20 and will be buying dinner.
The disappointment was a feeling o f failure in his body and mind, an emptiness feeling
from the head down, like what he had been doing for the last couple hours just turned out
to be erap. So at the moment o f the beep, Tom is feeling disappointment and thinking
he’s lost $20 and will he buying dinner.
Feelings
Tom experienced feelings in 4 o f his 18 samples, or 22%. Three of these feelings
occurred with other eo-occurring forms inner experiences. Three were golf-related in
content. As we just saw, Tom experienced a fairly significant feeling o f disappointment
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associated with unsymbolized thinking about his loss during competition, even though he
performed very well himself, two points better than his handicap in fact.
During Tournament Sample T.3, Tom was on the 7th hole, which is the most difficult
hole on the course. He had made a birdie to put his team up by three and had just picked
up the ball out of the hole. He was looking at the ball, staring at it for dirt, turning it
around in his fingers. At the moment o f the beep, Tom is experiencing a confident feeling
with the knowledge that he and his team are winning. This is experienced as more o f a
feeling than a thought process, but he has no bodily awareness at the moment o f the beep.
This confident feeling is almost a swagger, with the knowledge he and his team are up by
three and it’s going to be difficult for the other team to come back and win. Also at the
moment o f the beep, Tom is thinking his team will win knowing that there is only 11
holes to go and his team is up by three, which is an understanding o f the situation without
words or inner seeing. His confidence and swagger were noticeable by a bounce in his
step, which he has when he’s competing, but this is not part o f his awareness at the
moment o f the beep.
Tom experienced another feeling during Sample 1.5 when he was practicing golf on
the 1

hole. Tom had just hit a shot that feels crappy like it caught a lot o f the grass and

dirt. Before the beep, Tom has felt the crappiness and ugliness o f the shot in his body. At
the moment o f the beep, Tom ’s awareness o f this bodily sensation has subsided, replaced
by a very angry feeling. The feeling seems like a mental frustration, metaphorically
similar to building pressure or building redness that needs to be let out. Garret believes
that he is not displaying any external or physical signs o f the anger.
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Inner Experience During Golf
Tom collected six Tournament Samples. His most frequently-oecurring inner
experiences were unsymbolized thinking (50%), inner seeing (33%), feeling (33%),
perceptual awareness (17%), and thought/feeling (17%), most o f which were previously
described. Two o f Tom’s Tournament Samples included mental preparation strategies
being used at the moment of the beep. One o f these strategies will be described as well as
his a feeling experience and his golf-related content.
In Tournament Sample T.2, Tom was mentally preparing him self to execute a putt.
He was on the 4"^ hole, a par 3. When he had played this hole the day before on a practice
match, he had made a 10 foot birdie putt to put his team up by two. Today as he was
getting ready to putt, he had started visually scanning a line from the hole back toward
his ball. He has visually traced this line starting from the hole and is now about midway
back towards the ball. At the moment o f the beep he is looking at a point o f slight
discoloration on the grass that was the midpoint o f the line. This “spot-putting” is a visual
and mental proeess, a visual mind scanning o f the ground looking for something to spot
and line up accordingly. He is completely concentrating his mind 100 pereent on
scanning the line, an instance o f active perceptual awareness.
In Tournament Sample T.4, Tom experienced an emotional reaetion to a golf
outcome. He was on the 10*'’ hole, a short par 4. He was walking up to the fairway and
was looking at the other guy’s tee shot. Then he saw his ball up on the green when the
beeper went off. At the moment o f the beep, he is seeing the ball on green and
thinking/feeling that he “hit the shit” out o f it. This involves seeing an inner seeing o f the
blue tee box yard marker that says “Par 4” on one line and “307” on the line below. This
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inner seeing seems to be an exact copy o f the marker that he had previously actually seen.
Simultaneously he is having an inner experience that seems like both a thought and
feeling o f stunned disbelief. This feeling is mental insofar as he is aware that this distance
is unusual - he doesn't usually hit the ball this far at sea level. So hitting it this far seems
to produce an experience o f disbelief, an experience that is both thought and emotion
together with no words present at the moment o f the beep.
Golf-Related Content
Tom collected 10 o f 12, or 83%, of his samples during either golf practice or
competition. O f those that were collected during golf, 72% were related to golf in
content. During the golf competition, 6 o f 6 or 100% o f his inner experiences contained
golf-related content. Examples o f experiences with golf-related content include internally
seeing and feeling the swing he had just made, mentally preparing himself to execute a
putt by looking at a spot on the grass, experiencing a confident mental feeling with the
knowledge that he and his team are winning, innerly seeing an exact copy o f the yardage
marker that he had previously actually seen and simultaneously having a thought/feeling
of stunned disbelief, experiencing an unsymbolized thinking o f a felt nature o f him self
being on this hole in tomorrow’s tournament exactly like he is there while thinking about
what club gives him the best chance, and experiencing an unsymbolized awareness o f
loss on multiple levels along with a feeling of disappointment after losing.
When he was having golf-related inner experiences, the content o f Tom’s experiences
frequently included details about his strategies to prepare himself mentally (e.g.,
memories o f similar positive past golf experiences, preparing to putt by drawing a line,
thinking about what to do on the same hole tomorrow) and details about his emotional
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reactions to golf-related outcomes (e.g., surprisingly good shots, bad shots, losing, anger
reduction). To summarize, Tom ’s golf-related inner experiences included content related
to what he was doing at the moment, preparation for what he was going to do later,
emotional reaction, or management o f emotion.
Discussion
Tom’s inner experiences were typically very clear and differentiated inner
experiences that were also typically task-related. He was often golfing and his inner
experiences were often related to golf. In addition, Tom took to the sampling process
with great ease. This was true for both the technical procedure as well as the expositional
interview. This was a notable difference in comparison with some o f the other
participants in this study. Tom experienced frequent inner seeing, and sometimes his
inner seeings had a kinesthetic component. He also experienced fairly frequent inner
speech. Most o f his inner speech was not golf-related. He also experienced frequent
unsymbolized thinking and feelings. These forms o f inner experience most often co
occurred with one another, especially inner seeing and inner speech.
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CHAPTER 12

CHRIS
Chris is a 36 year-old highly-skilled golfer with a handicap o f six. He was recruited
by one o f the researchers through a contact in the community. He completed his first
three daily life sampling days before the golf competition sampling. For the first two
days, Chris obtained samples from his daily life at home. On the third day, he sampled
while playing golf (recreational golf). He collected his daily life samples in the middle of
the summer, and he participated in the golf competition sampling in the middle o f the
same summer. Chris shot 82, 10 strokes over par, 4 strokes higher than his handicap o f 6.
As a result, Chris finished 8*^ in the golf competition.
Inner Seeing
Chris experienced inner seeing in 8 o f 25 or 32% o f his samples. All but one of
Chris’s inner seeings co-occurred with other forms o f inner experience present at the
moment of the beep. In Sample 2.3, for instance, Chris had been talking to his brother
about how Chris’s nephew is struggling in summer-school algebra. At the moment o f the
beep, Chris is experiencing an inner seeing o f him self helping his nephew with his
algebra. He sees his nephew, him self talking, a brown table, white paper, a book, and the
kitchen in its various orange/yellow and purple colors with sunflower designs more in the
background behind himself and his nephew. Chris and his nephew are in the center of the
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inner seeing, but his nephew is the focus o f his awareness at the moment of the beep.
This was a clear and detailed inner seeing.
In Sample 3.4, Chris was playing recreational golf and driving toward the 12“’ green
to look for his ball. He had just found his ball sitting on a hill behind the green almost in
the “crap” after the ball had failed to cut as he had intended. At the moment o f the beep,
Chris is experiencing a small sense o f relief in his inner experience. His relief seems to
him to be a reaction to the fact that the shot is not actually in the “crap.” Chris does not
recall the details o f how this was experienced (e.g., mentally, bodily). Also at the moment
of the beep, Chris is saying to himself out loud “Oof, almost in the gunch, long” in a
somewhat relieved tone. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is internally visualizing
the path he had wanted the ball to take when he hit it, which looks like a solid,
continuous, curving, three-dimensional line that starts low, then moves high, and then
curves right. His preliminary target, the right edge o f the green right next to bunker, is
seen in the middle o f his visualization. The focus o f his attention is the path o f the ball, a
solid, continuous line. Chris is certain that that inner seeing was present at the moment of
the beep, but he is uncertain about whether the following inner seeing was present at the
exact moment o f the beep. As near as he ean tell, it occurred after the moment o f the
beep, but it may have overlapped with the first inner seeing o f the path he wanted the ball
to take. In this second inner seeing, Chris saw the path the ball actually took, saw that it
didn’t cut right as he intended.
Chris experienced an unsymbolized thought and a feeling simultaneously along with
an inner seeing at the moment o f the beep in Sample 1.3. In this sample, Chris was
watching a movie about Truman Capote; an actor had said something about Harper Lee.
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At the moment o f the beep, Chris is making a mental association between what he had
heard about Harper Lee and how Truman Capote is really the charaeter D uff in the book
Lee wrote. To Kill A Mockingbird. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is experiencing
a mental feeling o f satisfaction, a feeling o f pleasure with himself at the knowledge he
has. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is innerly seeing a warning sign on the side of
a road illuminated by upward-facing lights. The sign reads “Warning” in black letters,
and continues something like “Don't be too smug, you bastard,” but although Chris
knows the meaning of this continuation, he is not eertain exactly o f the words. The sign is
in the center of the inner seeing, and he is also seeing two sign posts, a barbed wire fence,
sagebrush, a small road, and mountains in the background. Chris is also seeing the sign
getting bigger as if he is in motion approaching the sign. Chris understands this inner
seeing as being a smugness-checking experience.
Chris frequently experienced inner seeing. All but one o f Chris’s inner seeings cooecurred with other inner experiences at the moment o f the beep. As he became more
experienced in the sampling method, Chris’s inner seeings became clearer and more
detailed at the moment o f the beep. His inner seeings were typically clear and detailed.
Feeling
Chris experienced feelings in 8 of 25 or 32% o f his samples. All o f Chris’s feelings
co-occurred with other forms o f inner experience at the moment o f the beep. In Sample
3.2, for instance, Chris experieneed both internal and external speech along with a feeling
o f disappointment during recreational golf. He had just hit a putt toward the hole on the
first green. The hole is about 35-40 feet away, and at the moment o f the beep the ball is
about 10 feet before the hole. At the moment o f the beep, Chris has said “Oh, too hard”
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out loud. Chris is also saying “too hard” internally at the moment of the beep. Both his
external and internal speech are spoken in a similar disappointed tone o f voice. This is a
mental process that has been spoken out loud first, and to himself second, both in the
vicinity o f the beep. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is experiencing a small
amount o f disappointment as he is realizing that he hit the putt too hard. Chris
experiences this disappointment as a feeling that is closer to a mental experience than a
bodily experience, but still not a thought. (After the beep, the putt ended up 4 feet past the
hole.)
In Sample 1.4, Chris was online playing a game when his computer shut down,
possibly due to lightning in the storm outside. At the moment o f the beep, Chris is
experiencing an intense feeling o f anger. It is not apparent to us, or we think to Chris,
exactly how he is experiencing this intense anger. It was difficult for Chris to articulate
exactly how he experienced his anger at the moment o f the beep. It seems to Chris that he
could have been experiencing a feeling o f hotness at the moment of the beep, but he is
not certain that he is actually feeling it at the moment o f the beep. It seems to Chris that
he could have just as easily experienced anger as seeing red internally, although he is not
exactly sure he was literally seeing red inside either. Chris thinks he also could have
experienced anger as dissociating is some way from the event itself. Any and all of these
are possible, but beyond experiencing anger, Chris is not sure exactly how he
experienced his anger. He is certain he experienced anger somehow, but the details o f this
experience are very ambiguous. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is internally seeing
his computer screen shutting down, just as he had seen it externally about 4 seconds
before. Chris is seeing a blip on the screen moving from the left to the right hand side of
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the screen in yellow and purple colors as it shuts down. Chris thinks he may also have
also been saying “ Shit, shit, shit! Son o f a bitch!” at the moment o f the beep, but it is not
apparent to us or, we think, to Chris whether this occurred at the moment o f the beep or
not; if it did occur at the moment it is not apparent whether it was said internally or out
loud. It is not apparent exactly how he is experiencing his intense anger feeling, we think,
because this sample was collected on Chris’s first sampling day.
Thus, feelings were frequent inner experiences for Chris. All o f his feelings co
occurred with other inner experiences at the moment o f the beep. Chris experienced three
feelings as mental experiences (38%); one feeling as bodily experienced (13%), and the
details o f the other four were not clear enough to determine whether they were mentally
or bodily experieneed (50%).
Inner Speech
Chris experieneed inner speech in 7 o f 25 or 28% o f his samples. All o f Chris’s inner
speech co-occurred with other forms o f inner experienee present at the moment of the
beep. All but one o f his inner speech experiences occurred during the golf competition.
All o f Chris’s inner speech occurred while he was playing golf. Chris experienced his
only instance o f inner speech outside o f the golf competition while he was playing
recreational golf on his 3"^“ sampling day. This occurred in Sample 3.2, which was
previously described in the Feeling section: he innerly said “too hard” while saying the
same phrase aloud and feeling disappointed.
In Tournament Sample T.8, Chris experienced a perceptual and a sensory awareness
along with a co-oecurring instance o f inner speech. He was walking to the tee on the 13th
hole, which is a par 3. At the moment of the beep, Chris is looking at the green and
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noticing passively that the flagstick is almost dead center on the green. Also the moment
o f the beep, Chris is taking a little practice swing, not a formal practice swing that is part
o f his routine but a shorter practice swing, and feeling a mildly painful twinge is his
wrist. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is saying to himself “A good swing's gonna
hurt” in a complaining tone of his own voice.
Chris experienced inner speech in seven o f his samples. All of Chris’s inner speech
co-occurred with other inner experiences at the moment of the beep, and all occurred
while golf competition. Chris experienced inner speech as himself speaking in his own
voice. In two instances, one o f which was described earlier (Sample 3.2), Chris
experienced both internal and external experienced speech that were related in content.
Sensory Awareness
Chris experienced sensory awareness in 7 of 25 or 28% o f his samples. For example,
in Sample T.8 (just described), Chris was feeling a twinge o f pain in his wrist. This wrist
pain occurred in two other golf competition samples as well. In Sample T.7, for example,
he was standing on the 12th tee and was putting his tee into the ground. At the moment of
the beep, Chris is feeling a physieal twinge in his wrist that is bothering him. This is a
sharp intense bodily sensation o f pain with a numb pinky finger. Also at the moment,
Chris is saying to himself “hard tu rf’ in his own normal voice.
In Sample 2.6, Chris was eating soup he has made for dinner, the same soup his
grandfather used to make. At the moment o f the beep, Chris is experiencing the silky,
creamy, graininess of the soup, a sensory awareness that is somehow recognized as being
very positive. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is making a comparison o f some
kind between his and his grandfather’s soup, but he has no idea exactly how this inner
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experience takes shape. He knows he is making a comparison, but he just does not know
how, an instance of unsymbolized thinking.
During Sample 3.3, Chris was playing recreational golf and standing by the 4’“ green
where he had a little chip shot to hit. At the moment o f the beep, Chris is looking at the
bunker and is sensing the waves of heat radiating from the direction of the bunker. This
sensation is mostly in his face and possibly a little in his legs as well, but he is not
entirely sure if he is also feeling heat in his legs. The experienee of the heat is very
intense, an almost overwhelming sensation o f hotness coming from the direction o f the
bunker.
Chris experienced sensory awareness in seven o f his samples. He experienced all of
his sensory awareness bodily as opposed to visually. Five of 7 or 71% o f these co
occurred with other forms o f inner experience. Four o f his sensory awareness experiences
occurred during golf, and three during the golf competition were painful or discomforting
twinges in his wrist as described in Tournament Sample T.7.
Perceptual Awareness
Chris experienced perceptual awareness in 5 o f 25 or 20% o f his samples. Four o f 5
or 80% of these occurred during golf competition. In Tournament Sample T.9, for
instance, Chris experienced perceptual awareness along with a sensory awareness and
inner speech experience. During this sample, he was on the tee o f the 13‘“ hole just after
the other golfer had teed off. At the moment o f the beep, Chris is feeling a throbbing
sensation in his wrist. It is not painful, but it is a noticeable throbbing experience. Also at
the moment o f the beep, Chris is saying to himself, “It's hot. We need to stop at that water
jug before the next tee” with an accent on the word “need.” Finally, Chris is also seeing a
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water jug on the golf course at the moment of the beep and making a mental note o f it, an
active visual perceptual process.
In Tournament Sample T.8, which was previously described in the Inner Speech
section, Chris experienced inner speech and perceptual awareness when he is taking a
practice swing, and is complaining to himself and saying “A good swing’s gonna hurt.”
Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is looking at the green and notieing passively that
the flagstick is almost dead center in the middle o f the green at the moment o f the beep, a
less prominent passive visual perceptual process.
Chris experienced perceptual awareness in six o f his samples. Five of 6 or 83% o f
these co-occurred with other forms o f inner experience. He typically experienced
perceptual awareness as active, although he had two passive perceptual awareness
experiences. All but one of his perceptual awareness experiences occurred during golf
competition, and o f these, all but one were golf-related.
Speaking Aloud
Chris had instances o f speaking aloud in 5 o f 25 or 20% o f his samples. These were
instances o f speaking out loud with awareness at the moment o f the beep. In Sample 3.1,
for instance, Chris was getting ready to play recreational golf. One o f the golf teaching
pros who used to give Chris lessons, whose niekname is “the guru,” was on the course.
Before the round, Chris had been talking to the guru. Now, Chris is driving to the C' tee
o f the golf course when the starter said “you’re a little late.” At the moment o f the beep,
Chris is saying “well, you gotta pay homage to the guru” out loud to the starter. This is
the beginning of the soeial transaction between Chris and the starter. Also at the moment
o f the beep, Chris is wanting to ask the starter for another towel. This is an implicit
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wanting experience that has no associated words or inner seeings at the moment o f the
beep. Chris experiences this as merely a thing to remember to ask for, an instance o f
unsymbolized thinking.
Chris also had instances o f speaking aloud in Samples 3.2 and 3.4, which were
previously described in the Feeling and Inner Seeing sections, respectively. In Sample
3.2, Chris says “Oh, too hard” out loud. Also in Sample 3.4, Chris is saying to himself
out loud “Oof, almost in the gunch, long” in a somewhat relieved tone. In both instances,
his externally spoken phrase was part o f his conscious awareness at the moment o f the
beep. Three o f 5 o f his instances o f speaking aloud occurred during recreational golf.
Chris was talking at the moment o f the beep as part o f his experience in 5 o f his 25
samples. In all cases, Chris was aware o f himself talking. Most o f Chris’s speaking aloud
was commentary said to himself out loud. All o f his speaking aloud occurred
simultaneously with other co-occurring forms o f inner experience such as inner speech,
feelings, inner seeings, and unsymbolized thinking.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Chris experienced unsymbolized thinking in 5 of 25 or 20% o f his samples. In
Sample 3.1, which was previously described in the Speaking Aloud section. Chris was
experiencing an unsymbolized implicit wanting experience that has no associated words
or inner seeings at the moment o f the beep. In Tournament Sample T.2, Chris also
experienced unsymbolized thinking. He was on the 1st hole, just walking back to the cart.
He did not hit the last shot very well but got a good result anyway. At the moment o f the
beep, Chris is thinking about how he got lucky with the last shot. If expressed in words.
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the thought would be something like “got lucky with that second one,” although no words
are in his inner experience at the moment o f the beep.
Chris experienced four instances o f unsymbolized thinking. Three of 4 or 75% o f his
unsymbolized thinking co-occurred with other simultaneous forms o f inner experience
(e.g., feeling, inner seeing).
Inner Experience During Golf
Chris collected 11 Tournament Samples. His most frequently-occurring inner
experiences were inner speech (60%), perceptual awareness (50%), sensory awareness
(40%), inner seeings (30%), and feeling (20%), many o f which were previously
described. He also experienced one instance each o f inner hearing, just doing, and
speaking aloud. Four o f Chris’s Tournament Samples included mental preparation
strategies being used at the moment o f the beep. These strategies will be described as
well as his golf-related eontent.
Mental Preparation Strategies
The beeper captured four mental preparation strategies Chris was using at the moment
o f the beep, accounting for 36% o f his golf competition samples. These inner experiences
consisted of several forms o f inner experiences with content that served the purpose o f
mental preparation for a golf related task.
In Tournament Sample T.3, Chris was on the 2"“ stroke o f the 2"“ hole, over the ball,
and he was just getting ready to hit the shot. He was going through a mental checklist in
which he was thinking that he had 280 yards to the hole, and if he hits a 2 iron, it would
leave him 60 to 80 yards to go, and it will cut a little from left to right, so he wants to
start it from the left side o f the course. At the moment o f the beep, he is going through his
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pre-shot mental instructions, saying to him self internally “start it left edge, and it should
work right” in his own normal inner voice. Also at the moment of the beep, Chris is
externally looking at where he wants the ball to land, which is the left edge o f the green.
In Tournament Sample T.IO, for instanee, Chris had gone through a list o f things in
his pre-shot routine, and he was stepping in to take his shot on the 16’“ hole. He had just
gotten ready to swing. At the moment o f the beep, Chris is feeling confident that he has
the right club. This confidence is experienced as a bodily feeling o f well being, o f feeliiig
comfortable, although it is not apparent if this feeling has a spécifié or general location.
Chris is also aware o f the eomfort feeling somehow at the moment o f the beep, but he is
not sure how he is aware o f the feeling. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is saying
“good pass” out loud, slightly more intense than normal, which means make a good full
swing.
Golf-Related Content
Chris’s experiences had golf-related content in 9 o f 11 or 82% o f his Tournament
Samples. Examples o f experiences with golf-related content include internal and external
speech about golf; thinking he got a lucky result without words or inner seeings; looking
at the hole with focus and imaging his clubs; taking a practice swing, feeling a painful
twinge in his wrist, looking passively at the hole, and saying internally that a good swing
will hurt; cleaning a golf ball, feeling relieved he is done golfing, and feel the sensation
o f heat outside; and the aforementioned mental preparation strategies.
Comparing Inner Experience During G olf and Daily Life
Chris’s inner experiences from his golf samples were similar to his daily life samples
with respect to three forms o f inner experience; these forms were inner hearing, inner
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seeing, and sensory awareness. His inner experiences from his golf samples were
different from his daily life samples with respect to five forms o f inner experience; these
were unsymbolized thinking, speaking aloud, feeling, perceptual awareness, and inner
speech.
Recreational golf was eonsidered part o f Chris’s daily life inner experience for the
purpose o f this idiographic chapter; it will be taken out o f golf and daily life analyses so
the settings are consistent across participants in the nomothetic results Chapter 16.
Chris experienced a similar amount o f inner hearing during his golf samples (1 o f 11
or 9%) as he did during his daily samples (1 o f 14 or 7%). He also had a similar amount
of inner seeing during golf (3 o f 11 or 27%) as he did during his daily samples (5 of 14 or
36%). Chris had a similar amount o f sensory awareness during golf (4 o f 11 or 36%) as
he did during his daily samples as well (3 o f 14 or 21%).
Chris experienced less unsymbolized thinking and less speaking aloud during his golf
samples (1 o f 11 or 9% for each o f these two) than he had during his daily samples (4 of
14 or 29% for each o f these two). Chris also had less feeling during his golf samples (2 o f
11 or 18%) than he had during his daily samples (6 o f 14 or 43%). Chris had a more
perceptual awareness during his golf samples (4 o f 11 or 36%) than he had during his
daily samples (1 o f 14 or 7%). He had even more inner speech during his golf samples (6
o f 11 or 55%) than during his daily samples (1 o f 14 or 7%), and the one instance inner
speech he had during his daily samples was actually when he was golfing on the third
daily life sampling day. Thus all of Chris’s inner speech occurred during golf, one during
practice and the rest during competition.
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Chris’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily life were similar with
respect to the amount o f inner hearing, inner seeing, and sensory awareness he had. His
inner experiences were different during golf compared with his daily life with respect to
the amount o f unsymbolized thinking, speaking aloud, feeling, perceptual awareness, and
inner speech he had. Chris experienced a decrease in unsymbolized thinking, speaking
aloud, and feeling during golf. Chris experienced a notable increase in perceptual
awareness and inner speech during golf. Comparing Chris’s golf and daily life
experiences, it is apparent that he had a lower number o f similar forms o f inner
experience compared to the number o f different forms o f inner experience. Thus Chris’s
golf and daily life inner experienees were mostly different.
Discussion
Chris’s two most frequent inner experiences were inner seeing and feelings. Almost
all o f both co-occurred with other inner experiences at the moment o f the beep. His inner
seeings varied in their degree o f elarity and level o f detail. Most o f his feelings were
mental experiences, and only a few were felt in his body. Chris’s next most frequent
inner experiences were inner speech and sensory awareness. Almost all o f both co
occurred with other inner experiences at the moment o f the beep. All but one o f his inner
speech occurred during the golf competition, and he also experienced simultaneous
internal and external speech twice. He experienced all o f his sensory awareness bodily as
opposed to visually. Most o f his sensory awareness occurred during golf, and several
during golf competition were twinges in his wrist.
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Chris typically experienced perceptual awareness as active experiences, and all but
one o f these occurred during golf competition; o f these, most were golf-related. Most of
Chris’s speaking aloud was said to him self out loud just same as if said internally.
Chris typically experienced unsymbolized thinking as a mental inner experience without
the presence of related words or inner seeings. The majority of his perceptual awareness,
speaking aloud, and unsymbolized thinking co-occurred with other inner experiences.
Chris’s inner experiences typically clear in form and content. His most frequentlyoccurring inner experiences during golf competition were inner speech, perceptual
awareness, sensory awareness, inner seeings, and feelings, many o f co-oceurred with one
another. Four o f Chris’s Tournament Samples included mental preparation strategies
being used at the moment of the beep.
Most of Chris’s golf samples had golf-related content. Chris’s inner experiences
during golf eompared with his daily life were similar with respect to the amount o f inner
hearing, inner seeing, and sensory awareness he had and different with respect to the
amount of unsymbolized thinking, speaking aloud, feeling, perceptual awareness, and
inner speech he had. He had a decrease in unsymbolized thinking, speaking aloud, and
feeling during golf, and a notable increase in perceptual awareness and inner speech
during golf. Chris’s golf and daily life inner experiences were mostly different.
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CHAPTER 13

MIKE
Mike is a 50 year-old highly-skilled golfer with a handicap o f 7. He was recruited by
one o f the researchers through a contact in the community. All o f the samples that were
used to describe M ike’s inner experience were collected within 24 hours o f the interview,
but Mike collected several samples from two days before as well that were not used.
On his first sampling day, Mike arrived with five samples obtained from two days
earlier and four samples obtained during golf within 24 hours. Only the samples from
within 24 hours were discussed, and the samples he had obtained from two days earlier
were not discussed. He completed his second sampling day by obtaining samples from
his daily life at home. He experienced difficulty with work that resulted in having to
reschedule his second day interview for later than originally planned. So that he would be
experienced with sampling before the golf tournament, we discussed three samples
during his second day that had been collected two days earlier (Samples 2.1-2.3) and the
only two samples colleeted within 24 hours (Samples 2.4-2.5). Samples 2.1-2.3 were
thrown out, and only his two samples collected within 24 hours (Samples 2.4-2.5) will be
discussed. Mike participated in recreational golf in 4 of 6 o f his daily samples.
To summarize, we used 4 o f M ike’s samples from day one, 2 samples from day two,
and the 10 samples collected from the golf tournament. This yielded a total o f 16
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samples. In the golf competition, Mike shot 74, 2 strokes over par, which is 5 strokes
lower than his handicap o f 7. As a result, Mike won the golf competition.
Unsymholized Thinking
Mike experienced unsymbolized thinking in 4 of 16 or 25% o f his samples. In Sample
2.5, for instance, Mike was listening to Howard Stem on the car radio while driving. The
context o f the show involves a character who is a “midget.” At the moment o f the beep,
Mike is experiencing a thought about what kind o f people go on this show, as if he is
asking himself this question, although no words are present at the moment o f the beep.
He is not certain about the nature o f the thought, whether it is a mental wondering or
questioning or something else, but Mike is confident that the thought was pres7ent at the
moment o f the beep with no inner seeings or words present. This is a fairly unambiguous
instance o f unsymbolized thinking in which Mike is thinking about what kind o f people
go on the Howard Stem show. At first, Mike thought the cars on the road must have been
in his awareness because he was driving, but when we discussed how sometimes what we
see while driving is in our awareness and other times not, Mike became much less certain
about this.
In Sample 1.2, Mike experienced a clear sensory awareness with a co-occurring
unsymbolized thought. Mike was playing golf on the 3rd hole, about 115 yards away
from the hole using his 8 iron. He was in the action o f his swinging his club when the
wind came up and was blowing in his direction. The beeper catches him almost at the top
o f his swing. At the moment of the beep, Mike is looking at the back part o f the ball and
sensing the wind on his left side o f his face. This is a clear sensory awareness. Also at the
moment o f the beep, Mike is wondering whether he has enough club to hit the ball where
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he had intended. This wondering is a somewhat clear mental process that occurs without
words. This was a mostly clear visual, sensory, and mental golf-related experience.
Although Mike was experiencing a distracting thought about the wind, he hit a great shot,
only 5 feet away from the hole.
Mike’s descriptions o f his unsymbolized thinking were different than some o f the
other participants. Whether Mike experienced unsymbolized thinking as wondering,
anticipating, hoping, wishing, or understanding, as others did, was never quite apparent.
He may have had difficulty describing his unsymbolized thinking or he may have had
different unsymbolized thinking than other participants. Either way, his unsymbolized
thoughts were less differentiated and more difficult to describe. Others were more certain
about how they experienced their unsymbolized thinking than Mike, and had more
differentiated unsymbolized thoughts that were easier to describe.
Perceptual Awareness
Mike experienced perceptual awareness in 3 o f 16 or 19% o f his samples. Mike
experienced perceptual awareness during Tournament Sample T.IO when he was getting
ready to make a shot and was looking down the fairway of the last hole. At the moment
o f the beep, Mike is planning where he is going to hit the ball. This is experienced as
actively looking down the right side o f the fairway, an external visual experience. There
are two carts out there, but Mike is looking past them, focused on the fairway as part o f
the planning where to hit the ball. It is not apparent whether or not his decision to hit the
ball down the right side is present at or after the moment of the beep. There is an active
focusing process occurring at the moment o f the beep, but his focus is broad and without
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much specific detail. It is also not apparent whether or not Mike is experiencing a thought
in addition to this perceptual awareness at the moment o f the beep.
M ike’s perceptual awareness experiences were typically clear experiences. Two of
these three perceptual awarenesses were elearly active. M ike’s perceptual awarenesses
were typically somewhat clear external visual awareness either without much detail or
with more detail and activeness.
Unclear Indeterminate Inner Experience
Mike had experiences for which there was not sufficient information to identify the
form o f his inner experience in 3 o f 16 or 19% o f his samples. In Sample 2.4, for
instance, Mike was sitting with his 3-month-old niece “Jill,” who is looking up at him
and smiling. At the moment of the beep, Mike is somehow reacting to Jill’s smile. It is
not apparent to us, or, we think, to Mike, exactly how that reaction takes place. Perhaps it
is a thought, which if represented in words might be something like “What a beautiful
smile!” although such words do not actually appear to be present. Perhaps it is a feeling, a
warmth towards Jill, but that warmth is certainly not apprehended in his body nor is it
experienced mentally, either. It is also not apparent to us, and possibly not to Mike either,
exactly when that reaction takes place. It remained ambiguous whether M ike’s moved
experience is present at the moment of the beep or after. It seems apparent that the beep
oceurs somewhere in the temporal vicinity o f Jill’s smile, and that Mike is moved by it
somehow, but beyond that little can definitively be said. Thus Sample 2.4 contained
temporal ambiguity, and it was not possible to determine the form o f M ike’s inner
experience.
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Another instance o f indeterminate inner experience occurred during Tournament
Sample T.5. Before the beep, Mike had hit a shot from the sand trap to about 15 feet past
the hole on the 18’“, and it had stopped about a second or two ago. At the moment o f the
beep, M ike’s eyes are aimed at the ball without apparent awareness o f the ball, and he is
having some kind o f inner experience related about how bad the shot was. The content of
his thought, that is, how bad it is, is unambiguously in his inner experienee at the moment
o f the beep, but Mike is not sure about the form, if any, through which this inner
experience takes place. He thinks it may take the form o f words spoken internally with a
negative intonation and the same meaning as “bad shot.” He thinks also may take the
form of a feeling o f some kind, but if there was one, Mike was not aware o f it at the
moment o f the beep or thereafter. Once again, it seems apparent that the beep oecurs
during M ike’s inner experience o f the bad shot, but not much beyond that can definitively
be said. Mike was sure about the content o f his inner experience, but he was not sure
about the form o f this inner experience.
Mike’s unclear indeterminate inner experiences consisted o f instances in which he
was unable to provide clear or sufficient details that eould highlight the form, if any, that
his inner experience took at the moment o f the beep. The fact that we could not determine
the form o f his inner experienee may have been due to the lack o f clarity in his inner
experience, his difficulty in describing it, our difficulty in helping him describe it, his
inexperience with the method, some o f these, or all o f these possibilities. Mike did more
clearly experience the content o f these inner experiences. For instance, as was previously
described, he experienced a moved reaction to his niece and a negative experience about
his bad shot.
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Other Inner Experiences
Mike experienced an equal number o f inner speech, feeling, sensory awareness, and
speaking aloud experiences. Each o f these occurred in 2 o f 16 or 13% o f M ike’s samples.
One o f M ike’s two instances o f inner speech occurred in Tournament Sample
T.7. In this sample, Mike had just hit his shot. He was watching the ball traveling in the
air. At the moment o f the beep, Mike was saying to himself internally “fairway, fairway,
fairway” in his own voice. He said “fairway” more than once, and probably three times,
but he does not remember whether it was said two or three times. There is no other inner
experience present at the moment o f the beep.
One o f M ike’s two feelings occurred in Sample 1.4; the other occurred in Sample 1.3,
which was previously described. During Sample 1.4, Mike was playing golf on the 11th
hole. He had just made a 40 foot putt and won some money. At the moment o f the beep,
he had made the putt and was walking halfway to the hole to pick up his ball. He is
experiencing a surprised, elated feeling at making the putt and winning money. This is a
happy and relieved feeling o f being very, very pleased both mentally (mostly) and bodily
(slightly). He is experiencing this as a happy feeling mostly in his head, with a hint of
bodily experience, but he does not remember where in his body he is experiencing it. It is
not apparent to us, or, we think, to Mike, but he may also be re-experiencing an inner
seeing in motion of the shot he made going into the hole. He does not remember whether
this possible experience occurred, and its details are unclear.
One of M ike’s two instances o f sensory awareness occurred in Tournament Sample
T.8; the other occurred in Sample 1.2, which was previously described. In Tournament
Sample T.8, Mike was on the 3rd hole getting ready to hit his first shot. He is waiting one
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of the other golfers to hit. At the moment o f the beep, Mike is experiencing a diffuse
intense heat experience. The experience o f feeling the heat is the most prominent aspect
of his awareness present at the moment o f the beep. Also at the moment o f the beep,
Mike was reaching out for his glass o f ice with awareness. This is a physical process o f
reaching for the glass o f ice with focus o f some kind, but it is not clear how this
awareness comes to him, whether it is visual or tactile or something else, so this is an
unclear doing experience. Also at the moment o f the beep, Mike his thinking about the
heat somehow. It is not apparent to us, or we think to Mike, how this takes place. He may
be saying to himself, “God it’s hot,” or he may be having some unsymbolized thought
without words, but the form o f this inner experience could not be determined. The
experience o f feeling the heat is the most prominent aspect o f his awareness present at the
moment of the beep. It is not apparent to us or Mike whether reaching for the ice is more
prominent than his diffuse heat experience at the moment o f the beep.
One o f M ike’s two speaking aloud experiences occurred in Tournament Sample T.4.
Mike is on the E' stroke o f the 18‘*' hole. He was walking up to the tee getting ready to hit
a three wood off o f the tee. He had been playing faster than he would have liked. The
beep went off as he was walking up to the tee. At the moment o f the beep, Mike is saying
a phrase out loud to himself quietly. It is loud enough for him but not others to hear. He is
not clear about the exact words or their order, but he is saying something like “Nice and
slow, nice and slow tempo” or “Nice and slow tempo, tempo, rhythm” at the moment of
the beep. This externally spoken phrase is Mike's process o f preparing for his next shot.
The phrase is part o f his awareness at the moment o f the beep, but this is not a very clear
experience. It is not apparent to us whether or not Mike has any inner experience at the
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moment of the beep, but Mike does not recall having any inner experience outside of just
saying this phrase out loud to himself to prepare for his shot.
Inner Experience During G olf Competition
Mike played the back nine in the golf competition. During the competition, Mike
experienced perceptual awareness during three o f his ten samples (30%), and he had three
indeterminate inner experiences as well (30%). Mike experienced both unsymbolized
thinking and speaking aloud in 2 o f his 10 samples (20%). He had one instance o f
sensory awareness, inner speech, inner seeing, and experienced doing (10%). Most of
these inner experiences were unclear at least to some extent. He had golf-related content
in his inner experience in 9 of 10 o f his inner experiences during golf competition (90%).
M ike’s golf-related content will be briefly discussed, followed by a description o f part o f
M ike’s mental preparation routine engages in that involves “tempo,” and a comparison o f
M ike’s inner experience during golf and daily life will be conducted.
Golf-Related Content
O f M ike’s 10 collected Tournament Samples, 9 or 90% contained golf-related
content. Examples o f golf-related content experiences watching another golfer and
simultaneously irmerly seeing o f his own previous shot, experiencing an indeterminate
thought about the badness of his shot, actively focusing visually on his ball with
simultaneous unsymbolized thinking that he hit it way too long, saying a phrase out loud
to himself to maintain a nice and slow tempo, an indeterminate inner experience about a
previous “bad” shot, unsymbolized thinking about going to a golf meeting, saying to
himself “fairway” internally and repeatedly after hitting a shot, feeling an internal diffuse
heat sensation while simultaneously reaching for a glass of ice and experiencing an
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indeterminate thought, and planning where to hit the ball by actively looking down the
fairway.
Mike had two inner experiences while he was golfing in which he was engaged in
what he described as his typical mental preparation routine. The first o f these actually
occurred during his first sampling day, whereas the second occurred during the golf
competition. As part o f his routine, he focuses on his tempo. M ike’s spoken “Tempo” is
apparently part o f his typical warm-up routine. He often says “Tempo” like a metronome
during his practiee swings to cue him self to swing nice and smooth and to stay behind the
ball.
In Sample 1.1 for instance, Mike was on the driving range hitting balls to warm up
before beginning his round. He is addressing the ball with his 8 iron, the last club he uses
in his warm-up routine. The beep catches Mike in his backswing with the club at about
waist height saying the word “Tempo” to himself rhythmically in his own voice. He does
not remember if it is the same as his normal external voice or not. Also at the moment o f
the beep, Mike is actively focused on the ball, paying attention to the center o f the ball by
looking at it. Also at the moment o f the beep, Mike is monitoring his swing in the sense
that he would notice if he did something wrong in his swing so that he could fix it.
However, this process is outside o f his awareness at the moment. It is a fact o f the
universe that he is monitoring his swing, but he is not aware o f that monitoring. The
details o f this inner experience are not very clear. Mike had difficulty separately what
was actually in his inner experience at the moment o f the beep from how he thinks his
preparation routine occurs generally, which is common for the first few sampling beeps.
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M ike’s other instance o f speaking “Tempo” to himself occurred in Sample T.4, which
was previously described, Mike is saying something like “Nice and slow, nice and slow
tempo” or “Niee and slow tempo, tempo, rhythm” at the moment of the beep out loud to
himself quietly. The externally spoken phrase is part of preparation for his shot.
M ike’s mental preparation routine apparently often involves the iimer experience o f
“Tempo.” We captured two instances o f this inner experience, one o f which was internal
speech whereas the other was external. Had we captured more, we might have been better
able to determine whether or to what extent the form and content of this inner experience
may vary.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
Two-thirds of M ike’s usable daily life samples were collected while golfing.
Recreational golf was considered part o f his daily life inner experience for the purpose of
this idiographic chapter; it will be taken out o f golf and daily life analyses so the settings
are consistent across participants in the nomothetic results Chapter 16.
M ike’s inner experiences from his daily samples were mostly similar in form to those
collected during the golf tournament. For instance, Mike experienced a similar amount of
perceptual awareness during his daily samples (1 o f 6 or 17%) as he did during the golf
tournament samples (2 o f 10 or 20%). He also experienced a similar amount o f unclear
indeterminate inner experience during his daily samples (1 o f 6 or 17%) as he did during
the golf tournament samples (2 o f 10 or 20%). He experienced a similar amount of both
inner speech and sensory awareness during his daily samples (1 o f 6 or 17% for both) as
he did during the golf tournament samples (1 of 10 or 10% for both). Mike had a fairly
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similar amount o f unsymbolized thinking during his daily samples (2 o f 6 or 33%) as he
did during the golf tournament samples as well (2 o f 10 or 20%).
The only remarkable differences in M ike’s daily samples and his golf tournament
samples were found in the number o f feeling and speaking aloud experiences he had.
Mike had feelings in 2 o f 6 or 33% o f in his daily samples and none in the golf
tournament samples. He also had no speaking aloud in his daily samples and 2 o f 10 or
20% in the golf tournament samples.
Mike was golfing during two-thirds o f his daily samples and, o f course, during all of
his golf tournament samples. The similarities between Mike’s daily samples and his golf
tournament samples were much more remarkable than the differences.
Discussion
M ike’s inner experiences were about average in clarity when compared to some o f
the other participants. A few o f our participants’ experiences were frequently mueh
clearer, and a few were frequently much less clear. When it occurred, M ike’s lack of
clarity manifested itself as indeterminate irmer experiences in which the form o f his inner
experience was unclear. When Mike had unclear indeterminate inner experiences, he did
more clearly experience the content of his inner experiences, however. Despite some
unclear indeterminate inner experiences, the majority o f M ike’s inner experiences were
clearer. For instance, his perceptual awareness experiences were clearer albeit often not
richly detailed.
During the golf competition, Mike experienced two perceptual awareness and two
indeterminate inner experiences. He also had a couple instances o f unsymbolized
thinking and speaking aloud. He had just one instance of sensory awareness, inner
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speech, inner seeing, and doing experience. Almost all of his golf competition samples
contained golf-related content. M ike’s mental preparation routine apparently involves the
inner experience o f “Tempo,” and we captured two instances o f this inner experience.
One of these involved internal speech whereas the other involved external speech. Mike
was golfing during most o f his daily samples and during all o f his golf tournament
samples, and the similarities in the form o f his inner experiences during his daily samples
and his golf tournament samples were much more noticeable than the differences.
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CHAPTER 14

RYAN
Ryan is a 48 year-old highly-skilled golfer with a handicap o f 4. He was recruited by
one o f the researchers through a contact in the community. He completed his first three
sampling days by obtaining 18 samples from his daily life. He collected his daily life
samples in the middle of the summer, and he participated in the golf competition
sampling in the middle o f the same summer, collecting 13 samples. Ryan shot 88, 16 over
par, 12 strokes higher than his handicap o f 4. As a result, Ryan finished 10* or last in the
golf competition.
Clarity
Ryan had more difficulty describing the form o f his inner experience than did most
other study participants. Ryan became increasingly able to describe his inner experience
more easily and consistently as he gained sampling experience, but even at the end of
sampling still had some difficulties. It was usually easier for him to identify the content
o f his inner experience than the form or features of it, although the content was difficult
on occasion as well. When it was difficult to describe the content o f his inner experience,
Ryan was unable to provide many precise details about any aspect of his inner
experiences.
Ryan had considerable difficulty apprehending or “zeroing in on” the moment o f the
beep. When asked what was present in his inner experience at the moment o f the beep, he
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often described content from well before or after the moment o f the beep, making it
diffieult to determine what was present at the moment of the beep. That is frequent
among many subjects on their first sampling day; this persisted to some degree
throughout Ryan’s sampling. Thus Ryan had difficulty both describing in his inner
experience as well as difficulty apprehending when his inner experience occurred in
relation to the moment o f the beep.
With practice, Ryan improved somewhat in his ability to describe the form o f his
inner experience, and he also somewhat improved in his ability to describe content.
Ryan’s relative unclarity cannot be ascribed to lack o f effort or interest in the sampling
process. He seemed interested throughout; he attended all scheduled sampling sessions
without canceling any; he attempted to answer all interview questions and was
comfortable saying why he thought it was difficult to describe his inner experience; he
kept track o f the exact time when each beep went off; all are indicators o f a conscientious
approach to the task. As an example o f his interest in the sampling, Ryan was curious
enough to ask what we had learned about his inner experience twice during different
sampling interviews.
He often described the same inner experience in different ways. When asked to
elaborate, he could do so somewhat more consistently as he gained sampling experience,
but inconsistencies still remained. He frequently used subjunctifiers and often seemed to
change his mind about what was present at the moment of the beep. By the golf
tournament, Ryan had gradually improved in his ability to describe the form and content
of his inner experiences, however it remained difficult for him to apprehend and describe
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his inner experience in relation to the moment of the beep throughout all o f his sampling
days.
All five o f Ryan’s samples from the first sampling day were so unclear that the form
could not be determined. It was not apparent whether this was due merely to difficulty
acquiring the sampling method, whether Ryan’s inner experience was unclear, or both.
Whatever the reason, these inner experiences where described in a manner much more
unclear than most of the other participants. On the second sampling day, Ryan had three
unclear inner experiences out o f six. On the third sampling day, Ryan had one unclear
inner experience and two unclear indeterminate inner experiences out o f six. During the
golf tournament, Ryan had no indeterminate inner experiences and clearer inner
experiences with respect to form and content for all o f his samples compared to his daily
life; however some ambiguity about the timing o f his inner experience in relation to the
moment o f the beep remained.
In Sample 3.3, Ryan had an unclear just doing experience. Before the moment o f the
beep, Ryan was replacing the grip on his putter. He was cutting some lead tape to put on
the putter and trying not to cut himself. At the moment of the beep, Ryan is just cutting
the tape and being careful not to cut himself. He is also looking at his putter, but he is not
aware o f the putter; he is absorbed in the doing o f his cutting behavior. It was very
difficult for Ryan to decide whether or not an inner seeing was present at the moment of
the beep or not. At first he thought there was an inner seeing o f his putter at the moment
of the beep, but the more we asked Ryan to describe it, the more uncertain he became.
Later, he came to think an inner seeing may have been present before the beep rather than
at the moment o f the beep, but he was never entirely sure. So Ryan came to think no
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inner seeing was present at the moment o f the beep and that he was just cutting the tape
and being careful at the moment o f the beep. This is a just doing experience with
ambiguity about the timing of the moment o f the beep as well as the possible presence or
absence o f another form of inner experience, an inner seeing, at the moment o f the beep.
In Sample 3.2, Ryan had an unclear indeterminate inner experience. Ryan was in his
garage, putting his golf clubs in his car, and looking at the interior o f his car. At the
moment o f the beep, Ryan is aware o f the spots on the carpet o f his car. These spots are
in his awareness somehow. It is not apparent to us, or we think to Ryan, exactly how this
inner experience takes shape. Ryan advanced several possibilities: perhaps he was having
an inner seeing o f what the carpet will look like when it’s clean, but if so, he does not
remember the details. Perhaps he was thinking about having the outside o f the car
cleaned in words, but if so, he cannot remember the exact words. Perhaps there were
several inner experiences present at the moment o f the beep. Perhaps he was just
noticing the spots on the carpet visually. This is a very unclear inner experience for which
Ryan cannot provide any or many details, probably because no or not many details were
there. Ambiguity about the form o f this inner experience was present as Ryan was never
able to apprehend and describe its form, nor could we. Ambiguity about the general
nature o f the content of this inner experience (e.g., the spots) was not present; however,
Ryan was never able to apprehend and describe much about the specific details (e.g.,
what his experience of the spots was like), and so o f course, nor could we. He knows the
beep catches him somehow involved in the noticing o f the spots on the carpet, but the
form and specific content o f this experience were unclear.
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Despite the lower clarity o f some o f Ryan’s experience, as he became more
experienced in the sampling method, fewer o f his inner experiences were unclear,
especially with respect to the form and content o f his inner experiences. These clearer
inner experiences included perceptual awareness, sensory awareness, feeling, and inner
speech.
Perceptual Awareness
Ryan experienced perceptual awareness in 8 or 31 or 26% o f his samples. In Sample
2.1, Ryan was working on the golf course and taking a break. He had seen a shady place
under a tree and decided that was where he would go. At the moment o f the beep, Ryan is
looking at the shade under the tree where he had wanted to go with visual awareness.
Ryan does not know whether or not he is thinking about going to this spot at the moment
o f the beep as part o f what he is looking at or whether he had already thought about going
and now is just looking at the shady place, but he is certain that he is looking at the shady
place with conscious awareness at the moment o f the beep. Ryan is looking with
awareness at the shady place, but he is simply uncertain about whether he is also thinking
about going there at the moment o f the beep.
In Sample 3.7, Ryan had a clear passive perceptual awareness. Ryan was backing out
o f the garage in his ear and looking at the white garage door. At the moment of the beep,
Ryan is just looking at the garage door go down without being particularly absorbed in
what he is looking at. He is just looking at the garage door go down, a passive visual
experience. This was different from some o f Ryan’s previous inner experiences in that he
eould easily tell that this was the only inner experience present at the moment of the beep
and that there was no other irmer experience present at the moment of the beep. He was
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not thinking about where he is going, about golf later that day, or anything else; he was
just noticing the garage door at the moment o f the beep.
Both o f the perceptual awarenesses Ryan experienced during his daily life samples
were basic visual experiences in his conscious awareness. The remaining six of R yan’s
perceptual awarenesses came during golf competition, which will be described in the
Inner Experience During Golf section.
Sensory Awareness
Ryan experienced sensory awareness in 6 o f 31 or 19% of his samples. In Sample 3.6,
Ryan had a sensory awareness in which he was absorbed with the clearness o f his vision.
The use o f the term clear in this sample refers to the clarity o f his actual visual sensory
process at the moment o f the beep rather than how the term has been used until this point
to refer to the clarity o f his inner experience. In Sample 3.6, Ryan was wearing the wrong
glasses and was seeing how unclear they make his vision. Leading up to the moment of
the beep, Ryan put on the eorrect pair o f glasses. At the moment o f the beep, Ryan is
particularly noticing how clear his vision is with the correct glasses. His being absorbed
in the clarity o f his vision is an unambiguous external visual inner experienee. At first,
Ryan was not sure if another inner experience was present at the moment o f the beep, but
he eventually decided that that occurred after the beep. After the beep, Ryan was thinking
that he has to put a tag on his glasses so he can tell which is the correct pair.
Unlike many o f his other daily life samples, in Sample 3.6, Ryan was experiencing a
visual sensory awareness that was clear with respect to the form and content o f his inner
experience as well as the timing moment o f the beep. Parallel to this, the content o f this
inner experience was the clarity o f his vision, and Ryan was particularly interested in this
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clarity as if, we speculate, it was somehow novel, perhaps different than his previous
inner experiences. Whatever the reason he is interested in this clarity, which will
probably never be known. Sample 3.6 marks a critical point in Ryan’s sampling because
his inner experience was much clearer for the first time and remained clear in all o f in his
subsequent samples. In fact in the next sample he collected. Sample 3.7, which was
previously described in the Perceptual Awareness Section, Ryan had a clear passive
perceptual awareness o f his garage door; he could easily tell that this was the only inner
experience present at the moment o f the beep. As we will see, this clarity continued from
Ryan’s first Tournament Sample T .l, which will be described in the Perceptual
Awareness subsection o f the Inner Experience During Golf section to follow. His clarity
continued throughout the rest o f his golf samples.
All five o f Ryan’s sensory awareness experiences involved being absorbed in external
visual sensations, and Sample 3.6 marked a turning point in the clarity o f Ryan’s
momentary inner experience.
Feeling
Ryan experienced feelings in 4 of 3 1 or 13% o f his samples. Three of these were very
similar in content and intensity: Ryan was “fuming” at the moment o f the beep. In two of
these three experiences, which will be described next, Ryan was fuming at his employees.
In the third, which will be described later, he was fuming at himself.
Fuming
In Sample 2.4, Ryan was driving and looking for a couple of his employees that had
not been able to find the site o f their job even though they had told Ryan they knew
where it was. At the moment o f the beep, Ryan is fuming, a feeling without any clear
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details. He does not know if he was experiencing this feeling mentally or bodily, but he
his sure is he fuming at his employees and this fuming is an extremely intense feeling at
the moment of the beep. Ryan is also looking at the Circle K at the moment o f the beep,
but he does not know whether this is in his irmer experience. Ryan has a sense that there
are several other things going on inside him at the moment o f the beep, but because he is
driving, looking for his employees, and fuming, all in the vicinity o f the moment o f the
beep, it was too difficult for Ryan to remember exactly whether anything else was in his
irmer experience at or near the moment o f the beep.
In Sample 2.5, Ryan was driving and looking for his lost employees still. At the
moment of the beep, Ryan is fuming at his employees, which he experiences as the same
feeling as the feeling in Sample 2.4, a fuming feeling without any clear details that is
extremely intense. Ryan has a sense that there are several other things going on inside at
the moment of the beep, but again because he is driving, looking for his employees, and
fuming, all in the vicinity of the moment o f the beep, it is too difficult for Ryan to
remember the details o f his inner experienee. O f all o f these things going on in the
vicinity o f the moment o f the beep, Ryan thinks the extremely intense fuming feeling
may have destroyed his apprehension of additional details about this irmer experience.
Ryan was fuming intensely at his employees in both the previous samples. He had a
sense that there are several other things going on inside near and possibly at the moment
o f the beep, but in neither case was Ryan able to remember the details o f what else may
have been going on, nor could he exactly tell when the beep may have occurred in
relation to these difficult-to-apprehend and difficult-to-describe other inner experiences.
This diffieulty may have been due to the fact he was engaged in driving and having
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intense fuming experiences that could have overwhelmed the other inner experiences.
Ryan’s other two feelings occurred during the golf tournament. In Tournament Sample
T.8, which will be described later in the Inner Experience During G olf section, Mike was
also fuming, this time at himself about his poor golf performance, but he did apprehend
as simultaneous speaking out loud experience in this instance.
Inner Speech
Ryan was speaking to himself in an inner voice in 4 of 31 or 13% o f his samples.
Three o f Ryan’s four inner speaking experiences occurred during the golf tournament.
One inner speaking. Sample 3.1, occurred during everyday life, but that inner speaking
was experienced as being secondary to a sensory awareness. Thus in none o f Ryan’s 18
daily samples was inner speech the prominent aspect o f his experience.
In Sample 3.1, Ryan experienced a sensory awareness with a secondary, not
confidently apprehended experience o f inner speaking. Ryan was watching a news
program about sex offending and looking at the suit the newsperson is wearing. At the
moment o f the beep, Ryan is noticing the suit the newsperson is wearing. Ryan is
particularly aware o f the plaid pattern of the brown suit, which has thin lines. Ryan also
has a sense of words being present in his own voice, but he cannot describe the exact
words. When asked to describe the exact words, he gave at least three versions o f what he
might have been saying, the last of which was something like “He's worn this suit
before.” Ryan was fairly certain he was saying something internally, but he did not
remember exactly what. Also, Ryan was watching TV but he is paying less attention to
story, so it is doubtful the story is in his inner experience. More attention is devoted
toward the suit and the words that he might have been saying, but we never approached a
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very solid understanding o f his inner speech experience with much certainty about its
precise content. Ryan is sure that he was no longer aware about the content o f the story,
however. Ryan’s other three instance of inner speech occurred during the golf tournament
was will be described in the Inner Experience During Golf section.
Inner Experience During Golf
Ryan played the back nine in the golf eompetition. Ryan collected 13 Tournament
Samples. His most frequently-occurring inner experiences were perceptual awareness
(46%), inner speeeh (23%), sensory awareness (23%), and feeling (15%). Ryan’s
Tournament Samples will be described, followed by his golf-related content. Finally, a
comparison will be made between Ryan’s inner experience in his golf samples and his
daily samples.
Perceptual Awareness
Ryan had instances o f perceptual awareness in 6 o f 13 or 46% o f his Tournament
Samples. Ryan had four instances o f active pereeptual awareness that involved aetively
looking and judging golf shots. In Tournament Sample T.l for instance, Ryan was on the
first hole about 75 yards away from the green. He had just taken a shot, the ball is in the
air, and he knew it was a good shot. The beep goes o ff when the ball is in the air about 20
feet from the hole. At the moment o f the beep, he is watching the ball come down and
knowing it is a good shot. This is an experience of externally seeing the ball in the air and
evaluating and recognizing it is as a good shot, which is a positive experience. This is an
active perceptual experience of watching the ball and knowing it is a good shot. After the
beep, the ball landed within 5 feet o f the hole.
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Tournament Sample T .l was the second sample collected after Ryan’s inner
experience became clearer in Sample 3.6, which was previously-described in the Sensory
Awareness section. It included a clear perceptual awareness inner experience, unlike
many o f the previously-described daily life inner experiences.
Inner Speech
Ryan had instances o f inner speech in 3 o f 13 or 23% of his Tournament Samples. In
Tournament Sample T.9, Ryan experieneed inner speech not-related to golf in content.
Before the moment o f the beep, Ryan was driving the golf cart and looking at the houses
around the golf course, and he was looking at the brownness o f the house, a sensory
awareness experience o f being captivated by the brownness, and he was somehow
thinking about how horrible the house looks. At the moment o f the beep, he is looking at
the landscaping in the back yard o f a particular house and thinking about how horrible it
looks. This occurs to Ryan as saying to him self inside “Look at that piece of shit!”
Ryan’s other two instances o f inner speech had golf-related content. For instance in
Tournament Sample T.3, Ryan was in conversation with another golfer and saying
“bullshit” internally to himself about the unfair point system o f another golf tournament,
and in Tournament Sample G .I2, he was internally saying “H e’s got a long putt,” or
“He’s got to hit this ball,” or something to that effect; he forgot the exact words.
Feeling
Ryan had feelings in 2 o f 13 or 15% of his Tournament Samples. Both o f these were
negative feelings directed at his poor golf performance.
Fuming. In Tournament Sample T.8, Ryan experienced a fuming feeling similar to his
fuming experiences that were previously described in the Feeling section (Samples 2.4
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and 2.5); however this time, Ryan apprehended a co-occurring speaking aloud
experience. In Sample T.8, before the beep, Ryan had hit a tee shot and was frustrated
because he could see his ball out o f bounds. At the moment of the beep, Ryan is fuming
at hitting a bad shot. This is a feeling experience, but Ryan does not know if he is
experiencing this mentally or bodily, he just knows he is fuming. This feeling occurs at
the same time he is speaking out loud. He is saying a series of expletives out loud such as
“you fucking idiot” or “motherfucker” or “how could you hit the ball over there?!” After
the beep, Ryan realized this was actually not his ball, and he became relieved
Sensory A wareness
Both o f Ryan’s sensory awarenesses were non-golf-related distracting experiences. In
Tournament Sample T.4, for instance, Ryan was on the 18th hole after he hit a good shot.
He had been playing terribly and decided not to ride in the golf cart before the moment of
the beep. As he was walking, the waterfall on the 18th hole caught his eye, and he before
the beep he was thinking about walking through the waterfall on this hot day, thinking
about how refreshing it would be, although he did not want to get his socks wet. At the
moment of the beep, Ryan is looking at the waterfall with admiration. He is noticing how
colorful the waterfall stones are and how neat the shape of the flowing water looks as it is
coming down. He is absorbed in the sensory aspects o f the waterfall.
Golf-Related Content
Ryan had golf-related content in 9 o f 13 or 69% of his Tournament Samples.
Examples o f golf-related content include seeing his ball in the air and recognizing it is as
a good shot, actively looking at an opponent’s ball and knowing that it is short (two inner
experiences), watching an opponent’s ball travel and judging it to be too slow, saying an
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expletive to him self internally in reference to an upcoming golf tournament’s unfair point
system in the midst of conversation about golf, fuming at having hit a bad shot while
saying a series o f expletives out loud, looking at his ball and recognizing it to be his,
saying to himself that his opponent has a long shot, and feeling pissed at him self about
his poor golf performance
Comparing Inner Experience During G olf and Daily Life
R yan’s inner experience during golf was clearer than his inner experience during
daily life. The onset of Ryan’s clarity was punctuated by his clear sensory awareness
experience in Sample 3.6, and it continued in sample 3.7; Ryan had no unclear
indeterminate inner experiences during his golf samples whatsoever (0 of 13 or 0%),
whereas during his daily samples he had much more (7 o f 17 or 41%). Thus Ryan’s inner
experience was clearer during golf.
The increase in the clarity o f Ryan’s inner experience may be due to intrinsic or
extrinsic reasons. The intrinsic explanation is that Ryan’s inner experience became
clearer much later and less gradually than for most o f the other study participants. It
could be that Ryan’s inner experience was fundamentally and inherently less clear prior
to Sample 3.6. Ryan’s inner experience cleared up dramatically at or around this point.
This spurt in clarity coincided with his gradually increasing experience with the sampling
method, but unlike his gradually increasing experience, his clarity jumped forward faster.
The disparate increases in his rate of technical prowess and clarity may mean that Ryan’s
inner experience was fundamentally and inherently less clear before Sample 3.6 and more
clear after for intrinsic rather than technical reasons. The extrinsic explanation is that
Ryan’s inner experience became clearer during golf because something about golf made
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his inner experience more clear. This explanation is supported by the observation that all
o f his inner experience during golf was much clearer than most o f his inner experience
during his daily life. This explanation also argues that his Sample 3.6 and Sample 3.7
clarity was, at least in part, a random occurrence. That is, random fluctuations in clarity
may have been occurring, and these samples captured two of them.
We believe that both o f these explanations are probably true; that is, Ryan’s daily life
inner experience was often unclear intrinsically and not for technical reasons, and
something about the extrinsic activity o f golf made his inner experience more
intrinsically clearer.
Discussion
Ryan’s inner experience during his daily life was less clear than most of the other
participants. Ryan specifically emphasized that describing his inner experiences was
difficult because so many things were going on in his inner experience just before,
during, and after the moment o f the beep. Another possibility is that we lacked the ability
to help Ryan get to a more definitive understanding o f his inner experience. Our
understanding is that either Ryan’s inner experiences were often complicated,
overlapping, asynchronous, and therefore difficult to describe especially when it came to
apprehending his inner experience as well as the timing of the moment o f the beep, or we
could not assist Ryan very well, or both; any o f these options may have been the case,
and some may have applied to some samples more than others. We believe it is most
likely that the majority of Ryan’s daily life instances o f unclarity were o f the fundamental
inherent type. This is to say that we believe Ryan’s inner experience prior to Sample 3.6
was often complicated, overlapping, asynchronous, and therefore difficult to describe

238

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

rather than due to any lack o f technical prowess in using the sampling method. One
reason for this is that his clarity came all at once, whereas his technical prowess increased
gradually, in our observation. Furthermore, Ryan approached the sampling task very
conscientiously, so it seemed unlikely that his difficulty describing his inner experience
came about as a result of the technical lack o f effort or inattention to what he was doing.
To the contrary, he often would describe exactly where he was, what he was doing, and
even sometimes what time it was when the beep occurred, but when he looked to describe
his inner experience, nothing but ambiguity and difficulty in described it was often
observed during the many o f the daily life interviews. We also believe that Ryan’s inner
experience during golf may generally be fundamentally and inherently more clear, as it
was when he collected his golf samples.
Whatever the reason(s), Ryan’s inner experience was described with less ease and
clarity, sometimes with respect to the form of his inner experience, on a few occasions
with respect to the content, but mostly with respect to the timing o f the moment o f the
beep. His first clear sensory awareness experience at the end of the third sampling day
marked a turning point in the clarity o f his inner experience that continued throughout the
golf tournament as Ryan became better able to describe the form and content o f his inner
experiences. It remained difficult for him to apprehend and describe his inner experienee
in relation to the moment o f the beep throughout all o f his sampling days, somewhat less
so during golf, however.
Why might Ryan’s inner experience have been so unclear for so many of his daily life
samples, only to become clearer during golf? It seems to us that several possible
explanations could account for this. The first possibility is that the golf situation brings
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out clarity in Ryan’s inner experience. The second is that it just took Ryan longer to do
the task for no apparent reason. The third is that he did have an epiphany, suddenly
“getting” the sampling method and acquiring technical prowess coincidental with golf.
The forth is that Ryan could have been sampling during a problematic time in his daily
life. If this were the case, perhaps his life is stressful, golf is an escape from stress, and
with less stress, his inner experience was clearer.
Ryan’s most salient daily life inner experiences were perceptual awareness, sensory
awareness, feelings, and inner speech. His salient golf inner experiences were the same
four forms of inner experience. The content o f his inner experiences were somewhat less
frequently-related to golf than most o f the other participants in this study. In fact, two of
his inner experiences during golf were distracted sensory awareness experiences. The
main differenee between Ryan’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily
life was the dramatic increase in clarity o f his inner experience during golf.
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CHAPTER 15

AARON
Aaron is a 54 year-old highly-skilled golfer with a handicap o f two. He was reeruited
by one of the researchers through a contact in the community. He completed his first
three sampling days by obtaining samples from his daily life. He collected his 15 daily
life samples in the middle o f the summer. He participated in the golf competition
sampling in the middle of the same summer and eollected 6 golf samples. Aaron shot 71,
1 stroke under par, 3. strokes lower than his handicap o f 2. As a result, Aaron finished in a
tie for 3'^‘*in the golf competition.
Aaron had an unusually difficult time learning to use the beeper. On the first
scheduled sampling day, Aaron tried to collect several samples in the beeper’s “chirp”
mode, most likely because he had failed to press the button that resets the beeper to send
it back into the random sampling mode. The beeper goes into “chirp” mode when a
random beep goes off and the user fails to press the reset button. When the beeper goes
into “chirp” mode, a battery saving feature, it beeps every 10 seconds to remind the
participant/researcher to either reset or turn off the device. Although the task o f resetting
the device was demonstrated during our initial meeting, and he correctly practiced it in
the researcher’s presence, he still had difficulty that affected his beeps collected on the
first day. The beeps collected this first day are considered spoiled because he responded
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to the “chirp” every 10 seconds instead o f the random beep. Aaron was given a different
beeper in case the original one was broken, but after it was tested, it appeared normal.
During the second attempt at sampling for the first day, Aaron called the researcher
with the same difficulty - the beeper had once again gone into “chirp” mode. After
reminding him to press the reset button, Aaron made another attempt at collecting beeps.
He was told to call with any difficulties he might have. After what seemed to Aaron to be
an hour o f waiting for a beep, Aaron called expressing concern that he was not using the
device correctly because he had not yet heard a beep. After being told he to turn off the
beeper and turn it on again, he eventually started collecting beeps and interviewed at the
sampling lab the next day.
During the first successful sampling day, Aaron had a difficult time describing his
inner experience at the moment o f the beep. Inner experiences before and after the
moment o f the beep, as well as his own general ideas about himself, intruded on his
discussion o f what was in his inner experience at the moment o f the beep. It is difficult to
determine whether he had difficulty with the sampling task, both with initially using the
beeper and describing momentary inner experience, and clearly defined inner experience,
or whether he had some sort o f inner experience that made the sampling task difficult
such as unclearly defined inner experience.
Unclear Indeterminate Inner Experiences
Aaron had inner experiences that were so unclear that the form of his inner
experience could not be determined in 6 o f 21 or 29% o f his samples. Even by his third
sampling day, the sampling task had not become easier for him; that is quite different
from most other DES subjects. In Sample 3.1, for instance, Aaron was on the phone with
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his hair dresser to make an appointment. He was in the process o f leaving a message
about his appointment on the answering machine. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron is
having some kind o f inner experience that serves the purpose o f getting ready to make his
appointment. It is not apparent to us, or we think to Aaron, exactly how this is
experienced at the moment o f the beep. Aaron may be anticipating without words or
inner seeing o f the person’s response when they pick up the phone. Aaron may also have
some appointment times in mind at the moment of the beep, but this is also very
ambiguous. It seems that Aaron is anticipating the person’s response in some way, and he
may even have some times in mind somehow (e.g., an inner seeing o f his schedule), or
these may in fact be the same inner experience, but this is a very unclear inner experience
in both form and content. For this reason, beyond the possibility that Aaron is
anticipating a response and/or perhaps having some times in mind, not much can
definitively be said. Aaron was also not very certain about when the beep occurred.
In Sample 3.2, Aaron was reading an article about Muhammad A ll’s daughter, Laila.
At the moment o f the beep Aaron is reading about one o f Laila’s professors, Nate
Bynum, who is helping Laila get into the movies. Aaron is having some kind o f inner
experience related to what he is reading, but it is very difficult for us to ascertain the
characteristics of this experience. Our best understanding is that Aaron’s experience was
unclear to him, resulting in his difficulty in telling it to us. It is possible that he is just
passively reading. It is possible that Aaron is experiencing the words he is reading
somehow internally. Both o f these seem equally possible ways in which Aaron’s inner
experience may have occurred. In addition to this being a very unclear inner experience,
Aaron was also not very confident about when the beep occurred.
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In Sample T.3, Aaron experienced an instance of unclear inner experience with two
instances o f perceptual awarenesses, one of which was clear. He was on his 4''’ stroke of
the 17* hole, a par 5. It is not entirely apparent where the beep occurs in this inner
experience, but just before the beep or perhaps even at the moment o f the beep, Aaron is
setting up to hit the ball, looking at the spot where he will hit it, and thinking about where
to hit it. He is looking externally at the spot where he plans to hit the ball to see the line
from where the ball will go, which he thinks is left to right, although Aaron is not sure
whether left to right is in his awareness or not. This is a clear perceptual awareness with
ambiguity about the moment o f the beep. Also near the moment o f the beep, he is
deciding where and how to hit the ball. This is experienced as an unclear thought process
about a number of factors (e.g., there’s a hill, a backdrop, should he hit it high or low?).
The details of this inner experience and exactly how it occurred are very ambiguous as is
the timing o f the beep. Also at some point as he is mentally preparing to hit the ball, he
sees the “cart girl,” Angie, pull up. It is not apparent when the beep occurred exactly,
whether it was just before or just after the moment o f the beep, but Aaron is seeing and
recognizing Angie driving up the green and getting distracted from golf. Aaron’s
momentary experience contained a clear perceptual awareness experience with ambiguity
about the timing of the beep, an unclear indeterminate thought process, and a perceptual
awareness o f being distracted also with ambiguity about the time o f the beep.
Aaron had several inner experiences in which the form and content were unclear.
These inner experiences also often lacked specific details. In most o f these instances, it
was also difficult for Aaron to identify the timing o f the beep in relation to his inner
experience. He did have fewer unclear indeterminate inner experiences during the golf
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competition. During his daily life samples, 5 o f 15 or 33% o f his inner experiences were
unclear and indeterminate, whereas during golf competition, 1 o f 6 or 17% were unclear
and indeterminate. Aaron also had slightly fewer difficulties identifying the moment of
the beep in relation to his inner experience during the golf competition. Despite the slight
decrease in unclear indeterminate inner experience during golf, several o f his Tournament
Samples still contained unclear inner experiences o f some o f the following forms.
Inner Seeing
Aaron experienced inner seeing in 4 o f 21 or 19% of his samples. In Sample 2.2, for
instance, Aaron was talking to his friend Tom on the phone; Tom had just asked how
Aaron’s other friend John is doing after recovering from a surgery. At the moment of the
beep, Aaron is saying “H e’s doing real well” externally to his friend on the phone. At the
same time, Aaron is internally seeing o f John in the motion o f golfing, seeing a scene that
had taken place a few days earlier. Aaron does not know whether the inner seeing is in
color or black and white and cannot say much about the details o f this inner seeing.
In Sample 3.5, Aaron was climbing his staircase, getting ready for dinner, and he was
half way to the stairs. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron is thinking about the color o f the
shirt he will choose to wear. He is internally seeing o f the edge o f his blue colored shirt
hanging in his closet, and he is noting specifically the blueness o f the shirt. He is not
aware of details beyond the blueness o f the shirt as viewed from its edge. This is a fairly
clear inner seeing that Aaron is experiencing at the moment o f the beep without many
details. Aaron is not having any inner experience related to walking up the stairs. Aaron
was also very confident about when the beep occurred in relation to his inner experience.
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Aaron experienced his clearest inner seeing in his daily life samples when he had a
golf-related inner seeing during a phone conversation in Sample 3.3. Aaron was on the
phone with a friend who was in Boston, where Aaron will be playing golf in the next few
days. His friend had been joking that someone was playing mind games with them by
putting them on a course in a tournament in which they all have to walk up hills in 90
degree heat and hum idity.. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron is internally imagining
himself struggling to climb up a par 4 hill to get to his ball. He sees himself walk as if a
camera is at the ball looking back down the fairway at him. He is seeing himself in
motion walking up the hill, and sees the green grass and trees. This is a clear and detailed
inner seeing experienced at the moment o f the beep. Aaron experienced this as a very
clear and memorable inner experience, one about which he had little or no doubt. At the
moment o f this beep, Aaron may also be somehow anticipating what it will be like to be
at this golf course in a manner that goes beyond inner seeing, such as thinking about it in
a different way or feeling what it may be like to be there, but the details o f this possible
inner experience are so ambiguous that not much about it can be said with certainty; it is
also possible that this may just be part o f the inner seeing at the moment o f the beep, an
additional metaphor to describe it, or an inner experience that occurred after the moment
of the beep. (Incidentally, when Aaron was asked a few weeks later how well this inner
seeing matched how the golf course turned out to be, he said it was scary how close the
course in general and two holes in particular were to this inner seeing.)
Aaron experienced all o f his inner seeing during his daily life; none were captured
during golf performance. His inner seeings varied in detail and clarity, from having
sparse detail and not much clarity to being clear and detailed.
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Speaking Aloud
Aaron was speaking aloud with no other inner experience in 4 of 21 or 19% o f his
samples. In Tournament Sample T .l, Aaron was on his 2"^ stroke of the 11* hole, a par 5.
Aaron was in the process of telling another golfer he is entitled to relief. At the moment
o f the beep, Aaron is saying the word “entitled” out loud. There was nothing else in his
awareness at the moment o f the beep. Aaron is also looking at the other golfer, but he is
paying attention to what he is saying rather than the golfer he is looking at.
In Tournament Sample T.5, Aaron had just finished the 8* hole and was checking out
another player’s score. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron was saying “Samuel, what did
you make?” out loud. Aaron’s awareness of his own score has come and gone before the
moment o f the beep, and at the moment o f the beep his inner experience is only that of
asking the other golfer about his score out loud. There is no other inner experience
present at the moment o f the beep.
Aaron’s two other instances o f speaking aloud occurred along with co-occuring forms
o f inner experience (i.e., inner seeing). Aaron’s speaking aloud inner experiences were
clear inner experiences; the words he was saying at the moment o f the beep were clear in
3 o f 4 o f his speaking aloud experiences.
Just Doing
Aaron had instances o f just doing in 2 of 21 or 10% of his samples. In Sample 2.5, for
instance Aaron was getting ready to go to the store and putting his key in the car door. At
the moment of the beep, Aaron is just in the process o f putting his key in the car to go to
the store with no other inner experience. This is just a process o f putting the key in the
car with no other inner experience at the moment of the beep.
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In Sample 3.6, Aaron was getting ready to leave for dinner and was putting
moisturizer on and seeing himself in the mirror. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron is
looking at his skin for spots o f dryness. This is experienced as a visual process o f
directing him self to where to put the moisturizer, a process that involves no thinking, just
an activity he is doing. It is not exactly apparent to us or we think to Aaron, but it seems
that he was not aware o f what he was looking at; instead, this is an activity he is doing
without a mental or perceptual process. There is no other inner experience present at the
moment o f the beep.
Aaron’s just doing experiences were activities he was doing without thought. One of
his just doing experiences was quite clear, whereas the other was somewhat unclear.
Inner Speech
Aaron experienced inner speech in 2 o f 21 or 10% o f his samples. In Sample 2.6,
Aaron was internally speaking about an item on a grocery list and listening to the radio.
Before the moment o f the beep, Aaron was listening to sports on his car radio while he is
driving to the store. At the moment o f the beep, he is driving his car and reciting
internally about the items on his grocery list. The words may be “ice cream” (or “hot
dogs”) said in his own internal voice. This is a clear instance of inner speech, but he is
unsure about its specific content (e.g., “ice cream,” “hot dogs”). Its general content is
grocery list-related. He is also tracking the sports program on the radio by listening, but
this is much less prominent than what he is saying to himself. Driving is automatic and
not a part o f his itmer experience at the moment o f the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.2, Aaron was on the 6* hole, a par 3; he has addressed the
ball and is lining up to take a putt. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron is saying to himself
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internally, “This is left to right” in his own words. Aaron is quite confident about this.
Also at the moment of the beep, Aaron is seeing the line where he will hit the ball. This is
an experience o f looking externally with focus and perceiving a brown spot on the green.
[Incidentally, this is the approach that Aaron typically takes to putting, finding a spot on
the green between the ball and the hole (spot putting).
Both o f Aaron’s inner speech experiences co-occurred with other forms o f inner
experience (i.e., just listening, perceptual awareness). His inner speech varied in detail
and clarity, from having sparse detail and not much clarity to being clear and detailed.
Inner Experience During Golf
Aaron played the back nine in the golf competition. He collected six Tournament
Samples. His most frequently-occurring inner experiences were speaking aloud (50%),
perceptual awareness (33%), and inner speech (17%) many of which were previously
described. In 5 o f 6 or 83% o f his samples, Aaron is either externally or innerly talking.
Two o f Aaron’s Tournament Samples included mental preparation strategies present
at the moment o f the beep. These strategies will be described first, followed by
descriptions of his external and inner speech and finally his golf-related content.
Mental Preparation Strategies
The beeper captured two mental preparation strategies Aaron was using at the
moment o f the beep, accounting for 33% o f his golf competition samples. Both included
perceptual awareness.
In Tournament Sample T.2, described above in the Inner Speech section, Aaron was
lining up to make a putt saying to himself internally, “This is left to right,” and seeing a
brown spot on the green where he will aim the ball. In Tournament Sample T.3, described
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above in the Unclear Indeterminate Inner Experiences section, Aaron is preparing to hit
the ball and looking externally at the spot where he will hit the ball. Also near the
moment o f the beep, he is thinking about a number o f factors to decide how to hit ball in
some manner, but the details o f this are not clear. Aaron at some point is also seeing and
recognizing Angie driving up the green and getting distracted from golf, a clear
perceptual awareness with ambiguity about the timing of the moment o f the beep.
Both o f Aaron’s mental preparations strategies contained perceptual awareness, but
they differed in Aaron’s apprehension of the moment o f the beep. One was clear, and the
other was unclear with respect to the timing o f the beep.
External Talking and Inner Speech
In 5 o f 6 or 83% o f Aaron’s Tournament Samples, he was either talking out loud with
no other inner experience or experiencing inner speech. For instance Aaron was speaking
aloud, as we saw previously in Tournament Sample T .l, when he was saying the word
“entitled” out loud to inform another golfer he was entitled relief. Also in Tournament
Sample T.5, he was asking Samuel “what did you make?” out loud. Aaron experienced
inner speech in Tournament Sample T.2 (also previously described) when he was
preparing for his put. This occurred by saying to himself internally “this is left to right” in
his own words.
Golf-Related Content
All o f Aaron’s Tournament Samples were inner experiences with golf-related content.
Examples o f golf-related content include talking out loud about golf to another golfer
with no other inner experience, asking another golfing question about golf with no other
inner experience, talking out loud in a quite tone of voice to make a joke to another golfer
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about how his handicap should be lower than he has claimed, talking to himself internally
about the distance o f the hole in his own voice, and the two aforementioned mental
preparation strategies.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
Aaron experienced fewer inner seeings during the golf tournament than during his
daily samples. None o f his golf samples contained inner seeing, whereas during his daily
life, Aaron had inner seeing in 4 o f 15 or 27% o f his samples. Aaron experienced more
perceptual awareness during golf than during his daily life. During golf, Aaron had
perceptual awareness in 2 o f 6 or 33% o f his samples, whereas during his daily life, none
o f his samples contained perceptual awareness. The clarity o f Aaron’s inner experiences
was greater during golf than during daily life. During golf, he had 1 o f 6 or 17% unclear
indeterminate inner experience (and even there it was possible to determine that the form
o f inner experience was inner speech), whereas during his daily life, Aaron had unclear
indeterminate inner experiences in 5 o f 15 or 33% in his samples.
Discussion
Aaron had difficulty learning to use the beeper. After a couple unsuccessful attempts,
he caught on. In the first sampling day, he had difficultly describing his experience at the
moment o f the beep; inner experiences before and after the moment of the beep, as well
as his own general ideas about himself, tended to intrude upon momentary experience.
Aaron also had several unclear indeterminate inner experiences, the form of which
could not be determined due lack o f clarity; these were often unclear in both form and
content and often lacked specific details. It was also often difficult for Aaron to identify
moment o f the beep precisely. Although he did have slightly fewer unclear indeterminate
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inner experiences during the golf competition, several of his Tournament Samples still
contained unclear inner experiences.
Aaron’s lack o f clarity may have been the result of: 1) difficulties with the sampling
method that obscured otherwise clear inner experiences, 2) difficulties with the sampling
and actual unclear inner experiences, or 3) difficulties with the sampling because o f
unclear inner experiences. We think either o f the latter possibilities were most likely the
case, that Aaron had difficulties with the sampling and/or because o f unclear inner
experience. One reason for this is that, despite increased practice with the sampling
method, Aaron still had instances o f unclear indeterminate inner experiences and unclear
inner experiences throughout his daily life and golf samples. So as the method became
apparently easier, the relative lack o f clarity remained.
All of Aaron’s inner seeing occurred during his daily life samples; none were found
during golf. His inner seeings varied in detail and clarity, from sparse detail without
much clarity to being clear and detailed. Aaron’s speaking aloud experiences were
typically clear. His just doing experiences were varied in clarity. Both of Aaron’s inner
speech experiences co-occurred with other forms o f inner experience. His inner speech
varied in both detail and clarity, from having sparse detail without much clarity to being
clear and detailed.
During golf, Aaron’s most frequently-occurring inner experiences were speaking
aloud and perceptual awareness. Both o f the mental preparations strategies Aaron
collected contained perceptual awareness and they varied greatly in clarity. One was
quite clear, and the other was unclear in form, content, and the timing of the beep. Aaron
had several external talking and inner speech experiences during golf as well. All of
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Aaron’s Tournament Samples had golf-related content. Aaron experienced less inner
seeing during golf than during his daily life, more perceptual awareness during golf than
during his daily life, and less unclear indeterminate inner experiences during golf than his
daily life.
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CHAPTER 16

NOMOTHETIC RESULTS & DISCUSSION
This study presents two kinds o f results. The previous section (Chapters 5 through 15)
presented the first kind o f results, idiographic descriptions o f the salient characteristics of
inner experiences within each individual participant, one participant at a time. The
current section (Chapter 16) presents the second kind of results, nomothetic results across
participants taken together, one characteristic o f inner experience at a time. There are
three ways that we will discuss these nomothetic results: (I) across-all-participant
descriptions o f experience during golf; (2) discriminating between during golf and daily
life experience; and (3) discriminating between the two separate skill groups.
Table 1 presents the participants’ most frequent characteristics during golf and daily
life. These results are presented in descending order starting with the most frequentlyoccurring characteristics o f inner experience during golf. Because participants can and
did experience more than one co-occurring inner experience, the percentages of
participants’ characteristics will not add up to 100 percent. To calculate these
percentages, the numerator was the number of samples in which the particular type o f
inner experience occurred, and the denominator was the total number o f samples
collected by the setting in which they were collected. For example, John had 2 samples in
which perceptual awareness occurred during his 12 daily samples, for a 17% frequency.
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TABLE 1; PERCENTAGES OF INNER EXPERIENCE

8
DURING GOLF AND DAILY LIFE
(O '

Category
Golf-Related Content
3.
3
"

CD

Perceptual Awareness

CD

■D
O
Q.

Inner Speech

C

a
o
3
"O

Mental Preparation

o

Unsymbolized Thinking

CD

Inner Seeing

Q.

Feeling
CD

Sensory Awareness

C/)
C/)

Speaking Aloud

"O

No Inner Experience
Category

Setting
Golf
Dailv
G olf
Dailv
Golf
Dailv
G olf
Dailv
Golf
Dailv
Golf
Dailv
G olf
Dailv
G olf
Dailv
Golf
Dailv
Golf
Dailv
Setting

Ca
56
0
44
33
11
13
11
na
11
27
0
0
11
7
22
47
0
0
0
0
Ca

Moderate Handicap Group
Br
Avg
Jo
Sa
Wi
14
67
75
82
89
8
0
9
5
0
42
0
44
0
21
17
10
33
0
25
14
17
64
29
33
10
10
17
7
0
8
0
11
0
6
na
na
na
na
na
14
25
0
0
15
30
9
19
25
7
17
0
0
36
15
20
25
0
27
16
17
0
0
18
13
20
64
24
33
7
8
0
6
0
0
10
9
21
17
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
57
8
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
2
Br
Avg
Jo
Sa
Wi

Mi
90
0
20
0
10
0
20
na
20
50
10
0
0
0
23
0
20
0
0
0
Mi

Low
To
100
0
17
0
0
100
33
na
50
0
33
100
33
0
0
50
0
0
0
0
To

Handicap Group
Ch
Ry
Aa
100
82
69
10
7
6
36
46
33
10
0
11
17
55
23
0
7
6
36
33
0
na
na
na
9
0
0
30
7
6
0
27
0
27
30
6
0
18
15
0
40
11
36
0
23
20
0
17
50
9
8
10
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Ch
Aa
Ry

Avg
85
6
33
6
24
9
22
na
13
13
13
21
15
15
15
11
15
6
0
0
Avg

Jo=John, Br=Brad, Ca=Caleb, Sa=Samuel, Wi=Will; To=Tom, Ch=Chris, Mi=Mike, Ry=Ryan, Aa=Aaron.
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All
Avg
76
5
27
17
27
9
14
na
14
16
14
18
14
20
11
16
7
3
4
1
Avg
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TABLE 1; PERCENTAGES OF INNER EXPERIENCE

8
DURING GOLF AND DAILY LIFE (CONTINUED)

ci'
Category
Unclear Indeterminate
a3

"

CD

Unclear

CD

■D
O
Q.

Inner Hearing

C

a
O
3
"O
O

Multiple Awareness

CD

Inner Spoken Expletives

Q.

Thought/Feeling

Number of samples
■CDD
C/)
C/)

Handicap
Net Golf Score
Tournament Rank
Category

Setting
G olf
Dailv
G olf
Dailv
G olf
Dailv
Golf
Dailv
G olf
Dailv
G olf
Dailv
Golf
Dailv
-

-

-

Setting

Ca
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
7
11
7
0
0
12
12
16
-3
3.5
Ca

Moderate Handieap Group
Wi
Br
Sa
Jo
Avg
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
3
0
0
18
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
14
0
4
9
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
4
8
0
20
0
5
0
22
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
9
11
48
7
9
11
10
15
63
15
18
26
17.6
13
15
0
+2
8
+ 1.0
-2
6
7
9
5
Wi
Br
Sa
Avg
Jo
-

Mi
20
50
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
2
7
-5
1
Mi

Low Handicap Group
Ry
To
Aa
Ch
0
0
0
0
11
0
33
0
0
0
0
17
22
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
7
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11
6
10
13
15
10
2
18
4
2
2
6
+12
-4
+4
-3
10
2
8
3.5
Ry
To
Aa
Ch

Avg
4
15
2
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
46
47
4.2
+0.8

All
Avg
2
8
4
0
3
2
1
1
2
3
2
0
94
110
10.9
+0.9

-

-

Avg

Avg

Jo=John, Br=Brad, Ca=Caleb, Sa=SamueI, Wi=WilI; To=Tom, Ch=Chris, Mi=Mike, Ry=Ryan, Aa=Aaron.
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Table 1 contains an exhaustive list of all categories o f inner experience captured during
the golf tournament to display all inner experiences that occurred. For comparison, the
frequencies of these same categories are also presented during daily life. The nomothetic
descriptions that follow focus on a shorter list o f the most salient nomothetic
characteristics experienced by our study participants with an emphasis on inner
experience the during golf tournament.
All 10 o f our participants sampled during golf competition and during daily life, a
heterogeneous set o f daily activités including work and leisure. Thus the simplest and
most useful way of characterizing participants’ activities for nomothetic analysis
considers golf samples and daily life samples separately. It should be noted that three o f
our 10 participants, Tom, Mike, and Chris, played golf during their daily life samples.
We call this recreational golf to distinguish it from the tournament golf samples. Tom
engaged in recreational golf in 10 of 12 or 83% o f his daily samples, Mike did so in 4 of
6 or 66% o f his daily samples, and Chris did so in 4 o f 14 or 29% o f his daily samples.
Because only these three participants engaged in recreational golf during some o f their
daily life samples, and because recreational golf was a hybrid activity (similar to the
tournament golf but also similar to the daily life activities), these recreational golf
samples were excluded from the analysis o f nomothetic results. This left a total o f 2, 2,
and 10 daily life samples for Tom, Mike, and Chris, respectively (see Table 1). The other
seven participants did not engage in recreational golf.
It should also be noted that this study was an exploratory qualitative study with a
small number o f participants in each group, making tests o f statistical significance futile.
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Thus observations from this study such this are worth mentioning as potentially
interesting, potentially preliminary trends that might be examined by future research.
Golf-Related Content
The most salient characteristic o f our participant group as a whole during was golfrelated content. Golf-related content included thoughts/awarenesses about the golf course
and its conditions, the characteristics of the hole they were on (e.g., tee box, grass, green,
hole), other groups golfers on the course (e.g., if they are out o f range to begin addressing
a shot), the characteristics o f their own or others’ golf equipment (e.g., clubs, ball, tee,
bag), the characteristics of their own or others’ performance (e.g., swing, result o f a shot),
and mental preparation strategies (e.g., internal planning ahead for performance).
Across all participants. The most salient characteristic of our participant group as a
whole was golf-related content. There were 71 instances of golf-related content out of 94
total samples during the tournament (76%). All o f our study participants had inner
experiences related to golf in content during the golf tournament (see Table 1). In fact,
this was the only salient characteristic that all o f our participants experienced during the
golf tournament. Golf-related content was salient both across our study participants and
between the two participant groups as well.
Across our participants, the overall average frequency o f golf-related content during
the tournament was 76%, the highest frequency o f all categories. Thus golf-related
content was present in most o f our participants’ tournament samples most o f the time.
The exception to this was Brad, who experienced golf-related content in only 1 o f 7 or
14% o f his tournament samples. This was at least in part because 4 of 6 or 67% o f his
non-golf-content tournament samples were instances o f no inner experience at the
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moment of the beep. With the exception o f Brad’s anomalous relative lack o f golf-related
content, the remaining participants’ golf-related content ranged in frequency from a low
of 56% in the case o f Caleb to a high o f 100% in the cases o f both Tom and Aaron.
Between g o lf and daily life. Not surprisingly, our participants experienced more golfrelated content during golf than daily life. There were 71 instances of golf-related content
out o f 94 total samples during the tournament (76%) but only 6 instances o f golf-related
content out o f 110 total samples during daily life (5%).
More instances o f golf-related content were found when our participants were golfing
than when they were not. Thus the content of our participants was very consistent the
behavior of our participants, with the exception o f Brad’s anomalous lack o f golf-related
content and no inner experience during golf. This is consistent with findings o f Hurlburt,
Koch, and Heavey (2002) that demonstrated the connection between observable behavior
and inner experience. Their study found that participants with high rates of external
speech had significantly less inner speech than a normal comparison group. The present
study shows that golfers experience more golf-related content when they are golfing than
when they are not.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. Between our two participant skill
groups, the lower handicap group had a slightly higher mean frequency of golf-related
content (85% o f the tournament samples) than did the moderate handicap group mean of
67%. The moderate handicap group mean was skewed by Brad’s anomalous relative lack
o f golf-related content, but dropping his result from consideration, the golf-related
frequency from the remaining four participants becomes 76%, still slightly lower than the
low handicap group.
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Low handicapper Ryan had the lowest frequency o f golf-related content in the low
handicap group. He experienced golf-related content in 69% o f his samples compared
with his group’s mean o f 85%. He also performed very poorly on tournament day,
shooting 12 points above his handicap and finishing last in the golf tournament. His golf
tournament gross score o f 88 is comparable to the average gross score o f the moderate
handicap group of 91, and he experienced a similar frequency of golf-related content. The
first, second, and third placed performers, Mike, Tom, and Aaron, had high frequencies
o f golf-related content at 82%, 100%, and 100%, respectively. Also, three o f Ryan’s
tournament samples were experienced as being distracted. These included being absorbed
in the sensory aspects of a waterfall on the course, being absorbed in the blueness of
another golfer’s shirt, and looking at a shady spot under a tree on the golf course. Ryan
was well aware of being distracted during the golf tournament and said he thought this
was why he performed poorly during our golf tournament in particular and during his
other past poor performances in general. We cannot be certain whether there was a
relationship between Ryan’s distracted inner experiences and his performance in
particular or in general beyond our observation that he was distracted on a day that he did
not shoot well; however, the aforementioned observations may point toward a positive
relationship between golf-related content and the quality o f golf performance.
A qualitative difference in the inner experience of golf-related content was observed
between our two participant skill groups. The golf-related content o f our low handicap
participants tended to be more elaborate and sophisticated than that o f the moderate
handicap participants. For instance, the low handicap participants had more mental
preparation strategies and more detailed golf-related content experiences than did the
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moderate handicap participants. As an example, low handicapper M ike’s golf-related
content included three mental preparation strategies. In Tournament Sample T.4, for
instance, Mike was mentally preparing him self for his next shot by saying a phrase aloud
to himself to maintain a nice and slow tempo as part o f his conscious experience. Also in
Tournament Sample T.IO, Mike was mentally preparing for his next shot. In this sample,
he was planning where to hit the ball by actively looking down the fairway. In contrast,
moderate handicapper Samuel had golf-related content experiences that included looking
actively or passively at golf-related stimuli such as the characteristics o f his own and
opponent’s golf equipment. In Tournament Sample T.4, for instance, Samuel was
concentrating on the ball by actively watching it move to note its trajectory. In
Tournament Sample T .l, however, Samuel was passively looking at the ball with
attention to the ball itself and without attention to anything else.
Summary and Discussion. All o f our study participants, with the exception o f Brad,
thought, felt, and otherwise had frequent experiences about golf during the golf
tournament. Golf-related content was the most salient characteristic o f our participant
group as a whole during golf. All o f the study participants had inner experiences related
to golf during the golf tournament. Our participants experienced golf-related content
about the golf course and its conditions, the characteristics o f the hole they were on, other
groups o f golfers on the course, the characteristics o f their own and their opponents’ golf
equipment, their own performance and their opponents’ performances, and mental
preparation strategies. Golf-related content was the only salient characteristic that all o f
our participants experienced during golf.
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Between golf and daily life, the content o f our participants was very consistent with
the behavior o f our participants, with the exception o f Brad’s anomalous lack of golfrelated content and no inner experience during golf. The congruence between inner
content and behavior is consistent with findings o f Hurlburt, Koch, and Heavey (2002)
that demonstrated the connection between observable behavior and inner experience. In
the field o f sport psychology, interventions that enhance performance recommend
athletes direct the specific content o f their inner experiences toward the performance task
(Suinn, 1996; Suinn, 1997). Our findings suggest that golfers can direct their awareness
toward golf content frequently.
Between the participant groups, a slightly different frequency o f golf-related content
between the groups was observed that bears further study. Low handicappers had slightly
more golf-related content and more elaborate and sophisticated golf-related content, such
as mental preparation strategies, compared to the moderate handicap participants.
Mental Preparation Strategies
Mental preparation strategies (a subset o f golf content) are inner experiences with
future-oriented golf-related content that serves the purpose o f preparing for a golf
performance task. There were 13 instances o f mental preparation out o f 94 total samples
during the tournament (14%). Mental preparation strategies were experienced by seven o f
our ten study participants including four o f the five low handicap participants and three o f
the five moderate handicap participants. Mental preparation strategies were a salient
characteristic across our study participants and between the participant groups as well.
Across all participants. Mental preparation strategies were experienced across our
study participants during the golf tournament. Low-handicappers Mike, Tom, Aaron, and
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Chris as well as moderate-handicappers Caleb, John, and Samuel ail experienced mental
preparation strategies during the golf tournament. The mental preparation strategies used
by all o f these study participants were typically very clear and differentiated golf-related
inner experiences that obviously served the purpose o f preparing for a subsequent golfrelated task such as hitting the next shot. The most common mental preparation strategy
occurred during preparation for putting, when three o f our participants experienced
perceptual awareness by externally looking to find a line along which to make their putt.
This mental preparation strategy, which Tom called “spot-putting,” was found in 3 o f 13
or 23% of the mental preparation strategies across the study participants. The remaining
mental preparation strategies were idiosyncratically experienced and contained perceptual
awareness, inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness,
feeling, and speaking aloud. The most common form of inner experience that occurred
during mental preparation strategies was perceptual awareness, which occurred in 7 o f 13
or 54% o f mental preparation samples. For comparison, the mean frequency o f perceptual
awareness during golf across all study participants was only about half o f this at 27%.
Mental preparation strategies occurred before upcoming shots in a variety o f settings;
they were experienced while sitting in the cart before a tee shot, standing on the course
before a tee shot, walking up to address a tee shot, standing on the fairway, walking on
the fairway, and while lining up to make a putt after having addressed the ball.
Between go lf and daily life. Because our participants were engaged in a
heterogeneous variety o f mostly non-golf-related tasks during their daily life samples,
because the main purpose of the current study was to examine inner experience during
golf performance, and because mental preparation strategies are defined as being sport-
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specific, we did not analyze daily life samples for the presence o f mental preparation
strategies. Thus Table 1 shows “na” for not available during daily life samples. This is
not to say that our participants did not have inner experiences related to what they were
doing at the moment o f the beep during daily life, such as Caleb’s Sample 3.4 when he
was experiencing sensory awareness and more prominent perceptual awareness for the
purpose o f making a chicken salad sandwich, but rather task-related mental preparation
strategies during daily life samples were not considered relevant because they were not
sport-specific, such as making a chicken salad sandwich.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. Both across and between the participant
groups, mental preparation strategies were experienced fairly idiosyncratically aside from
the most common mental preparation content, spot-putting, and the most common form,
perceptual awareness. There were no apparent qualitative differences in the way mental
preparation strategies were experienced across or between the participant groups.
Although mental preparation strategies were experienced by both participant groups,
three low handicappers experienced two mental preparation strategies, and one
experienced four, whereas the moderate handicappers experienced at most one mental
preparation strategy. The low handicap group mean frequency for mental preparation
strategies was 22%, compared with the moderate handicap group mean frequency o f 6%.
There were more than three times as many mental preparation strategies in the lowhandicap group (10) than the moderate-handicap group (3). The low handicappers who
used these strategies never displayed less than two; moderate handicappers never
displayed more than one mental preparation strategy. In the low handicap group, Tom,
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Aaron, and Mike each experienced two mental preparation strategies that were captured
during the golf tournament. Chris experienced four mental preparation strategies.
Two samples illustrate low handicap participants’ mental preparation strategies
during golf. Mike was speaking aloud the words “nice and slow tempo” to slow his
rhythm down for the next shot (Sample T.4), and Tom was preparing him self to execute a
putt by externally and visually scarming a line from the hole back toward his ball (Sample
T.2). In the moderate handicap group, John, Caleb, and Samuel each experienced one
mental preparation strategy that was captured during the golf tournament. These
participants, respectively, experienced mental preparation strategies that included innerly
and kinesthetically seeing his body position at the top o f a backswing, deciding in
unsymbolized thinking whether to make a safer or more risky shot, and trying to visualize
the path the ball will take to the hole by externally looking along a curving line (see
Samples T .l 1, T.9, and T.2, respectively).
A relationship between mental preparation strategies and golf performance was also
observed. The best three performers in the low handicap group in terms of both their
gross and net scores each experienced two mental preparation strategies during the golf
tournament. The best two performers in the moderate handicap group, again using both
raw score and rank, each experienced one mental preparation strategy during the golf
tournament. The worst performers in each o f the two skill groups. Will and Ryan, had no
mental preparation strategies during the golf tournament. This suggests a possible
positive relationship between mental preparation strategies and quality o f golf
performance may exist; however, because neither 1) an a priori reliable operational
definition for mental preparation strategies was specified, nor 2) an a priori prediction
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regarding the relationship between mental preparation strategies and golf performance
was specified, it was beyond the scope o f this study to examine the mental preparation
strategies statistically. Future research using DES may examine this relationship if these
conditions are met and these conditions can be properly bracketed as potential
presuppositions to avoid becoming demand characteristics.
Summary and Discussion. Mental preparation strategies were experienced by seven of
ten of our study participants and were a salient characteristic both across our study
participants and between the participant groups. These mental preparation strategies were
typically very clear and differentiated golf-related inner experiences that prepared the
participants for subsequent shots. Spot-putting was the most common mental preparation
strategy during golf in 3 o f 13 or 23% o f samples, and perceptual awareness was the most
common form found in 7 o f 13 or 54% o f the mental preparation strategies across the
study participants; however, a variety o f other forms o f inner experience including inner
speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, feeling, and speaking
aloud were also involved. Most o f the mental preparation strategies were
idiosyncratically experienced and occurred in a variety o f settings including putting,
driving, on the fairway, and in the golf cart. The preliminary signs o f a possible positive
relationship between mental preparation strategies and the quality o f golf performance
were evident, but establishing this relationship more definitively was beyond the scope of
the current study.
The possible positive relationship between mental preparation strategies and quality
of golf performance we observed is very consistent with findings in the sport psychology
literature. For instance, Thomas and Over (1994) surveyed 165 men (aged 20-74 yrs)
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with golf handicaps ranging from 5 to 27 and found that golfers with lower handicaps
reported greater mental preparation than did those with higher handicaps. McCaffrey and
Orlick (1989) individually interviewed 14 top professional golfers and 9 golf course
teaching professionals and found mental preparation was one o f the common factors
described as being important for quality golf performance. Similar findings have been
reported with interventions that teach mental preparation pre-shot routines and show
improved performance (Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990). Cohn (1990) reviewed the
efficacy of cognitive-behavioral performance preparation interventions and stated that
“research on such strategies shows that athletes can learn to develop consistent, highly
systematic preparatory routines and also that routines benefit performance, but the
findings of the effects o f routines on performance have been erratic” (p. 306). Cohn
attributes this to time frames being too far removed to determine whether improvements
were the result o f interventions or physical practice (or both).
Consistent with past methodological suggestions for improving knowledge about the
nature o f inner experience during performance (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989; Flardy et al,
1996; Meyers et al, 1996), and to overcome problems o f retrospective self-report as
discussed by Cohn (1990) and others (Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1989; Ptacek, Smith,
Espe, & Rafferty, 1994; Raglin & Hanin, 2000), the current study explored momentary
inner experience during sport performance in a naturalistic context. To date, this is the
first study to directly access and describe the actual golf-related mental preparation
strategies used during golf performance itself, and this was done in a naturalistic setting
during a golf tournament rather than retrospectively via self-report questionnaire or
interview.

267

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Perceptual Awareness
Perceptual awareness is a process o f focusing on objects o f the environment for their
objective or instrumental qualities, often for the purpose of a task. The two categories we
have discussed above (golf-related and preparation strategies) are characteristics o f the
content o f experience. By contrast, perceptual awareness is characteristic o f the form of
inner experience. Perceptual awareness is a form o f inner experience that is often visual,
as the seeing o f an object as part o f conscious experience for its objective, instrumental
qualities. Perceptual awareness was coded only when it was unambiguously one o f the
most prominent inner experiences present at the moment of the beep to distinguish it
from instances in which a participant’s eyes may have been open at the moment of the
beep and they later remembered what they saw.
Perceptual awareness was the second most frequent salient characteristic o f inner
experience during the golf tournament (golf-related content was the most frequent), and it
was a salient characteristic o f inner experience across our study participants. There were
25 instances o f perceptual awareness out o f 94 total samples during the tournament
(27%).
Across all participants. Perceptual awareness was a salient nomothetic characteristic
across our study participants. Across our study participants, 8 o f 10 or 80% experienced
perceptual awareness during golf (see Table 1), and 7 o f these 8 or 88% had more than
one instance o f perceptual awareness during golf. It was also the most frequent form, as
opposed to content, o f inner experience for four participants during golf. Perceptual
awareness was typically golf-related and was involved in 7 o f 13 or 54% of the mental
preparation strategies collected during the golf tournament.
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Qualitatively, the experience o f perceptual awareness among our study participants
was idiosyncratic. This was particularly noticeable as our participants’ amount o f focus
on visual stimuli in their conscious experience varied. Some perceptual awareness
experiences were passive, idle looking experiences in the midst o f doing a task. These
experiences had less focus, but visual stimuli were still unambiguously experienced
consciously. Other perceptual awarenesses were active and focused goal-directed looking
experiences. These experiences had more focus on visual stimuli, and were also
unambiguously experienced consciously. Still others were not unambiguously passive or
active experiences. Because the definitional borders o f these experiences are less solid
than with other forms o f inner experience, it is difficult to arrive at an exact number for
how many times each o f these two different types of perceptual awareness occurred. For
the same reason, it is difficult to know if perceptual awareness has dichotomous
activeness-passiveness poles, whether activeness-passiveness is more continuous,
whether it manifests itself in other qualitative ways, or whether activeness-passiveness
may generalize to other groups o f participants.
Thus perceptual awareness was a salient inner experience that was typically golfrelated and involved in most o f the mental preparation strategies. It that was
idiosyncratically experienced and varied in the activeness and passiveness o f visual
focus.
Between g o lf and daily life. Perceptual awareness was somewhat more frequent
during golf than during daily life across our participants, present in 25 o f 94 or 27% of
tournament samples and on 19 o f 110 or 17% o f daily life samples. Perceptual awareness
was more frequent in 6 of 10 or 60% o f our participants during golf than during daily life.
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Only one of our participants experienced a lower frequency o f perceptual awareness
during golf performance and three experienced a similar amount o f perceptual awareness
during golf and daily samples.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. The difference between perceptual
awareness during golf and daily life was larger for the low handicap group, 33%
compared to 6%, than the same difference for the moderate handicap group, 21%
compared to 25%. Three moderate handicappers experienced more frequent perceptual
awareness during golf than daily life, whereas all five low handicappers experienced this
difference. W ill’s anomalous lack of perceptual awareness during golf brought down the
average moderate handicap frequency during golf and daily life. We think skill group
difference in perceptual awareness during golf and daily life may be an interesting
rudimentary quantitative observation and possibly a preliminary, tentative trend.
Summary and Discussion. During the golf tournament, our participants’ perceptual
awareness experiences were typically clear external visual experiences during which
visual stimuli were part o f their conscious experience. Perceptual awareness was the
second most frequent salient characteristic and the most frequent form o f inner
experience our participants experienced during the golf tournament. Perceptual awareness
was experienced idiosyncratically by our study participants. Some perceptual awareness
experiences were passive, idly looking experiences in the midst o f doing a task. Others
were active and focused goal-directed looking experiences. Still others were not
unambiguously passive or active inner experiences. Most of our participants had a higher
frequency o f perceptual awareness during their golf than during their daily life samples,
although individual differences were present. Most of their perceptual awareness was
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related to golf in content. As discussed in the previous mental preparation subsection of
this chapter, perceptual awareness was often involved in mental preparation strategies
during our participants’ golf samples. The difference between perceptual awareness
during golf and daily life was larger for the low handicap group.
Perceptual Awareness versus No Inner Experience
Perceptual awareness is a form of inner experience that, in the current study, we
observed occurring visually. To better explain the borders of perceptual awareness, we
will digress from salient nomothetic characteristics for a moment to consider no inner
experience, a salient idiographic characteristic for Brad. Once examined, instances o f no
inner experience will be compared to the nomothetically-salient phenomenon of
perceptual awareness.
Because our participants’ eyes were open, we presume, during most o f their samples
and they could remember objects in their visual field did not necessarily mean our
participants were experiencing perceptual awareness. In fact, one o f our participants had
instances o f no inner experience at the moment o f the beep but remembered objects in the
visual field being present. Brad had four instances o f no inner experience present at the
moment of the beep during golf. Instances o f no inner experience will be described to
better distinguish between perceptual awareness o f visual objects in conscious experience
versus objects being available in the visual field but unambiguously not in one’s
awareness.
Perceptual awareness does not simply occur whenever objects are present in the
visual field. Brad’s instances o f no inner experience during golf despite objects being
present in the visual field demonstrate this. In Tournament Sample T.2, for instance. Brad
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was on the 5th stroke of the 5th hole, and he was standing on one side o f the green with
the beeper in his pocket. At the moment o f the beep, he was looking across the green, his
eyes aimed at fellow golfer John standing on the far side of the green; however, neither
John nor the green itself were in his awareness; in fact, nothing seemed to be in his
awareness at the moment of the beep. Brad does not think he ever would have been aware
o f what he was looking at if not for the beep. In this sample. Brad unambiguously had no
inner experience present at the moment o f the beep but remembered what his eyes were
aimed at most likely because o f the beep. In Tournament Sample T.5, Brad had no inner
experience with a sense of even less awareness. Brad was sitting in the cart having just
finished the 10th hole. At the moment o f the beep. Brad’s eyes were aimed at the beeper
and there was nothing in his awareness. This experience was similar to the other
instances of no inner experience just described, but this time there seems to be even less
awareness. He knows his eyes were open, but he somehow has even less awareness. Brad
had another instance o f no inner experience that was closest to the threshold o f an
experience in conscious awareness in Tournament Sample T .l. In this sample. Brad was
on the third hole and had just pulled his cart up to the tee box. He was turning the volume
dial of the beeper when the beeper went off. At the moment of the beep. Brad’s eyes are
aimed at the dial, and he is turning the dial of the beeper with his finger. He has no visual
awareness o f looking at the dial and no tactile awareness o f feeling the dial as he turns it.
Brad thinks this experience is akin to driving with no awareness. Nothing is present in his
inner experience at the moment of the beep, but o f Brad’s instances o f no inner
experience, he thinks this experience is the closest to his visual awareness threshold.
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To summarize, Brad’s instances o f no inner experience varied on how close to his
threshold of visual awareness, but they were unambiguous instances o f no inner
experience despite the presence o f visual stimuli present that were remembered after the
beep. Thus objects were available to our participants visually and through their other
senses throughout their golf and daily life experiences. Our observations show that these
objects were not always part of their inner experience at the moment o f the beep. In the
case o f perceptual awareness, clear visual awareness was evident. At the other extreme.
Brad’s instance of no inner experience show that it is possible to have no visual
awareness, or any experience, at the moment o f the beep.
Summary and Discussion. Perceptual awareness is a process o f focusing on objects of
the environment for their objective or instrumental qualities, often for the purpose o f a
task. As a category o f inner experience, perceptual awareness does not simply occur
when objects are present in the visual field; in fact Brad’s instances o f no irmer
experience during golf despite objects being visually present demonstrates this as do
instances o f other forms of inner experience during golf without perceptual awareness.
Brad’s instances o f no inner experience also varied in how close they were to his
threshold of having visual objects in his inner experience, illustrating Monson and
Hurlburt’s (1993) conceptualization o f the imprecise, vague, yet continuous borders o f
inner experience. Thus Brad and other participants were presented with visual stimuli
during golf and daily life, yet the presence or absence o f perceptual awareness was
demarcated by the presence or absence o f prominently-experienced visual stimuli at the
moment of the beep, respectively.
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Perceptual awareness was the most frequent form of inner experience during golf
performance observed by the current study. Because perceptual awareness is a relatively
novel phenomenon to the study of inner experience during golf performance, this
phenomenon has not been precisely observed and described by the field of sport
psychology. The notion that it is necessary to focus attention externally during
performance, which is similar to perceptual awareness, has been described in theory by
Nideffer (1986); in practice by Rotella (1995) who said “when great players are playing
well, [they] simply [pick] out a target, envision the kind of shot..., and hit it” (p. 44); and
in research such as that o f Poolton, Maxwell, Masters, and Raab (2006). Poolton and
colleagues recently found that attentional focus has an influence on learning to putt.
Groups learned to putt under different conditions either 1) being instrueted to focus on
the movement of the putter (external focus) or 2) on their hands (internal focus). The
external group’s performance remained robust, whereas the internal group’s performance
dropped significantly. It is important to note that exactly how attention was to be focused
on one’s hands was not specified in precise phenomenological terms, nor was any direct
exploration of how inner experience occurred after instructions conducted, which is quite
common in sport psychology studies. Was attention to be focused by using perceptual
awareness, sensory awareness, inner speech, or some other means? Questions such as this
may best be answered by momentary explorations o f inner experience such as the current
study.
Despite the notion that attentional focus is important in golf, precisely how attention
is focused during golf has been relatively unknown until now. The current study
demonstrates that perceptual awareness is one o f the ways that attention is focused on
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performance during golf. As the most frequent category of inner experience during golf
performance, perceptual awareness appeared to play an important role in golf
performance. It is important to note, however, that perceptual awareness is a much more
specific form of inner experience than the attention construct that is described in the sport
psychology literature. Attention is merely one o f the components o f perceptual awareness
(and other forms o f inner experience). DES demonstrates more precisely one of the ways
that attention can be focused, in the case o f perceptual awareness, as a process of
focusing attention on objects o f the environment for their objective or instrumental
qualities, often for the purpose of a task.
Inner Speech
Inner speech is the experience o f speaking words in one’s own voice without the
external sound actually being produced. The experience is typically very similar to how
one might speak aloud. There were 25 instances o f inner speech out of 94 total samples
during the tournament (27%). Inner speech was a salient characteristic across our
participants during golf, and it was also a salient characteristic between golf and daily life
settings.
Across all participants. Inner speech was a salient nomothetic characteristic during
golf performance across our study participants. Nine o f our ten study participants
experienced at least one instance of inner speech during the golf tournament. During golf
the qualitative experience o f inner speech across participants was typically self-directed
and typically contained golf-related content (76%). Samuel experienced inner speech as
self-directed, self-berating, inner spoken expletives twice (see Samples T.5 and T.8).
John experienced inner speech during golf by telling himself to smoke a cigar to regulate
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his emotions. Will experienced inner speech during golf by telling himself he had “too
much adrenalin” (see Sample T.3). Inner speech was involved in 3 o f 13 or 23% of the
mental preparation strategies collected during the golf tournament (see Chris’ Samples
T.IO and T.3 and Aaron’s Sample T.2). Thus inner speech was typically golf-related in
content, and it involved mental preparation for golf, emotion regulation, reactions to golf
performance including analysis o f personal technique and performance as well as inner
spoken expletives, statements about the golf course conditions, and statements about golf
equipment.
Between go lf and daily life. Inner speech was a salient characteristic that was more
frequent during golf than during daily life. Inner speech occurred at three times the rate
during the golf tournament (27%) as during daily life (9%).
There were noticeable individual differences in inner speech frequencies between golf
and daily life. Five of our participants experienced a higher frequency o f irmer speech
during golf performance than they did during daily life. In contrast, three o f our
participants experienced a similar frequency of inner speech during the golf tournament
than during daily life. Tom experienced a lower frequency o f irmer speech during the golf
tournament than during daily life.
Despite individual differences, inner speech was a salient nomothetic characteristic
that was more frequent during golf than during daily life. Thus inner speech appears to
play a role in golf performance.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. The difference between inner speech
during golf and daily life was similar for the low handicap group, 29% compared to 10%,
as the comparable difference for the moderate handicap group, 24% compared to 9%.
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Two moderate handicappers experienced much more frequent inner speech during golf
than daily life, whereas all two low handicappers experienced this same difference. Thus
it appeared there was no skill group difference in inner speech during golf and daily life.
Summary and Discussion. Inner speech was a salient nomothetic characteristic across
participants especially during golf and also during daily life. The settings in which it
occurred most frequently were individually different, but nine o f our participants
experienced inner speech during golf. When it was experienced during golf, inner speech
was typically self-directed, related to golf in content, and it also was involved in 3 of 13
or 23% o f the mental preparation strategies collected during the golf tournament. It was
also involved in emotion regulation, reactions to golf performance, and statements about
the golf course conditions and golf equipment. Inner speech was more frequent during
golf than daily life for five o f our participants.
The phenomenon we call inner speech is referred to by the sport psychology literature
as self-talk. In the previous review o f the sport psychology literature, it was observed that
this term has been defined broadly and narrowly, but from our perspective and that of
others (e.g.. Hardy et al., 1996), it has also been defined quite imprecisely. In fact, selftalk has been used to describe statements said aloud (Van Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, &
Petipas, 1994), said internally (Williams et al., 1993), and even statements delivered by
others such as coaches that athletes may somehow process internally (Gould, et al., 1989;
Weinberg & Jackson, 1990).
The narrow definition o f self-talk, as talking to oneself in one’s own voice without
external sound being produced, is similar to our definition of inner speech. A broader
definition used in the sport psychology literature could include both inner speech and
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what we have called speaking aloud, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The
overall mean frequency of inner speech during the golf tournament was 27%, and as we
will see, the overall mean frequency o f speaking aloud during the golf tournament was
7%. Inner speech appeared to play a role in golf performance because it was involved in
3 of 13 or 23% o f the mental preparation strategies observed in this study and more
frequent during golf than daily life, so it is not surprising that it has been given a
considerable amount o f attention in the sport psychology literature, particularly with selftalk interventions.
Our results suggest, however, that the pervasiveness of self-talk during sport
performance has been overstated by at least some researchers, perhaps by the influence of
“the widely held prejudice that all thinking is in words” (Hurlburt, 1997, p. 947). This
prejudice is exemplified by Williams and Leffingwell (2002) who said, “broadly defined,
self-talk occurs whenever an individual thinks, whether that individual is making
statements internally or externally” (p. 81; see also Williams & Leffingwell, 1996) as
well as Bunker and Williams (1980), who stated, “anytime you think about something,
you are in a sense talking to yourself’ (p. 236; see also Bunker, Williams, & Zinsser,
1993). However, our results indicate that that is decidedly not true: in 77% o f our golf
tournament samples, self talk as inner speech was unambiguously not occurring.
This study therefore strongly supports Hardy and colleagues’ (1996) call for better
specification o f “precisely what constitutes self-talk” (p. 37) because “past researchers
have been too ‘loose’ in their operationalization o f self-talk” (p. 37-38). This suggests
that the phenomena o f inner speech and speaking aloud are not very well understood. We
propose that the difference between what we call irmer speech and speaking aloud might
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prove to be useful as could any attempt to reduce the prejudice that all thinking occurs in
words, which is unambiguously incorrect. Our results suggest that some inner experience
occurs in inner speech, and as we will shortly see, possibly less occurs by speaking aloud.
We believe that the imprecise observation and specification o f inner experience during
sport performance is not restricted to self-talk. Our results illustrate the need for better
observation and specification o f the actual phenomena o f inner experience during sport
performance in general as well.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking is the experience of a mental event without the experience of
words, inner seeings, or any other symbol o f inner experience. There were 13 instances of
unsymbolized thinking out o f 94 total samples during the tournament (14%).
Across all participants. Unsymbolized thinking was a salient characteristic across our
study participants. Unsymbolized thinking was present in 31 of 204 or 15% o f the total
combined golf and daily life samples collected. Unsymbolized thinking was also a salient
characteristic for six o f our participants including Caleb, John, Brad, Mike, Tom, and
Chris.
G olf and Daily Life. Unsymbolized thinking was a salient characteristic across our
study participants in both golf and daily life. Across both our participant groups
combined, unsymbolized thinking was present similarly in both golf (14%) and daily life
(16%) samples. The frequency o f unsymbolized thinking did not differ by golf and daily
life sampling settings in a consistent manner. G olf and daily life frequencies were highly
individually different. Five o f our participants had similar amounts o f unsymbolized
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thinking during golf and daily life, four had less during golf than daily life, and one had
more during golf than daily life.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. The frequency of unsymbolized
thinking was similar in both the low and moderate handicap groups. During golf, the low
handicappers experienced unsymbolized thinking in 6 of 46 or 13% o f their tournament
samples compared to the moderate handicappers’ 7 o f 48 or 15%. During daily life, the
low handicappers experienced unsymbolized thinking in 6 o f 47 or 13% of their samples
compared to the moderate handicappers’ 12 o f 63 or 19%.
Summary and Discussion. Unsymbolized thinking was a salient characteristic across
our study participants in both golf and daily life. The frequency of unsymbolized thinking
was similar in both of these settings, by both participant groups, in quantitatively and
qualitatively similar ways.
Within the existing sport psychology literature, no known discussion regarding the
presence o f or the possible function o f unsymbolized thinking or anything very similar
was found. We observed the presence o f unsymbolized thinking during golf performance.
The presence o f phenomena such as perceptual awareness and unsymbolized thinking
during golf performance suggests that inner experience during golf performance, and
perhaps performance during other sports, may consist of a broader range o f inner
experiences than what has been described by the sport psychology literature.
Inner Seeing (aka Images)
Inner seeing is seeing something internally that is known not to necessarily be
externally present. There were 13 instances o f inner seeing out o f 94 total samples during
the tournament (14%).
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Across all participants. Seven o f our ten participants experienced inner seeing at
some point during the study. Inner seeing was a characteristic across our study
participants in both golf and daily life. Five of our ten participants experienced inner
seeing during golf, and six experienced inner seeing during daily life. O f the five that
experienced it during golf, inner seeing was a salient idiographic characteristic for all o f
these participants except one. Inner seeing was involved in 4 o f 13 or 31% of the mental
preparation strategies experienced during our participants’ golf samples.
Between g o lf and daily life. Inner seeing was a characteristic across our study
participants in both golf and daily life. Across both our participant groups combined,
inner seeing was present similarly in both golf (14%) and daily life (18%) samples. The
frequency o f inner seeing did not differ by golf and daily life sampling settings in a
consistent manner. Golf and daily life frequencies were highly individually variable. Six
o f our participants had similar amounts o f inner seeing during golf and daily life, and four
had less during golf than daily life.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. In the low handicap group, a similar
mean frequency o f inner seeing was observed in the low handicap group during golf
performance (13%) and during daily life (21%). In the moderate handicap group, a
similar mean frequency o f inner seeing was observed during golf performance (13%) and
daily life (16%). Among the low handicap participants, three experienced inner seeing
during golf. Among the moderate handicap participants, two experienced inner seeing
during golf. Thus a similar frequency was observed between the groups, and a similar
number o f participants from each group experienced inner seeing during golf.
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Summary and Discussion. Inner seeing was a salient characteristic across our study
participants. It was similar in frequency in both golf and daily life. Inner seeing was
similar in frequency in both groups during golf and daily life. Inner seeing played a role
in mental preparation strategies. It was involved in 4 of 13 or 31% of the mental
preparation strategies experienced during golf.
The phenomenon we call inner seeing is referred to by the sport psychology literature
as imagery. In the previous review o f the sport psychology literature, it was noted that
imagery is one of the most studied internal processes in sport psychology and the most
frequently used mental rehearsal strategy (Meyers et al., 1996). Much like inner speech, it
has been both broadly and narrowly defined. It has been broadly defined as using all of
the human senses to re-create or create an experience in the mind (Vealey & Greenleaf,
2001) and has been perhaps more narrowly defined as “symbolic sensory experiences that
may occur in any sensory mode” (Hardy et al., 1996, p. 28). Our definition o f inner
seeing as seeing something internally that is known not to necessarily be externally
present is closer to the narrow definition. Imagery use by athletes has been reported to be
as high as 99% retrospectively (Orlick & Partington, 1988). In this, the first study to
directly observe inner seeing directly during performance, the observed frequency o f
inner speech was noticeable but much more modest than this. Inner seeing was not
occurring in 86% of our collected golf samples. Like inner speech, inner seeing was
definitely noticeable during golf performance, but its importance in relation to golf
performance, or at least its prevalence, may be somewhat overstated by the sport
psychology literature. It was involved in about one third of the mental preparation
strategies observed, however, so it may have a role in mental preparation.
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Feeling
A feeling is an emotional experience that includes such experiences as anger, guilt,
sadness, and so on. There were 13 instances of feeling experiences out o f 94 total
samples during the tournament (14%).
Across all participants. Across our participants during golf, feelings were typically
golf-related and typically negative. Eight o f 11 feelings or 73% were negative-golfrelated during golf. There did not, however, seem to be a meaningful relationship
between overall golf performance and negative-golf-related feelings. Tom had feelings in
2 o f 6 or 33% o f his golf samples including a confident feeling that he was winning and
but also a feeling o f disappointment at losing to the other team. Thus Tom had mixed
feelings and played well. Chris had only positive feelings during golf and played poorly.
Ryan had only negative feelings and played poorly, and both Mike and Aaron had no
feelings during golf and played well.
Between go lf and daily life. Feelings were salient during both golf and daily life.
Feelings were equally frequent during golf and daily life for the low handicap group.
Feelings were less frequent during golf than during daily life for the moderate handicap
group. In the low handicap group, a similar mean frequency of feeling was observed in
the low handicap group during golf performance (15%) than during daily life (15%). In
the moderate handicap group, a lower frequency o f feeling was observed during golf
performance (13%) and daily life (24%).
Five participants, four of whom were in the moderate handicap group, had less
frequent feelings during golf than daily life. One o f these participants. Will, experienced
less frequent but more negative feelings during golf than daily life, but his feelings were
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salient during both golf and daily life. For example during daily life, Will experienced
feelings o f happiness and amusement, bodily energized satisfaction, intense mental
satisfaction, overall bodily contentment, and mental excited confident optimism. During
golf. Will experienced mental frustration felt in his head and the feeling of the too much
adrenalin and energy throughout his whole body and head. Will finished ninth in the golf
tournament.
Like Will, Chris experienced less frequent feelings during golf than daily life;
however, unlike Will, Chris had two positive feelings during golf that included a bodily
feeling o f well being and confidence and an overall feeling o f relief and relaxation. Like
Will again, however, Chris finished poorly at eighth place in the golf tournament. Similar
in performance to both Will and Chris, our last place finisher, Ryan, had two negative
feelings during golf performance. These included a fuming feeling at what he thought
was his bad shot (which turned out not to be) and a pissed feeling at himself about his
poor performance. Our first and second place finishers, Mike and Aaron, had no feelings
during golf. Thus feelings did not appear to be related to performance, and individual
differences in the frequency and experience o f feelings were evident.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. In the low handicap group, the mean
frequency o f feeling during golf performance was 15%. In the moderate handicap group,
the mean frequency of feeling during golf performance was 24%. Among the low
handicap participants, two experienced feelings during golf. Among the moderate
handicap participants, all five experienced feelings during golf. Thus less frequent feeling
was observed in the low handicap group than the moderate handicap group during golf.
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and fewer participants in the low handicap group experienced feelings than the moderate
handicap group during golf.
Summary’ and Discussion. Across our participants during golf, feelings were typically
golf-related and typically negative. Feelings were salient during both golf and daily life.
Feelings were equally frequent during golf and daily life for the low handicap group but
less frequent during golf than during daily life for the moderate handicap group. Feelings
did not appear to be related to performance, and individual differences in the frequency
and experience o f feelings were evident.
As previously noted in the sport psychology literature review, the majority o f sport
psychology research on emotion has been directed at the relationship among anxiety,
arousal and performance, although stress and coping research has grown considerably in
the last decade (Giacobbi et ah, 2004). Will appeared to be over-aroused when he
experienced a feeling of too much adrenalin and energy throughout his whole body and
head, but other than that, the feelings we found were heterogeneous and individually
different (e.g., frustration, satisfaction, confidence, fuming). Much less attention has been
devoted in the sport psychology literature to the feelings we found in the current study,
which were most frequently negative during golf and somewhat less prevalent during golf
than daily life. One exception to this was Ruiz and Hanin’s (2004) indirect evidence that
idiosyncratic and context-specific feelings such as happiness, pride, relief, anger, anxiety,
fright, sadness, and shame may be involved in sport performance.
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness is a bodily (e.g., hotness, coldness, itchiness) or external (e.g.,
brightness, shininess, blueness) sensory experience that is, in and of itself, a major theme
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of an inner experience. There were 10 instances o f sensory awareness out o f 94 total
samples during the tournament (14%).
Across all participants. Sensory awareness was a salient characteristic across our
study participants in daily life. Sensory awareness occurred at least once in nine o f our
ten participants’ daily samples. Across our participants, sensory awareness was a salient
characteristic for five of our participants during daily life, a similar number of
participants from the moderate (N = 2) and low (N = 3) handicap groups. There were 18
instances o f sensory awareness out o f 110 total samples during daily life (16%).
Between g o lf and daily life; Between low and moderate handicap groups. Within our
low handicap group, sensory awareness occurred about equally in golf (11%) and daily
life (16%). Within our moderate handicap group, sensory awareness occurred at a low
frequency during golf (6%) but much higher during daily life (21%). Sensory awareness
during golf was often not related to golf in content and did not seem to play an important
role in golf performance.
Sensory awareness was salient for two of the low handicap group participants during
golf performance, Chris and Ryan, and one o f the moderate handicap participants, Caleb.
These and all other participants’ sensory awarenesses were characterized by a lack of
golf-related content in during golf. In 7 o f 9 or 78% o f the tournament samples, our
participants experienced sensory awareness that was not related to golf in content.
Instead, the content o f these experiences consisted of internal and external not golfrelated sensory awareness. Instances of internal sensory awarenesses included Caleb’s
sensation of weakness from the heat, Chris’ sensation o f a painful twinge in his wrist and
later a throbbing sensation in his wrist, and M ike’s sensing the hotness o f the weather.
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Two of the three instances o f external sensory awareness were experienced by Ryan as
distracted experiences. One of these was Tournament Sample T.4, when he was looking
at the waterfall with admiration and noticing how colorful the waterfall stones are and
how neat the shape of the flowing water looks as it is coming down after playing terribly.
The other occurred during Tournament Sample T.6 when Ryan was absorbed in the
blueness of M ike’s shirt as Mike was playing. Sensory awareness also occurred during
none of our participants mental preparation strategies during the golf tournament.
Because sensory awareness was typically not related to golf in content and was not
involved in mental preparation strategies during the golf tournament, sensory awareness
did not seem to play an important role in golf performance for our participants. For Ryan,
our last place finisher, external sensory awareness seemed to take his attention away from
golf performance.
Summary and Discussion. The phenomenon we call sensory awareness has not been
described specifically or extensively in the sport psychology literature, but like perceptual
awareness and unsymbolized thinking, the current study observed and described it as a
salient nomothetic characteristic during golf performance. It could be argued that arousal
and anxiety, if experienced as momentary bodily inner experience would be sensory
awareness; however, the specific phenomenon we have observed and described in this
and other past DES studies (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002) as sensory awareness has been
largely neglected by the field of sport psychology.
Speaking Aloud
Speaking aloud is the act of producing external speech. There were 7 instances o f
speaking aloud out of 94 total samples during the tournament (7%).
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Across all participants. Speaking aloud was not a salient characteristic across all
participants because it was only experienced by the low handicap group participants.
Between g o lf and daily life. Speaking aloud was a salient characteristic for the low
handicap group during golf but not during daily life. Four of the five low handicappers
experienced speaking aloud during golf, but only two experienced speaking aloud during
daily life. For the low handicap group, speaking aloud was more frequent during golf
(15%) than daily life (6%) samples.
Most o f this golf and daily life frequency difference was accounted for by Mike,
Ryan, and Aaron. Just before the tournament, it came to our attention that these three
participants all happened to know one another. They were, at various points throughout
the tournament, talking to each other about golf. In fact all o f the seven instances of
speaking aloud during golf were golf-related in content, whereas none o f the three
instances o f speaking aloud during daily were golf-related in content. More discussion o f
this will follow.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. Speaking aloud was a salient
characteristic that was different between the two study groups during golf. None o f the
moderate handicap group participants experienced speaking aloud during golf or daily
life.
Mike, Aaron, Chris, and Ryan were the low handicap group participants that
experienced speaking aloud during golf performance. All instances of speaking aloud
were golf-related in content. Mike, Aaron, and Ryan were all participants that knew one
another and competed in the same group o f four participants, and all experienced more
instances o f speaking aloud during golf than daily life. Speaking aloud was particularly
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salient for Mike and Aaron. Mike experienced speaking aloud as part o f his mental
preparation during Tournament Sample T.4 when he was saying “Nine and slow tempo”
out loud. He also experienced speaking aloud in Tournament Sample T.9 when he was
saying “Damn, I hit it in the left trap” to one o f the other golfers. Aaron experienced
speaking aloud in half of his tournament samples. In all three o f these instances, he was
speaking aloud to other golfers rather than himself as Mike was once. Aaron specifically
commented on how much talking to one another occurred during the golf tournament.
Aaron pointed to the friendly yet competitive camaraderie among these three participants.
Because 4 o f 7 or 57% of the speaking aloud instances across these participants were
speaking aloud to other golfers among this group o f three, we speculate that these
speaking aloud instances could be explained by the friendly-competitive camaraderie
among these three participants. The remaining 3 o f 7 or 43% instances o f speaking aloud
were phrases said to the participant themselves.
Summary and Discussion. As noted in the previous discussion o f inner speech in this
chapter, the phenomenon we call speaking aloud falls under the broad definition o f self
talk in the eyes o f many sport psychology researchers as statements said aloud (Van
Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, & Petipas, 1994). Although we advocate a narrower and more
specific definition distinguishing inner speech from speaking aloud and other forms and
contents o f inner experience that emerge from direct observations of momentary inner
experience, speaking aloud has been observed and described, albeit retrospectively, by
other researchers under the broad definition o f self-talk.

289

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Individual Differences
To this point, this chapter has shown several nomothetic similarities and differences
in inner experience during golf performance and daily life across participants and
between participant groups. Another important aspect o f inner experience that has also
been briefly described throughout this chapter, particularly in the feeling subsection, but
deserves independent attention is the idiosyncratic nature of inner experience. As Table 1
illustrates, of the 16 categories o f inner experience during golf and daily life, only 1
category was experienced by all 10 o f our study participants - golf-related content. Golfrelated content is an extremely broad category; in fact, considering mental preparation
strategies, a more specific content category, we notice that 7 participants experienced this
category whereas 3 did not. In fact further attention to the categories o f inner experience
during golf and daily life demonstrates that for 15 o f the 16 categories or 94%, at least
one and typically more participant(s) did not experience any of each o f the 15 categories
either during golf or daily life and sometimes both (see zeros). This illustrates that,
although patterns were found among the inner experience o f our study participants, the
range of inner experiences observed in this study were actually quite individually
different. Thus the idiosyncratic nature o f inner experience is also evident.
Nomothetic Results Summary
The current study sought to explore inner experience during golf performance to
address the very basic question, what is inner experience during golf performance? Our
results suggest that inner experience during golf performance may consist o f golf-related
content and mental preparation strategies as well as perceptual awareness and inner
speech most prominently. Second to this, unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness.
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feeling, and speaking aloud may also be involved. In addition, it was apparent that,
although these categories o f inner experience were observed to be nomothetically salient,
inner experience during golf performance as well as daily life was found to be quite
individually different.
The current study allowed us to explore the differences between golf and daily life
inner experiences. Across our study participants, perceptual awareness and inner speech
were more salient during golf than daily life. Feelings were slightly less salient during
golf than daily life. Between our participant groups, inner seeing was less salient during
golf than daily life for the low handicap group but equally salient for the moderate
handicap group in golf and daily life. Sensory awareness was less salient during golf than
daily life for the moderate handicap group but equally salient for the low handicap group
in golf and daily life. These differences show that inner experience may vary during
different activities such as golf and daily life. In addition, inner experience may vary
between different golf skill groups during different activities.
The current study also allowed us to address another very basic question, that is, what
is the relationship between inner experience and the quality o f golf performance? Our
results suggest that the salient characteristics that showed greatest possible signs of
between-group differences during golf performance were golf-related content and mental
preparation strategies. This raises the question for future study about whether golf-related
content, particularly mental preparation strategies, are positively-related to quality o f golf
performance. Future studies may further examine the role of perceptual awareness and
inner speech in golf performance.
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Discussion
Somehow or another I knew you guys were going to ask me ‘Exactly what were you
thinking about?’ And that’s kind o f a strange thing because, unless I would have had that
beep, I probably couldn’t tell y o u .... I would have never ever ever been able to tell you
what I was thinking about.
-Mike

Sport performance is widely believed to depend on inner phenomena that occur
during performance. Empirical investigations in sport performance have generally
avoided the direct and immediate assessment of inner phenomena in favor of casual and
indirect retrospective report measures. The reliance on retrospective self-reports obtained
long after performance may be problematic because to compete and simultaneously to
recall internal processes is a demanding combination. In this regard, much of the
knowledge o f irmer experience during sport has been generated on the nineteenth hole, so
to speak.
By contrast, this study directly and promptly assessed the inner phenomena of 10
experienced golfers during golf performance using DES. As the previous eleven chapters
have shown, collaborating with an athlete and prompting him or her to directly assess
inner experience in a timely fashion during golf performance generates rich, detailed, and
faithful accounts o f inner experience. As M ike’s unsolicited statement above attests,
directly sampling inner experience between the first and eighteenth holes captures
phenomena that would likely be highly degraded if not completely lost forever.
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The main findings o f the current study suggest inner experience during golf
performance consists o f golf-related content, mental preparation strategies, perceptual
awareness, and inner speech as well as unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness,
feeling, and speaking aloud; and it was apparent that inner experience during golf
performance as well as daily life was quite individually different. The current study
assets, limitations, and potential future directions will now be discussed.
Study Assets
As our toumament-winner Mike’s statement at the beginning of this chapter attests,
teaching athletes directly to observe and describe inner experience and subsequently
prompting them to do so during performance generates rich, detailed, faithful, useful, and
probably more accurate accounts o f inner experience that are less susceptible to the
memory problems associated with retrospective self-report. We cannot help but wonder
what it is that Mike would be doing if he were asked to recall his inner experience during
golf performance retrospectively. Even with carefully-worded, non-leading questions,
what would he say? How would he recall? Most importantly, how accurate would his
accounting be? Now consider what he would likely say if we asked questions that
presumed the prejudice that all thinking occurs in words such as “what were you saying
to yourself during golf?” or questions that presumed that imagery is all-important in golf
such as “what were you imagining during golf?” Would he not be lead to tell us what he
was saying and seeing whether or not he was saying or seeing anything at all? The
leading nature o f these questions would be difficult for him to resist. Perhaps he would,
but how often and for how long? And even if he would, would other research
participants?
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DES provides high fidelity descriptions o f the phenomena o f inner experience. It is a
method o f directly assessing inner experience that encourages active collaboration with
its participants to obtain faithful accounts o f untainted inner experience in naturalistic
settings. When the goal is obtaining reports that are faithful to the actual phenomena o f
inner experience in sport, this study suggests that DES can be used during sport
performance to generate descriptions that illuminate the actual phenomena o f inner
experience.
The strengths o f the method and the current study are its portability, its ability to
capture inner experience in naturalistic settings, and the ability to observe and describe
inner experiential phenomena accurately and faithfully. It also provides high fidelity
descriptions that richly illustrate the processes of inner experience both idiographically
and nomothetically. As discussed by Hurlburt and Akter (2006), DES collects randomlyselected, time-specific, manifest, ongoing, contemporaneous, personal inner experiences.
Randomly-selected moments ensure that inner experiences are most representative o f the
person’s actual inner experiences, and it also helps DES researchers better bracket
presuppositions. Time specificity allows the participant-researcher collaborative team to
examine actual specific slices o f time grounded in the actual inner experiences present at
the moment o f the beep as opposed to generalities that may be speculated about with
respect to the participant. Thus time specificity leads to inner experiential specificity, and
after enough samples and enough participants, better specificity about inner experiences,
in this case better accounts o f inner experience during golf performance. DES also
examines manifest, directly-observable phenomena rather than unconscious processes,
making the method able to capture obviously-apparent momentary inner experience more

294

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

clearly. By capturing ongoing inner experiences, DES seeks to reduce the reactivity of
the method by focusing away from the participants reaction to the beep that may occur
after the beep in favor o f the momentary inner experience present in the sliver o f time
was define as “the moment of the beep.” This of course further enhances time and
personal inner experiential specificity. The strength o f collecting contemporaneous
reports enables DES to overcome many of the pitfalls of retrospective self-report such as
memory problems. Finally, the personal nature o f samples obtained by DES in this and
other DES studies allow us to capture phenomena as they are actually experienced by our
participants rather than abstracting about personal inner phenomena. Thus the samples we
obtained best illustrate the actual experienced momentary phenomena o f our 10
participants during naturalistic golf and daily life settings. (See Hurlburt & Akter, 2006.)
Study Limitations
Because o f the intensive, iterative nature o f successively zeroing in on the details of
inner experience in the expositional interviews, it is essential that a priori presuppositions
are bracketed (Hurlburt, 1990; Hurlburt, 1993; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt,
Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) to prevent leading the participants to provide skewed
descriptions o f their inner experience. One o f the practical consequences o f this is having
few, and in some cases, no hypotheses regarding the results o f a DES study. DES follows
a bottom-up approach to generating knowledge about inner experience. It begins with
moment-by-moment, person-by-person idiographic descriptions o f inner experience.
With increasing numbers o f participants, descriptions o f inner experience may lead to
nomothetic trends, which may in turn generate general knowledge about the inner
experiential tendencies o f groups of individuals. Using the DES method, making
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predictions is appropriate when predictions are induced by the observations of
exploratory DES studies such as the current one. Thus predictions are more appropriate in
secondary DES studies or replications, and in these studies, these predictions are
bracketed as much as possible.
Because this is the first DES study to examine inner experience during golf
performance, we had no predictions regarding what we would find. One o f the limitations
of the current study is that we could not appropriately conduct quantitative analyses to
compare inner experiences between the two study groups without having made a priori
predictions. Hurlburt and Akhter (2007) suggest that “those who describe phenomena
[be] firewalled away from those who theorize about the significance of those
phenomena.” Although the current study observed and described idiographically and
nomothetically salient phenomena during golf performance, the practical significance of
these phenomena have still to be determined. Thus the current study is limited as basic
research; however, future studies may better determine the practical significance o f these
and/or other new phenomena still undiscovered.
In a study such as this that observes inner experience and behavior, it would be
tempting to view the mere co-occurrences of various inner experience and behaviors and
infer causation. This was not the purpose o f this study. A myriad o f other variables could
account for the co-occurrences that were found in this study. We did not randomly select
participants, did not randomly assign them to experimental condition, and had less
control over study conditions than a controlled experiment would. Thus one of the other
limitations of this study is that we cannot infer causation. Instead our tasks were to
demonstrate that DES can be used to explore and describe inner experience during golf
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performance, to identity potentially interesting phenomena, and to point out noticeable
patterns among phenomena, if any.
Despite not being able to infer causation, this study demonstrates that DES can be
used to explore and describe inner experience during golf performance. Nomothetic
results indicate that inner experience during golf performance may consist o f golf-related
content and mental preparation strategies as well as perceptual awareness and inner
speech most prominently. Second to this, unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness,
feeling, and speaking aloud may also be involved. In addition, it was apparent that,
although these categories o f inner experience were observed with some degree of
observed consistency, inner experience during golf performance as well as daily life was
found to be quite individually different.
There were 16 categories of inner experience identified among the current study
participant samples during golf. There are undoubtedly more ways o f having inner
experience during performance as well. Predictions would also have been inappropriate
because, without an empirical basis, that is, one based on previous DES observations, we
would have no appropriate way o f knowing which o f 16 or more categories o f inner
experience would be important in formulating predictions. With the limited number of
participants in our study, the ability to test our predictions would have also been limited.
Also, with 16 or more categories o f inner experience, our Type I error would have also
been high. More importantly, predictions may have led us away from new or different
manifestations o f inner experience, such as perceptual awareness, golf-related content, or
mental preparation strategies. Thus sensible reasons exist for having had no predictions in
this, the first study to examine inner experience during sport performance. The
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unfortunate byproduct of this is that we cannot with much definitiveness make statements
about what it takes to be successful in golf.
Another limitation of the current study is its uncontrolled nature. This study explored
inner experience during golf and daily life, but participants collected their samples in a
variety of heterogeneous settings during daily life and during a variety o f settings on the
golf course including in the golf cart, standing on the fairway, getting ready to drive the
ball, getting ready to putt the ball, talking to other golfers, watching other golfers, and so
on. Although inner experience was related to behavior in the case of golf-related content
being higher during golf than daily life, consistent with Hurlburt and colleagues (2002),
the uncontrolled nature of these settings may have limited our knowledge about the
precise nature of golf-related behavior and inner experiences during golf performance.
Another limitation o f the current study is the limited generalizability o f its findings.
This is the first DES study o f inner experience during sport performance. As such,
whether our findings generalize to other golfers in other situations has yet to be
examined. For instance, even though all DES studies since 1990 have found
unsymbolized thinking in their participants’ samples Hurlburt states that “it must be
acknowledged that all DES studies have been performed by Hurlburt and his colleagues,
so as yet there may be some limitations on the generalizability o f their conclusions”
(Hurlburt & Akhter, 2007).
As basic research the current study is limited in its scope and by its inability to make
predictions that could be analyzed appropriately by quantitative statistics. As an
exploratory study it also limited by its uncontrolled nature, its generalizability, and its
inability to better determine the practical significance o f the phenomena it uncovered
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during golf performance. What it does suggest at least tentatively is that golf-related
content, mental preparation strategies, perceptual awareness, and inner speech as well as
unsymoblized thinking, inner seeing, sensory awareness, feeling, and speaking aloud
were involved in inner experience during golf performance.
Future Directions
As a result o f the findings o f this study, future DES studies have more solid
grounding to test predictions about inner experiential phenomena. One set o f predictions
that may be examined by future DES studies could be whether inner experiential
phenomena are related to the quality of golf performance. We feel that golf-related
content, mental preparation strategies, perceptual awareness, and inner speech are worth
examining because these were the most salient characteristics during golf performance,
although others should certainly be tested as well. O f these phenomena, mental
preparation strategies seemed to show some signs of possibly being positively related to
quality o f performance; however, before moving forward too quickly we must consider
that this was only one study with a limited number o f participants. Thus it would be most
appropriate to replicate this study using DES while both bracketing presuppositions in
general and bracketing presuppositions specific to any predictions that are made. Future
DES studies may examine inner experience during golf performance under more
controlled conditions, controlling for factors such as the type o f task a golfer is
conducting, and using more participants as well. After this, future DES studies may also
study different performance tasks, extending research to other sports.
It is our position that DES studies, and perhaps those o f other similar methods with
similar techniques and goals, will best enhance the depth, breadth, and quality of
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knowledge about inner experience during sport performance. We believe sport
performance knowledge will most likely be advanced from the bottom-up, that is first
idiographically, moment-by-moment, participant-by-participant, and second
nomothetically, at the level o f study-by-study. If more convenient correlates o f inner
experience are eventually found, more convenient research could be conducted on the
same phenomena o f inner experience examined in this study with larger groups of
participants, exponentially increasing knowledge about the relationship between inner
experience and sport performance, the subject matter o f sport psychology. In this
endeavor, DES may play an essential role.
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